This study examines how the performance of startups during the time period up to their initial public offering (IPO) is affected by the macro environment, a topic that has not been given much consideration to date. Taking the end of 2012 (the beginning of Abenomics), when Japan’s economic environment shifted to a hot market, as the transition point, we analyzed companies that did IPOs in terms of such variables as the target market, the attributes of the companies in the sample (type of entrepreneurship), and the date of their actual establishment. We found that for those companies operating in an economically favorable environment, the average time period from startup to IPO was relatively long. This could be because an economically favorable environment and improved business conditions spurred startups that had been implementing a wait-and-see attitude. We have some reservations about using “time to IPO” naively as a performance indicator, and caution should be exercised when using it.

In solar cell manufacturing from the late 2000s to the early 2010s, the turnover for top manufacturers implied that it was only a matter of years before they went out of business. In general, many tend to believe that top manufacturers went bankrupt because of the bubble and burst caused by policies intended to promote and control the PV industry in various countries; however, considering that solar cells can be sold in any country worldwide and the global market for solar cells continues to expand, the ups and downs of solar cell manufacturers cannot be explained by the bubbles and bursts of individual countries alone. In fact, (i) while the turn-key solutions of Western manufacturing companies facilitated market entry, in China, people witnessed successful companies and imitated them to start their own businesses. Many of these companies launched and entered the market one after another in a short time span, thereby causing companies in other countries to go bankrupt due to low prices. However, (ii) even these Chinese firms have been experiencing a decline in capacity utilization amid a chronic oversupply caused by vigorous entrepreneurship, and top manufacturers have collapsed due to minor setbacks that later proved catastrophic.

The number of gas stations (GS) in Japan has halved in the last quarter-century, as price competition has made selling gasoline unprofitable. Further, the Japanese government has formulated a policy to end the sale of gasoline and diesel-powered vehicles by 2035. Under these circumstances, Yamahiro, a GS company, (A) according to non-oil services, divided its GSs into three groups, namely, car inspection/testing, car washing/coating, and car rental, and further increased the specialization of each station by focusing on the services it offers; (B) not reduced the number of employees at the station despite operating self-service GSs and introduced the vehicle identification system and vehicle information management system to improve the profitability of its non-oil services by linking these systems; (C) utilized the vehicle data to create synergies between the car-rental business and used car sales business; and (D) increased the number of GSs by taking over unprofitable stations from wholesale dealers of oil products and retraining their entire workforces. As a result, the company expanded its business in Tokyo area, presently earning 40% of its profits from non-oil services, and won the Japan Quality Award (JQA).

The isomorphic mechanisms of organizations are known to consist of institutional isomorphism (coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism) and competitive isomorphism. The World Association of Zoos and Aquariums (WAZA) put pressure on the Japanese Association of Zoos and Aquariums (JAZA) over the issue of keeping wild dolphins in captivity and even suggested its expulsion, resulting in a form of coercive isomorphism. At that time, JAZA adopted measures such as stricter group rules and membership criteria, which led to competitive isomorphism within JAZA, as many aquariums that did not agree with JAZA’s position left the association. As a result, the Japan Aquarium Association (JAA) was born as an association of aquariums, formed by aquariums, for aquariums. In other words, institutional isomorphism at the level of associations was accompanied by competitive isomorphism, and the adaptation of organizations to the institutional environment and their subsequent selection of association occurred simultaneously.

This paper is a study of the entrepreneurial ecosystem (EE) formed by Japanese startup clustering around the University of Tokyo’s Hongo Campus. A chronological analysis of 234 startups clustering around the university showed that the EE started to evolve in 2004 with a university-led incubator, and that non-incubator startups began increasing in around 2014, growing into an entrepreneur-led EE beyond the control of the university.