This paper clarifies relationships between the collapse of coal mining settlements and abolition of regional railways due to Haboro Coal Mining Railway Company closing projects at all its mines in Hokkaido during a period of the high economic growth (1955-73). Although many railways were abolished mainly in coal mining areas of Hokkaido and Kyushu in the 1960s and 1970s, previous researchers have scarcely studied the relationship between this abolition and the collapse of coal mining settlements due to the fourth generation of Japanese governmental measures regarding coal mining. The author looks at two issues in this paper: 1. the processes of regional railway abolition and coal mine closures and their effects on each other, and 2. the relationships between behaviors of mining companies and coal mine closures due to subsidies from Japanese governments.

Although Suzuki-Shoten (Suzuki Merchant Company) had drawn up plans to develop Tomamae coalfield in northwestern Hokkaido in the 1910s, it did not begin to develop the field until the latter half of the 1930s because of defective transportation. After Japan Government Railway opened the Haboro Line in 1932, Haboro Coal Mining Railway Company was established and constructed railways for coalmine transportation in 1941. It started to mine for coal in the mines in Chikubetsu and nearby places in the 1940s and expanded to mines in Haboro and Kami-Haboro after WWII as a hero in small-to-midsize coalmines.

The author has been able to clarify two issues. 1. Haboro Coal Mining Railway Company not only closed projects at all its mines due to subsidies from the Japanese government but also abolished a railway because its passenger numbers decreased due to the coal mine closures. 2. Because the company had applied to the Hokkaido government to get fuel for heating, it had been in the process of restructuring and closed in November, 1970. However, the management had made their mind up to close in September,1970.

Shiseido used the Great Kanto Earthquake as an opportunity to reorganize its distribution framework based on a new system for its cosmetics and soap businesses, despite the risk that sales channel restrictions may lead to lost sales opportunities. This study examines the objectives and significance of Shiseido’s reorganization of its distribution arrangements after the Great Kanto Earthquake.

To clarify the challenges faced by Shiseido in reorganizing its distribution framework and its intentions in introducing this system, it is necessary to examine the historical developments at the company prior to the earthquake. Therefore, this study focuses on aspects that have received less attention in previous studies: the entrepreneurial capabilities of Shiseido’s managers, their role in reorganizing the distribution framework for the cosmetics and soap businesses, and Shiseido’s relationships with other companies.

The context to the introduction of the distribution system for cosmetics lies in the initiatives put in place by the company’s founder, Arinobu Fukuhara, who focused on increasing collaborations with retailers to solve business issues. The system adopted by Shinzo Fukuhara and Noboru Matsumoto was a method that was ideal to manage distribution difficulties after the Great Kanto Earthquake. Participants in the distribution network were required to adhere to a fixed price policy; however, the most important objective was to organize a retail and distribution system that could make meaningful contributions to the development of Shiseido’s businesses.

Shiseido introduced a new system for the distribution of soap, and sales of soap exceeded those of cosmetics. The simultaneous operation of these businesses acted as a hedge against business-related risks. In addition, selling soap led to the expansion of the distribution system for cosmetics.

The distribution framework for the cosmetics and soap businesses, thus, laid the foundations for Shiseido’s subsequent development.