The Concept of Action Reconsidered

Abstract

　"Action", although seen as a foundation of all sociological inquiries, still has much to be considered and articulated. Most sociologists may agree that the concept of "action" is effective so long as it means bodily motion/immotion caused by a mental factor of the agent, the "end". Then, is this concept applicable to any human bodily motion/immotion, as most sociologists often do? We see this attitude inconsistent, because when one understands that "action" can include every human bodily motion/immotion, its relevance disappears. "Action" has its unique denotation only in contrast to "behavior without particular end".
　This paper tries to answer two questions: how do we determine a certain trajectory of other's behavior as "an action"? And what types of collective order can we conclude from the concept? We examine Jeremy Bentham's effort to establish the general theory of action, from which later sociological theories have derived. As a penal theorist, Bentham started with the view that we may conceive "an action" when a certain trajectory of behavior brings about "an event" which is extra-ordinary. "Action" in this sense indicates intrinsically a rare occurrence. Though he as a moralist and sociologist altered this view and applied the concept to our ordinary activities in general.
　This fact leads us to the classification of collective order into two aspects: the one which is observable under the rule of "action", the other which is the regularity itself seen in the trajectory of behavior. The former is the order people comply to solve uneasiness caused by an extra-ordinary "action"; the latter is indicated by peoples' on-going behaviors where "event" has not occurred yet. The concept of "action" is in no way able to clarify the full-picture of the regularity.
　The above analysis allows us to treat "action" properly as "ethical rather than scientific" activity.