抄録
Presently, many identity-based proxy signature (IBPS) schemes have been proposed, but most of them require high computational costs and the proposed security model for IBPS is not enough complete. To overcome this weakness, Gu et al. recently proposed a framework and a detailed security model for IBPS. They also proposed an efficient IBPS scheme and proved the unforgeability of their scheme in the standard model. However, in this letter, we demonstrate that Gu et al.'s scheme fails to satisfy the property of unforgeability because it can not resist the following attacks: after getting a private key, an adversary behaving as a malicious signer can forge a private key on any identity without the help of the private key generator (PKG); after getting a delegation, an adversary behaving as a malicious proxy signer can forge a proxy signing key on any delegation without the agreement of the original signer; after getting a signature, an adversary behaving as a malicious user can forge a signature on any identity without the private key or forge a proxy signature on any warrant without the proxy signing key.
