Conflict Analysis of Water Resources Allocation

A Game-theoretic Analysis of Environmental Load Allocation

Abstract

This paper focusses the significance of the total load control scheme which was recently introduced by the Japanese Government, to apply to designated closed water bodies in Japan. By showing that part of the problem is the resolution of conflicts in the allocation of environmental loads to be discharged by interested parties, a game-theoretic model by use of cooperative game theory has been presented. Mathematical analyses have been performed to derive theoretical properties of the two-person game that has been formulated as a prototype model of the conflict.
It has been shown that what originally appears to be a game of COD load allocation can be reduced to what is called a cost allocation game. This latter type of allocation game has been proved to be largely determined by an a priori assignment of total COD loads dischargeable to each player.
Illustration has been made of the necessity of setting up on a higher level than this game, some fairness norms that may bind what follows as a cost allocation game. The paper concludes by suggesting possible further generalization of the proposed two-person game into an n-person game.