This paper addresses a pressing question of world philosophy, viz. the impact of living in a multicultural world on ethical education. To explore this question, the introduction gives an overview of the ambivalent attitudes of modern, detraditionalized societies toward their embedded traditions and substantial values, based on the theories of social scientist Ronald Inglehart and philosopher Charles Taylor. The second section, which builds on Aristotle’s insights and their interpretation by Martha Nussbaum, discusses a traditional component of ethical education, viz. the virtue of practical wisdom. Sections three and four focus on thechallenges of multiculturalism to ethical education. In today’s societies, it is difficultto reach a consensus and to find plausible points of orientation in pressing ethical questions. This is why a very influential way of responding to the multicultural situation, viz. to focus on universal but at the same time formal and procedural moral principles, and to leave the contents of substantial values up to the individuals’ discretion, has fallen short of expectations. In exploring an alternative approach to this question, I use Paul Ricoeur’s views on the value of traditions, viz. appreciating them as culturally embedded mediators between universal moral principles and the contingencies of the life-world. This is the second goal of ethical education. Yet, to avoid the looming deadlock of ethical traditionalism and particularism a reasonable debate is necessary to find out if and how particular ethical traditions have a universal potential, which can be integrated into universal principles. This approach aims at fostering the dialogue among ethical traditions with the help of an enlarged idea of rationality. Thus, the third goal of ethical education is training people in self-reflection about the ethical values of their own traditions, as a first step to understanding the values of other traditions as potential universals.

This paper analyzes the evolving role of moral philosophers in addressing contemporary challenges, arguing for a more dynamic “philosophical posture” that balances theoretical rigor with practical relevance. It examines how philosophers can effectively engage with complex ethical issues while maintaining their core principles, envisioning them as modern argonauts navigating diverse fields from bioethics to artificial intelligence. The discussion critiques the potential reduction of philosophical knowledge to technical expertise and emphasizes the need for actionable insights grounded in community realities. The paper concludes by calling for a renewed philosophical engagement that combines comprehensive understanding with practical wisdom to address our era’s existential challenges. Concluding, the paper calls for philosophers to actively engage with societal and ethical issues and reclaim philosophy’s foundational vocation. This involves a comprehensive understanding and wisdom to navigate the existential and global challenges of our era.

In the first book of De Libero Arbitrio, Augustine concludes that the origin of evil is “its own will and free decision” (propria uoluntas et liberum arbitrium) (1. 11. 21). Despite its importance for the development of Augustine’s theory of will, researchers have largely ignored this statement and failed to provide a detailed analysis of it. This paper will, by contrast, take this claim seriously, aiming to reveal its full philosophical significance by focusing on the function of the concept of will.

In the first section, I begin by exploring the meaning of propria uoluntas et liberum arbitrium by analyzing it word by word and situating it in its proper context. I show that this expression is composed of words with legal nuances and that, taken as a whole, it expresses the view that nothing other than the mind itself subjugates the mind to desire. In the second section, I focus on Augustine’s formulation of philosophical inquiry in his earliest treatises before De Libero Arbitrio, showing that it consists of three steps: the purification of desire, the exercise of reason, and the contemplation of the Truth. In the final section, I demonstrate that propria uoluntas et liberum arbitrium forced Augustine to reorganize the model of the soul and of philosophical inquiry that he had forged since his earliest days. A new program of philosophical inquiry, which was formulated later in De Doctrina Christiana, places the purification at the final stage, suggesting that the concept of will was the driving force in transforming how Augustine engages in philosophy.

La présente étude vise à clarifier le rapport entre la théorie bergsonienne de la reconnaissance dans Matière et mémoire (1896) et le « schéma dynamique », terme qu’utilise Bergson dans son article de 1902 intitulé « L’effort intellectuel ». Le « schéma dynamique » désigne une représentation abstraite qui intervient dans l’effort intellectuel, et à partir de laquelle le mouvement de l’esprit se développe. Ce concept joue un rôle majeur dans l’élaboration de la définition bergsonienne de la causalité comme « un passage graduel du moins réalisé au plus réalisé ». L'apparition de cette nouvelle conception de la causalité est d'autant plus importante dans le développement de la philosophie bergsonienne qu'elle est liée à la théorie de la vie de L’évolution créatrice. Il est vrai que le concept de schéma dynamique, avec la notion de la causalité qui en résulte, figure pour la première fois dans « L'effort intellectuel » ; il n’apparaît pas encore dans Matière et mémoire, où Bergson emploie plutôt le terme « schème moteur » pour expliquer la reconnaissance. Néanmoins, les deux ouvrages s’appuient essentiellement sur la même théorie de la mémoire. Il doit donc y avoir une continuité entre Matière et mémoire et « L’effort intellectuel », mais il est difficile d’en déterminer la nature. Certains chercheurs insistent sur le parallélisme entre les deux textes ; d’autres soulignent plutôt leur hétérogénéité. En comparant « L'effort intellectuel » avec Matière et mémoire, nous montrons que la vérité est entre ces deux points de vue : l’idée qui portera le nom de schéma dynamique existe déjà dans la théorie de la reconnaissance de Matière et mémoire, mais l’existence de cette idée naissante n’est appréciable que difficilement à cause de la conception centripète du sentiment de l’effort que Bergson emprunte à W. James.

Bernard Williams called the core feature of modern morality “the morality system”, and proposed a substantive critique of the system that made a strong impact on contemporary ethics. However, any critique of morality, including Williams’, is confronted with the pervasive questions, “What morality is being criticized?” and “On what grounds is it being criticized?” So moral critics need to show that their critique is about our morality and that it is justified. The two questions are precisely the objections posed to Williams’ critique, and the aim of this paper is to defend it.

Williams argues that the morality system motivates us to conceptualize obligation and blame in a peculiar way, in which obligation is inescapable and blame only applies to truly voluntary actions, and shows that we can conceptualize them differently and naturalistically. The first objection to this critique, however, concerns the question of “What morality?”: the morality system is merely an extreme morality that people with a moral sense do not adopt (The Scope Objection). I will respond to this objection by arguing that it misses the real target of Williams’ critique, which is the commitment to voluntariness. Unlike the conception of obligation in the morality system that opponents consider extreme, the commitment is widely presupposed in modern morality. At this point, the second repeated objection comes to the fore, which concerns the question of “On what grounds?”: the morality system’s commitment to voluntariness is indispensable for a fair morality (The Point of Morality Objection). I will answer this objection by showing the Williamsian consideration against the commitment. The commitment that attempts to realize extreme fairness actually defeats the very workings of blame. I conclude that the problem with the morality system’s commitment to voluntariness is a misconception of life: it misconstrues human motivation, the real workings of co-existence, and the required fairness.