CLEAR & RETURN: Stopping Run-Time Countermeasures in Cryptographic Primitives

抄録

White-box cryptographic implementations often use masking and shuffling as countermeasures against key extraction attacks. To counter these defenses, higher-order Differential Computation Analysis (HO-DCA) and its variants have been developed. These methods aim to breach these countermeasures without needing reverse engineering. However, these non-invasive attacks are expensive and can be thwarted by updating the masking and shuffling techniques. This paper introduces a simple binary injection attack, aptly named clear & return, designed to bypass advanced masking and shuffling defenses employed in white-box cryptography. The attack involves injecting a small amount of assembly code, which effectively disables run-time random sources. This loss of randomness exposes the unprotected lookup value within white-box implementations, making them vulnerable to simple statistical analysis. In experiments targeting open-source white-box cryptographic implementations, the attack strategy of hijacking entries in the Global Offset Table (GOT) or function calls shows effectiveness in circumventing run-time countermeasures.