The Journal of Economics
Online ISSN : 2434-4192
Print ISSN : 0022-9768
Volume 79, Issue 1
Displaying 1-4 of 4 articles from this issue
Articles
  • The Case of Higashi-Nihon-Daishinsai
    Naoto Kunitomo
    2013 Volume 79 Issue 1 Pages 2-16
    Published: April 01, 2013
    Released on J-STAGE: March 25, 2022
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
  • Sequential First Price Auction, Clock Auction, and VCG Mechanism
    Hitoshi Matsushima, Hiroshi Teruyama
    2013 Volume 79 Issue 1 Pages 17-49
    Published: April 01, 2013
    Released on J-STAGE: March 25, 2022
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

    This paper shows the experimental results for multi-object auctions in terms of efficiency, revenue, and bidders’ payoffs. We assume that there are two heterogeneous objects and two bidders, and that each bidder does not know the other bidder’s material payoff structure. We conducted the laboratory experiments for eight payoff structures associated with complements and substitutes. We compare three types of auction formats, i.e., sequential first price auction, clock auction, and VCG mechanism. We also research questionnaires concerning the subjects’ impressions about the performance of these formats. The experimental results imply that the VCG mechanisms generally function very well, while the performance of the clock auctions is pretty bad in some cases. These observations are in contrast with the results of the questionnaires.

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