鎌倉中期における日宋貿易の展開と幕府

抄録

Within the reexamination of the pioneering work done by Mori Katsumi on foreign trade between Japan and the Song Dynasty, Mori's research on the Kamakura Period has yet to be sufficiently investigated. Mori argued that the Song trade developed during the first half of the 13th century under the Kamakura Bakufu's version of laissez-faire policy, then during the second half under Bakufu attempts to monopolize foreign trade. In response, the author of this article points out that there is no empirical basis to support any Bakufu pursuit of monopoly and thus sets out to clarify the process by which the Song trade developed through identifying the factors determining the Bakufu's attitude towards and influence on foreign trade during the middle years of its regime. During the early 13th century, the enterprising activities of Japanese monks traveling to Song China became linked with the interests of powerful political interests and maritime merchants, leading to a foreign trade establishment led by influential figures within the inner circle at the Imperial Court in Kyoto. Meanwhile, very little trace of involvement by the Bakufu in Kamakura can be found, suggesting little interest towards foreign trade on the part of the warrior regime. Therefore, during the time in question, the development of trade was the result of proactive efforts on the part of influential players in the Capital region, rather than any alleged laissez-faire policy on the part of the Bakufu. It was only after the 13th century was three-quarters over that the Bakufu increased its presence in the world of foreign trade, due to 1) the maturation of Kamakura as an urban center and 2) changes in religious policy in the wake of the coup d'etat of 1246 and the establishment of the Hojo Family Regency the following year. That is to say, the Bakufu began promoting the ascendancy of the Zen temples of Kamakura. Part of this Zen development plan involved the wholesale incorporation of the culture and material life of Southern Song Buddhism, which brought the Bakufu into contact with Japanese monks having experience in China. Consequently, maritime merchants in pursuit of the best trade conditions possible connected themselves to the Bakufu through the network established by these monks, thus constituting one factor in the Bakufu's heightened influence upon foreign trade. However, the style with which the Bakufu chose to be involved was along an extrapolation of the existing trade structure based on an alliance of court personages, maritime merchants and monks interacting with China. The author concludes that instead of focusing on a midKamakura period foreign trade development scenario driven by akufu policy shifting between the two poles of laissez-faire and state monopoly control, it is necessary to paint a larger picture composed of a variety of interests promoted by a myriad of actors, including not only the Hojo-led Bakufu, but also the aristocracy in the Capital region, Japanese monks training in China, the world of Southern Song Buddhism, and the purveyors of maritime commerce.