This special issue examines the maritime order in Asia from both security and economic perspectives, taking into account the recent rise in tensions and increased risks in East Asia. This special issue comprises articles contributed by the presenters and discussants of the presentations and discussions at the plenary session of the 2024 Spring Convention of the JAAS. It was striking that there were significant divergences in the perceptions of the risks threatening maritime order from the viewpoints of security and economics in the presentations and discussions at the session. However, after the discussions at the time, it was found that there were also parts where the two viewpoints overlapped. The part of their convergence can be found in articles in this special issue. As strategic rivalry deepens, the logic of economic security is gaining ground, and strategic political factors are expected to erode the economy even more. In this context, it is also necessary to consider the maritime order from the perspectives of security and the economy and to reconcile the findings obtained from these perspectives.

This article argues that China’s South China Sea policy is subject to the most important security goal of China, which has changed over time, rather than serving as an independent political objective of maritime advancement, as believed in the literature in Japan.

During the period in which China perceived the Soviet Union as its greatest threat, China selected Vietnam—an allied country of the Soviet Union—as the sole target in the South China Sea from the 1970s until the Mischief Reef Incident in 1995. China promised the Philippines that it would peacefully solve South China Sea disputes. However, China has not physically responded to the development of administrative control over the features of the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea since the 1970s.

As relations with the Soviet Union improved in the middle of the 1980s, Chinese maritime experts and military officers began insisting on protecting maritime interests under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, China continued to select Vietnam as its sole target in the South China Sea and engaged in battle with Vietnam in 1988 in the Spratly Islands. Deng Xiaoping avoided challenging the Philippines—an allied country of the U.S.—in the South China Sea because he prioritized maintaining a sound relationship with the West, which enabled China to focus on economic development. The 1995 Chinese seizure of the Mischief Reef claimed by the Philippines signaled a China’s shift in South China Sea policy. However, China’s top leaders largely prioritized the preservation of a stable international environment; thus, China continued to apply low-profile policies in the South China Sea, as shown by its signing of the Code of Conduct with the ASEAN. The Xi Jinping administration clearly ended this low-profile policy by seizing the Philippines-claimed Scarborough Shoal and subsequently defining the goal of building a strong maritime nations in 2012.

However, in recent years, the Xi Jinping administration began following its predecessors more closely by shaping the South China Sea policy subject to suit the Taiwan issue. China’s harassment of the resupply missions for the Philippines grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal and its simultaneous fueling of the fear of the Philippine public being entangled in the Taiwan contingency represent China’s calculated punishment of the Philippines due to the U.S.–Philippines security cooperation relationship, through which the U.S. has gained access to four additional basing sites in the Philippines under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).

Speakers from different disciplines delivered highly specialized presentations at the Spring Convention of the Japan Association for Asian Studies. However, regrettably, the session as a whole did not align well. This article considers the types of foundations or approaches that are desirable to comprehensively discuss the prospects of an Asian maritime order. First, it highlights the importance of recognizing a common foundation for a cause. The instability of the Asian maritime order is a reflection of international relations that have developed fluidity and polarization. A group of area specialists should take the initiative to study how to avoid or reduce the cross-disciplinary problems and risks arising from this situation. Second, specific issues that may have broader impacts should be discussed more actively. Significant variations exist in the measures taken by each country to prepare for the instability of existing sea lanes, which are worth analyzing. Moreover, the complex methodology for gray zone operations undertaken by China is strengthening the inseparability of politics and economics over regional affairs. Finally, after the Kinmen Island Incident in February 2024, the interconnectivity and correlation among issues in the East and South China Seas and the Taiwan Strait have rapidly intensified. Scholars should focus on this rising structured conflict between China and other countries including Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the United States.

In recent years, marine container transport, in East Asia, has been increasing. Products produced in East Asian countries are imported and exported to the world via the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal, but these choke points are sensitive to geopolitical risks, and their blockade has a significant impact on the East Asian economy. To minimize the impact of choke point risks on the East Asian economy, it is necessary to clarify trigger points and prepare alternative options to deal with choke point risks.

China has adopted a “gray zone strategy” to achieve strategic objectives while avoiding armed conflict. This paper takes as an example the response of Japanese and Philippine maritime law enforcement agencies to the Chinese Coast Guard, which is deployed to assert its interests in islands and marine resources in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and argues that greater international cooperation, based on an understanding of the gray zone strategy and the role of maritime law enforcement agencies, is essential for maintaining regional stability and maritime order.

President Hu Jintao called for China to be a maritime power in November 2012. Since then, China’s maritime offensive has increased in the East & South China Seas. China has made a great effort to renew and develop the military equipment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy and the PLA Rocket Force.

The PLA navy purchased an Aircraft Carrier Varyag from Ukraine and developed two domestic carriers, though it is said that the Chinese aircraft craft carrier battle groups’ capability is still insufficient to defend these carriers. Many of the navies of the western countries have adopted the gas turbine engines for quick departure and navigation, though the PLA navy couldn’t import gas turbine engines for long time, because the western embargo had placed. However, the number of the PLA navy gunboats with the gas turbine engines has increased to 42% in 2022.

The PLA command renamed the Second Artillery Crops the PLA Rocket Force in 2016, and they have proceeded the development of anti-ship ballistic missiles. It is said that their anti-ship ballistic missiles increase accuracy. Professor James R. Holmes predicted that the PLA will develop the 21^st Century Fortress Fleet, and the Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles will exclude the U. S. Navy from the South China Sea in the future. The shooting range of the Chinese Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) have been short until the beginning of 2000^th, so that China’s strategic submarines with the SLBMs needed long range air cover to defend them. China has made great effort to develop long range attack aircraft with stealth capability. It is said that H20 stealth strategic bombers’ completion is approaching.

Further, China made an effort to integrate four maritime law-enforcement agencies into the China Coast Guard (CCG) in 2013, and China has begun to construct many large patrol vessels. China has developed maritime militia, too. China uses large CCG patrol vessels & maritime militia fishing boats to chase the smaller patrol vessels & fishing boats of ASEAN countries from the South China Sea. If the U. S, navy comes, the PLA navy will face. The completion of the Chinese weaponry development, will invite the Chinese occupation of the South China Sea, and their focus of offensive will shift to the East China Sea. This will be the future agenda for the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

China’s maritime expansion and hegemonic movements in recent years, particularly in the South China Sea, have primarily been viewed as security issues. In addition to my role as a commentator for the 2024 Conference of JAAS, I would like to supplement this discussion with economic aspects, focusing on the results of my own field research over the past few years. In this context, the focus will primarily be on the “Road” component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which involves not only maritime routes but also inland waterways, energy transportation via pipelines, large-scale real estate developments such as industrial parks, resorts, and casinos, as well as labor migration driven by Chinese workers, which can be seen as a form of colonization. All of these factors should be considered when evaluating the economic impact. I should note that the scope of this research is limited to Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and their surrounding countries, where the influence of BRI is particularly significant, based on the field research capabilities of myself and my research collaborators.

In the 1990s, an event occurred that created a new horizon in the history of Japan-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter, DPRK) relations. Kanemaru Sin visited the DPRK, and Kim Il-sung made a “blitzkrieg-like” proposal for the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the DPRK. Following that, in 1991, Japan and the DPRK began negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic relations. These events are often viewed as a sudden development that occurred in the 1990s, along with the improvement in relations between the ROK and the communist camp of nations following the end of the Cold War.

In this paper, I clarify that the series of events that began with Kanemaru’s visit to the DPRK was not a late development due to changes in the surrounding circumstances, such as the collapse of the Cold War and ROK’s diplomacy with China and the Soviet Union, but, rather, emerged after repeated discussions on pending issues between Japan and the DPRK during the Yasuhiro Nakasone administration in the 1980s. To this end, the movements of Japan and DPRK surrounding the “Fujisan Maru No. 18” (hereafter, Fujisan Maru) incident in December 1983 are the main subject of analysis.

Immediately following the incident, the DPRK had in mind the possibility of the issue continuing for a prolonged time and was using it as a means of establishing intergovernmental relations with Japan. Japan, on the other hand, was appealing to the ROK and the United States that precisely because of the Fujisan Maru issue, it was necessary to maintain constant contact with the DPRK. In other words, the Fujisan Maru incident acted as a catalyst for intergovernmental Japan-DPRK negotiations, and in that sense, the incident was a turning point in Japan-DPRK relations. Ultimately, the resolution of the Fujisan Maru incident and the exchange of a three-party joint declaration leading to negotiations on the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and DPRK led to progress in Japan-DPRK relations.

My analysis revealed that from the early 1980s, the DPRK, which had been actively showing its willingness to improve relations with the Nakasone administration, had been holding negotiations more frequently beginning around 1985 regarding the resolution of the Fujisan Maru issue, with the Japanese government also responding behind the scenes. From then forward, despite the occurrence of sudden issues such as the Zudan Incident, negotiations between Japan and the DPRK continued, and the Nakasone administration made a breakthrough on the issue, leading to a series of processes that culminated in the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the DPRK in 1991.

During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established Anti-Japanese bases and launched mass mobilization campaigns to rally the populace. One of these campaigns was the Labor Hero Movement, modeled after the Soviet Union’s Stakhanovite movement. Initiated in 1939 through the People’s Production Encouragement Ordinance, the movement recognized individuals with outstanding contributions and became an integral part of the production campaign from 1943 onwards. Previous studies have often analyzed this movement without distinguishing between the agricultural and industrial sectors, with most focusing predominantly on the agricultural sector. Few studies of the Labor Hero Movement in the industrial sector have focused on the Zhao Zhankui Movement in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region. However, in contrast to the agricultural sector, where labor heroes were individual farmers, the industrial sector’s Labor Hero Movement was centered on public factories. Consequently, the methods of conducting the movement and the incentive mechanisms in these two sectors are likely to have been different. Additionally, unlike the more stable Shaan-Gan-Ning region, frontline bases like the Jinxibei and Taihang base areas were frequently under Japanese attack, which influenced both the methods and incentives of the movement. This study aims to compare the differences between the agricultural and industrial sectors of the movement, as well as between rear and frontline bases, to provide a comprehensive understanding of the Hero Model Movements and clarify the inheritance of model worker commendation practices in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

In the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, the Zhao Zhankui Movement highlighted the labor attitude of working for the “public” (i.e., the state), prioritizing honor over material rewards and criticizing those who pursued personal gain. This movement did not consider the backgrounds of model workers during selection, although many were from poor backgrounds or were CCP members. This movement’s emphasis on self-sacrifice and political loyalty set a precedent for later practices in the PRC. In frontline bases, model workers were also recognized for technical improvements, as their labor, combined with military efforts, was crucial. Under severe military pressure, these regions prioritized the rapid production of high-quality weapons. The historical experience of integrating labor with the military force in these frontline bases influenced the PRC’s later labor commendation practices, especially during the Great Leap Forward, when both production and military preparedness were emphasized. This analysis reveals how differing sectors and conditions across regions shaped the Labor Hero Movement and its legacy in the PRC’s labor commendation practices.

The Kuomintang’s (KMT) system of governance had deviated from the system of yi-dang-zhi-guo (the Party governs the country) during the “bandit suppression campaign” period in the early 1930s, when KMT conducted encirclement operations against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s various enclaves across the country. In the provinces which were designated as “bandit suppression” zones such as Henan, Hubei, Anhui, and Jiangxi in the early 1930s, Chiang Kai-shek was able to consolidate his own political regime, though it was not based on the supreme principle of yi-dang-zhi-guo. This aspect was clearly manifested when one attempts to define the relationship between the Party organ and the government organization: in the “bandit suppression” zones, a peculiar and close-knitted party-government relationship emerged where both the Party organs and government organizations were subordinate to military institutions such as “Bandit Suppression Headquarters”. Consequently, the Party organizational efforts in the “bandit suppression” areas were costly to their financial resources, thus resulting in the decrease in the number of Party members, while the “Political Study Clique (zhengxuexi),” a bureaucratic clique, expanded its influence in local government organizations. These trends were nothing but a deviation from the principle of party-ruling regime and it indicates that an alternative system of governance in the regime had already been established before the Sino-Japanese War.