IEICE Transactions on Communications
Online ISSN : 1745-1345
Print ISSN : 0916-8516

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A Stackelberg Game Based Pricing and User Association for Spectrum Splitting Macro-Femto HetNets
Bo GUZhi LIUCheng ZHANGKyoko YAMORIOsamu MIZUNOYoshiaki TANAKA
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ジャーナル 認証あり 早期公開

論文ID: 2017EBP3097

この記事には本公開記事があります。
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The demand for wireless traffic is increasing rapidly, which has posed huge challenges to mobile network operators (MNOs). A heterogeneous network (HetNet) framework, composed of a marcocell and femtocells, has been proved to be an effective way to cope with the fast-growing traffic demand. In this paper, we assume that both the macrocell and femtocells are owned by the same MNO, with revenue optimization as its ultimate goal. We aim to propose a pricing strategy for macro-femto HetNets with a user centric vision, namely, mobile users would have their own interest to make rational decisions on selecting between the macrocell and femtocells to maximize their individual benefit. We formulate a Stackelberg game to analyze the interactions between the MNO and users, and obtain the equilibrium solution for the Stackelberg game. Via extensive simulations, we evaluate the proposed pricing strategy in terms of its efficiency with respect to the revenue optimization.

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© 2017 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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