This article shows the situation in depth about the independence of the Ba Maw government and compromise from the Japanese army, through the issue of transferring the enemy’s property to the Ba Maw government. The literature indicates that the Ba Maw government acted autonomously and did not try to avoid a head-on collision with Japan. Such a relationship between the local regimes and the Japanese army is a focal issue for the historical assessment of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, there is no established theory regarding how much importance can be attached to the relationship. This article aims to examine the strategy of transferring the enemy’s property in Burma by utilizing historical documents collected in Japan and Burma.
The first section will review the events related to the transferal of the enemy’s property before Burma gained “independence” in August 1943. In “Biruma Dokuritsu Shido Yoko（緬甸独立指導要綱）（The Guideline of Burmese Independence）” that was established at the Liaison Conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial General Headquarters, it was decided to transfer items other than those that were special and important after the “independence,” implying that Japan would not transfer oil fields, mines, and railways. However, Ba Maw disagreed with the decision and succeeded in establishing the format that oil fields and mines would once be transferred. Also around this time, transferring forest income to the government of Ba Maw became permitted.
The second section will examine how the enemy’s property was transferred after the “independence,” and how Ba Maw tried to actualize it. In “Tekisan Shori Yoryo（敵産処理要領）（The Main Point of the Enemy’s Property）” that was completed in October 1943 by the Burma Area Army, it was decided that in addition to oil fields and mines, railways would also be transferred. However, when the transfer was executed in March 1944, the transfer for railway was postponed. In response to this, Ba Maw proposed that railways, mines, and factories should be jointly operated by Japan and Burma, leading to the agreement that the Burma side would possess 60% of the share. In addition, Ba Maw also announced the general rule to lay a tax on Japanese in Burma, and succeeded to continuously make the Japanese army pay above the actual cost for the forest management.
In this way, this article suggests that Ba Maw persistently continued the effort to recover Burma’s rights and interests. Japan was unable to constrain it and had to compromise every time.
