パターナリズムと財政政策のOLGモデル分析

抄録

The purpose of this study was to incorporate altruism from children to parents in a two-period overlapping generation model referred as joy-of-giving model.
Parents derive utility from the size of the bequests they leave to their children, so combining both ascending and descending altruism, leads to a new form of altruism known as two-sided altruism or paternalistic altruism. Intergenerational transfers operate in both directions, from children to parents (intra-family income transfers for nursing care) and from parents to children (bequests), to examine the long-run equilibrium of the model with two-sides and to study the effects of the degree of both altruism and fiscal policies on the long-run equilibrium by comparative static analysis that assumes a small open economy for easy examination.
In addition to this purpose, the objective was to study the effect of pension systems on long-run equilibrium and to analyze optimal estate taxation in a steady state. Concretely, we considered two pension systems: a lump-sum pay-as-you-go pension system and a modified pay-as-you-go pension system, in which benefits are financed by contributions and a part of the estimated taxation levied on the parental generation, incorporates the rest of public expenditures into the pension system to maintain a balanced budget.
This study derived the following results.
First, the degree of both altruism affects on intra-family transfers to their parents in the steady state showed altruism to children has a negative effect, whereas altruism to parents has positive. Moreover, the effect of the degree of both altruisms on bequests in the steady state is different according to the relationships of growth rates in a population, interest rates and types of pension systems.
Second, the effects of increases in the contributions to intra-family transfers and bequests in the steady state depend on not only differences in the pension system but also the relationship of the growth rate of a population and interest rates. Otherwise, the effect of estate taxation on intra-family transfers is the same between the differences in a pension system in a steady state. In other words, in the lump-sum pay-as-you-go pension system, an increase in estate taxation has negative effects on both bequests and intra-family transfers in the steady state. On the other hand, in a modified pay-as-you-go pension system, increases in estate taxation have negative effects on intra-family transfers in the steady state.
Finally, in a modified pay-as-you-go pension system, optimal estate taxation arises with decreases in the ratio for spending of public expenditures in the steady state.
Throughout the paper, paternalism effects are shown and the above-mentioned results support the model with two-sided altruism.

JEL Classification: H55, G23, H31, D91, H21