平家領の形成と領有構造

抄録

The research to date on the formation process of the Taira Family's (Heike) rise to power has emphasized both rapprochements and opposition between Taira-no-Kiyomori and retired Emperor Goshirakawa-In. However, the factors determining the political choices made by Kiyomori cannot be thoroughly explained by such a dichotomy in relation to Goshirakawa-In. In this paper, the author argues the need to reexamine Kiyomori's political choices and the rise of the Heike to power from the perspective of the Family's territory and the nature of its proprietorship over it, based on recent research being done on the political history of the shoen 荘園 estate system. The author begins with the formation process of the Heike's Tomoda-no-Sho 鞆田荘 estate and concludes that 1) Heike control was realized by confirming the estates boundaries through negotiations and adjustments on the central political scene and 2) both Kiyomori and Taira-no-Tadamori were able to expand those boundaries within the process of establishing their own political positions. In other words, rather than marking any new development in the system of local land proprietorship, the formation of Tomoda-no-Sho owed more to the political process at the time. Next, the author turns to Ota-no-Sho 大田荘 and Yatabe-Gun 八部郡, which are considered the Heike's most typical proprietary estates, and argues that they, too, were formed through the same kind of negotiations and adjustments at the political center as with Tomoda-no-Sho, concluding that the structure of all Heike land ownership was greatly influenced by the political process. Then, in order to put the relationship between politics and proprietorship in more concrete terms, the author examines the problem of inheritance of the property held by the Heike as imperial regents (sekkanke 摂関家), which was the direct cause of the coup d'etat of 1179, concluding that through his involvement in the unrest, Goshirakawa-In was able to visualize the possibilities for his own intervention in all of the Heike's property, making him conscious of the danger Kiyomori actually posed and motivating him to begin taking steps to dismantle the institution of the retired emperor's household. From the above conclusions, the author argues that the political choices made by Kiyomori could not have been limited by any power struggle with Goshirakawa-In, but were rather determined by the proprietary structure of the territory controlled by the Taira Family. Based on this argument, the author attempts to reexamine the Heike's rise to power from the perspective of that proprietary structure, indicating first that the Heike established its military institutions within the framework of policing operations necessary to protect the shoen estate system. Secondly, he shows that although the Heike's territory was based mainly on negotiations and adjustments conducted at the political center, the actual formation of that territory on the local level would never be realized if it met with opposition from administrator's on the ground (zaicho kanjin 在庁官人). This is one structural feature that made it necessary for Heike proprietorships to be formed within the framework of the shoen estate system. Finally, the author argues that any further examination of the development of Heike political power after the 1179 coup will have to take into serious consideration the structural determinants of the Family's feudal proprietorships.