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Volume 24, Issue 3
Displaying 1-3 of 3 articles from this issue
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Akira Kudo1989 Volume 24 Issue 3 Pages 1-26
Published: October 30, 1989
Released on J-STAGE: November 06, 2009
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSGenerally, the international transfer of technology occurs from a country posessing a high level of technology to one of a lower level. Prior to the Second World War many German technologies were introduced into Japan. There was, however, at least one case where they tried to transfer Japanese technology to Germany. It was the case of Ostasiatische Lurgi-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung located in Berlin.
The company, Ost Lurgi, was established in March 1926 as a joint venture of Mitsubishi Goshi, Metallgesellschaft and Degussa. The initiator of the establishing Ost Lurgi was Fritz Haber, inventer of the Haber Bosch process, who visited Japan in 1924, thought highly of the standard of Japanese technology and originated a number of proposals for technico-industrial cooperation between Germany and Japan. One of his idealistic proposals gave rise to the establishment contract of Ost Lurgi.
The purpose of Ost Lurgi was to transfer Japanese technology to Germany. The Shimazdu process for manufacturing battery cells and ship hull paint owned by Shimazdu Works was the only actual proposal as to Japanese technology. Degussa showed an initial interest, but reached a negative conclusion on this. Metallgesellschaft's dissatisfaction with the contract also deepened. As a result, Ost Lurgi was liquidated in December 1931, when the contract was invalidated. Ironically, in June 1932, the patent right for the Shimazdu process was established in the United States, followed by its transfer in France and Great Britain as well as in the United States, but not in Germany. In the light of the present context of booming Japanese direct investment in West Germany, this failed attempt, however, can be seen as a pioneering technico-industrial endevour, from which there is much still to learn.View full abstractDownload PDF (2492K) -
Masakazu Shimada1989 Volume 24 Issue 3 Pages 27-57
Published: October 30, 1989
Released on J-STAGE: November 06, 2009
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSThere have been few studies concerning the fact that the Industrial Club of Japan (ICJ) played a prominent role in the process of establishing the “Kyochokai”. A report by the ICJ formed the basic foundation of the “Kyochokai”. The business leaders in the ICJ assumed a vital role in collecting funds and making up its policies, and were elected as the main members in the “Kyochokai”. It is very important to analyze the role that the ICJ played in the establishment of the “Kyochokai” and to examine the business leaders' views of labor management relations which were founded upon the ethics of “Kyocho-shugi (the principle of harmony and conciliation)”.
In 1919, the Hara government consulted the ICJ about the “Shin-ai-Kyokai” plan which the government itself had drafted. This plan reflected the paternalistic relationship between labor and management. Business leaders in the ICJ felt that they should deal with the increasing labor disputes after World War I in a way different from the paternalistic one. So, they adopted a strategy based on the “kyocho-sugi” including arbitration of labor disputes and various social policy programs.
However, the social policy programs of the neutral foundation “The Kyochokai”, were not governmental programs. Actually they were industry-based voluntary programs which did facilitate labor management relations.
Seijiro Miyajima is one of the persons who most heatedly argued the necessity of “Kyocho-shugi”. He recognized the gap between the classes of labor and management and the opposing nature of their interests, and he contributed to moving the views of the ICJ members closer to the spirit of “Kyocho-shugi”.View full abstractDownload PDF (3143K) -
[in Japanese]1989 Volume 24 Issue 3 Pages 58-76
Published: October 30, 1989
Released on J-STAGE: November 06, 2009
JOURNAL FREE ACCESSDownload PDF (2390K)
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