教育の社会的蓄積，人的資本形成および経済発展

——貧困のわなからの脱出についての一考察——

抄録

In this paper, we analyze the interactions between the accumulation of intergenerational expenditures on education and economic development with an overlapping-generations model mainly based on Galor and Moav (2004) , which captures the endogenous replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital accumulation. Galor and Moav (2004) assumed that an individual determines the transfer to his child to maximize his utility and the expenditure on education of his child is financed by the transfer. The child determines his expenditure on education by himself to maximize his income level. Moreover, they assumed that the economy consists of two groups of individuals, rich and poor, and analyzed the endogenous evolution of the economy from early to mature stage. In the early stage of development, which they call “Regime I”, the rate of return to human capital is lower than the rate of return to physical capital and the process of development is fuelled by capital accumulation, and in the mature stage of development, which they call “Regime II”, the rate of return to human capital increases sufficiently so as to induce human capital accumulation, and the process of development is fuelled by human capital as well as physical capital accumulation. The stage of economic development is influenced by the capital-labor ratio, and the dynamic system is uniquely determined by the joint-evolution of the intergenerational transfers of members of poor and rich.
However, in this paper, we assume that the expenditures on education are determined by both the individual and his parent. That is, we assume that the utility of a parent is influenced by the expenditures on education to his child based on Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Cardak (2004a,b) . In addition, we assume that the parental expenditure on education is accumulated socially. That is, in our model, the poor receives benefits from the rich in human capital accumulation. We focus on the extrication from the “ poverty trap” , which is defined as the conditions when the transfer of poor is zero, specifically. Galor and Moav （2004） define in Regime I the transfer of poor is in the “poverty trap” and in Regime II the transfer becomes positive. Moreover, in Galor and Moav (2004), the individual's utility function is invariable even in the process of economic development. However, in our paper, we consider that the individual's utility function evolves with economic development. We compare our model with the one of Galor and Moav (2004), and examine the influence of the parental expenditure on education to his child on human capital accumulation and economic development. As a result, we point out that the optimal expenditure on education, determined by the individual, becomes positive in the lower values of the capital-labor ratio, and extrication from the “poverty trap” is achieved in an earlier stage of economic development than in Galor and Moav (2004).

JEL Classification: I25, O11, O12, O15