Policies and Tax Systems for Regulating Vacant Houses

A Case Study on Spain and Japan

抄録

An increased number of vacant houses have been found in Spain and Japan in recent years, specifically in de-growth areas. This article explores the extent to which these two countries have promoted policies and tax systems to counteract this phenomenon. According to existing research, tax systems sometimes work as factors that encourage the increase of vacant houses. However, the systems in the two countries in question are dissimilar. We apply the divergence perspective for developing housing system typologies, and analyse vacant housing policy measures from the administrative perspective of Japan’s centralised unitary and Spain’s decentralised unitary state.

As a result, while the Spanish taxation system may expect housing owners to circulate their properties in the real estate market, the duty schemes in Japan encourage homeowners to build or to hold onto their houses. Moreover, the recent vacant housing policies of both countries seem to actively decentralise taxation authorities, disclose information on vacant properties and take advantage of vacant spaces. More generally, vacant housing control in Spain is relevant to countries with decentralisation or even a federal system, which can control housing vacancy levels by the power of local governments. By contrast, the Japanese method of vacancy control applies to East Asian and socialist countries, where national governments can promptly implement policies. Moreover, the policy promoting a nationwide vacant house bank would help to mitigate information asymmetry.