In Japan in the 1970s, there was widespread reflection among modern economists on methodological foundations of economics. This reflection found common ground with the objections of the American radicals of the same period. Takamitsu Sawa later called this trend “Japanese radicals,” commenting that while American radicals questioned the value premises of economics, Japanese radicals remained

methodological considerations. Using Sawa’s expression “Japanese Radicals” as a supporting line, this paper examines the universe of discourse of methodological reflection in Japan in the 1970s, and clarify that in the discussions of that time, there were also questions about the search for new “justice” and value assumptions that were not limited to narrowly defined methodologies. At the same time, the paper clarified the social context behind the trends in Japan and the U.S., including the differences in the position of mainstream neoclassical economics, the position of Marx’s thought, and the existence of an economic discussion forum that assumed general readers.

In Japan, there have not been many arguments based on theoretical economic models regarding non-investor-owned firms such as cooperatives. And theoretical elucidation of such organizations has been sought for a long time. Modern economic theory of cooperatives began with Ward（1958） and its main focus has been on labor managed firms （LMF） and labor cooperatives which are owned by agents providing labor inputs to those institutions.

Recent developments in this research field have shown that there are economic environments in which non-investor-owned organizations, such as cooperatives, partnerships, non-profit firms, mutually owned firms, and government institutions, could be more efficient compared to investor-owned firms, or such organizations might accomplish specific roles which traditional investor-owned firms cannot fulfill in the market. These works share some common characteristics that many of them were inspired by Hansmann （1996） and applied some theories of organizational economics including property rights theory with incomplete contracts which were developed by Grossman and Hart（1986） and Hart and Moore（1990）.

The current work provides an overview of important theoretical models of LMF as well as non-investor-owned firms in organizational economics, with special attention on those modeling user owned firms such as Hart and Moore （1996, 1998） and Bubb and Kaufman （2013）. We analyze the assumptions adopted in these models and explain how the conclusions are derived from these assumptions. Finally we consider what kind of implications these models of user owned firms might have for cooperatives and mutually owned firms in Japan.

This paper reviews empirical studies in Japan and the US on stock investors’ accounting information choice and information processing. Assuming limited information processing capacity, I first examine how investors choose high-value information and prioritize information processing. I then analyze the effects on corporate stock price formation. Finally, I review empirical results on firm’s strategic disclosure and management behaviors exploiting investors’ information choice and processing decisions. This paper aims to illustrate that when studying effects of accounting information on the security market and corporate behaviors, it is important to consider the fact that investors with limited capacity choose to process only some but not all available information.