"Action", although seen as a foundation of all sociological inquiries, still has much to be considered and articulated. Most sociologists may agree that the concept of "action" is effective so long as it means bodily motion/immotion caused by a mental factor of the agent, the "end". Then, is this concept applicable to any human bodily motion/immotion, as most sociologists often do? We see this attitude inconsistent, because when one understands that "action" can include every human bodily motion/immotion, its relevance disappears. "Action" has its unique denotation only in contrast to "behavior without particular end".
　This paper tries to answer two questions: how do we determine a certain trajectory of other's behavior as "an action"? And what types of collective order can we conclude from the concept? We examine Jeremy Bentham's effort to establish the general theory of action, from which later sociological theories have derived. As a penal theorist, Bentham started with the view that we may conceive "an action" when a certain trajectory of behavior brings about "an event" which is extra-ordinary. "Action" in this sense indicates intrinsically a rare occurrence. Though he as a moralist and sociologist altered this view and applied the concept to our ordinary activities in general.
　This fact leads us to the classification of collective order into two aspects: the one which is observable under the rule of "action", the other which is the regularity itself seen in the trajectory of behavior. The former is the order people comply to solve uneasiness caused by an extra-ordinary "action"; the latter is indicated by peoples' on-going behaviors where "event" has not occurred yet. The concept of "action" is in no way able to clarify the full-picture of the regularity.
　The above analysis allows us to treat "action" properly as "ethical rather than scientific" activity.

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　The attraction of motorsport is regarded as "speed (and thrill) ". From the perspective of motorsports players, however, this assumption involves problems. While racing drivers are attacking circuit tracks, they scarcely pay attention to the speedometer (moreover, it is often removed from racing machines). In addition, at the instant their machines reach the "top speed" on straightaways, the drivers feel relatively most relaxed; they aren't competing in a "sport". This fact makes us suspicious of the the universe of meaning/discourse that reduces motorsport to "speed".
　Early motorsport greatly contributed to the development of motorization. It represented people's "desire for speed". From Luhmann's system theory, this relationship is interpreted as a sort of "symbiotic mechanism"; the organic foundation of social systems. On the other hand, however, the automobile society is characterized by the inhibition of speed. The antinomy of inspiration and inhibition was a result of the differentiation of the universe of meaning into two distinctive spheres, namely the "symbolism of safety" and that "of speed". The former is the "perverted" perspective of the traffic law/police. It identifies itself with the symbol "safety" and only rhetorically accuses the "diabolic" side of speed in blindness to the reality of traffic risk. The latter is the "opposite" of the former. It identifies itself with the symbol "speed" and also forgets risk. Each symbolism is the negative image or "double" of the other and mutually amplifies its own perversion by utilizing the opposite as the "catalyzer".
　This dichotomy is the very mechanism that enables motorization. The most drastic effect of this maneuver is the "creation" of the "desire for speed". This anthropological category is indeed a construct of the universe of meaning differentiated into both symbolisms, which is, based on Luhmann's theory, a "self-referential system".

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　The purpose of this paper is to construct a model of the subjectivization from an Althusserian point of view with taking the aporia of self-reference into account.
　The mechanism of subjectivization is divided into two phases. I call the first phase 'the transcendental subjectivization', which enables every subject to refer to himself. The distinction of the logical types, which is, as Russell says, the precondition of self-reference, can be achieved only by 'the trenscendental consciousness' and the emergence of this consciousness is none other than 'the transcendental subjectivization'. This consciousness does not become the object of the self-introspection as Wittgenstein expected. What brings it is, according to Lacan, the identification of the existence with 'the non-sense signifiant', and this identification means the appearance of the existence to the world.
　The second phase is 'the ideological subjectivization', which compels each subject to subject himself to ideology. The instability of the transcendental consciousness causes this subjection to ideology supported by the function of the ideological apparatus. The essential points of this subjectivization are as follows: ideology is introduced to the place of the transcendental consiousness. As it is not the object of the introspection, the subject fails to recognize this introduction of ideology to his own consciousness. Consequently, the subject must be submitted to the effect of ideology and makes himself identify with ideology without any doubt. Thus the subject is constructed as the subject in the strict sence of the word.
　The subjectivization consists of these two phases. The irony of this mechanism is that it makes us believe as if it hung on our own 'voluntary will'.

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　The purpose of this study is to describe the process whereby the continual use of philopon was defined as both a crime and a disease after World War II in Japan. (Philopon is a drug containing Phenylisoproplymethylamin which is called 'speed' in the United States) I use a model advanced by Conrad and Schneider in Deviance and Medicalization (1980/1992) to delineate this process. And this process proceeded as follows:
　1 definition: Philopon was abused by those whom the medical profession thought to be immoral, for example, novelists, dancers, standup-comedians, etc.
　2 prospecting: Some members of the medical profession discovered the intoxication factors in philopon after the death of a famous standup-comedienne. After her death, many studies about philopon intoxication emerged suddenly.
　3 claim-making: The Japan Medical Association claimed that philopon should be controlled by the medical profession, implying that all medicine should be under its control. The Osaka Medical Association claimed that, for reasons of the public health, philopon should be prohibited, implying that the medical profession should be one of the first agencies concerned with public health. Some psychiatrists claimed that the continual use of philopon is a social problem, implying that psychiatrists should have the authority to make judgments about public health. Police claimed that philopon is a cause of many other crimes, implying that they could better maintain the social order if philopon were prohibited.
　4 legitimacy: The goverment regarded the problems of continual philopon use as medical problems, so it regulated the traffic of philopon. And the medical profession, especially psychiatrists, were supported by a movement for public health, especially mental health.
　5 institutionalization: The law prohibiting philopon was based mostly upon medical intoxication designation after an assault case in Saitama Pref.
　6 re-claim-making and re-institutionalization: After a case of assault against a child, the law was reformed to prohibit philopon use more strictly, and the mental health law was also reformed to keep users off the streets.
　I suggest through the analysis of this process that in Japan (1) the medical profession tends to speak about the area of morality, (2) the medical designation of deviance can set the stage for criminal designation, and (3) legitimacy is achieved in the governmental bureaucracy rather than in the courtrooms or legislatures.

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