Revisiting “propria uoluntas et liberum arbitrium” in Augustine’s De Libero Arbitrio

Abstract

In the first book of De Libero Arbitrio, Augustine concludes that the origin of evil is “its own will and free decision” (propria uoluntas et liberum arbitrium) (1. 11. 21). Despite its importance for the development of Augustine’s theory of will, researchers have largely ignored this statement and failed to provide a detailed analysis of it. This paper will, by contrast, take this claim seriously, aiming to reveal its full philosophical significance by focusing on the function of the concept of will.

In the first section, I begin by exploring the meaning of propria uoluntas et liberum arbitrium by analyzing it word by word and situating it in its proper context. I show that this expression is composed of words with legal nuances and that, taken as a whole, it expresses the view that nothing other than the mind itself subjugates the mind to desire. In the second section, I focus on Augustine’s formulation of philosophical inquiry in his earliest treatises before De Libero Arbitrio, showing that it consists of three steps: the purification of desire, the exercise of reason, and the contemplation of the Truth. In the final section, I demonstrate that propria uoluntas et liberum arbitrium forced Augustine to reorganize the model of the soul and of philosophical inquiry that he had forged since his earliest days. A new program of philosophical inquiry, which was formulated later in De Doctrina Christiana, places the purification at the final stage, suggesting that the concept of will was the driving force in transforming how Augustine engages in philosophy.