Adam Smithʼs social theory analyzes and interprets both the unfolding and accumula-tive structures of human nature and society, while considering the foundation of hu-man instinct. My reinterpretation makes it possible to achieve a coherent understand-ing of The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, and to recognize the commonalities among Smith, Hume, and Darwin with respect to the viewpoint of evolutionary point of view.
Smithʼs concept of “instinct” is distinctly biological; it differs obviously from Lockeʼs philosophical concept and Humeʼs psychological one. There is no doubt that Smith followed Locke and Hume in terms of his empirical understanding of human knowledge and ways of thinking; nonetheless, Smith remained convinced that ani-mals had instincts-that is, they are born with innate programs. As shown in his de-tailed descriptions in “Of the External Senses”-including those of instinctual per-ception among the young of the partridge, the goose, and suckling animals, as well as worms that have no head but yet search for food-Smith came to this idea through elaborate direct observations and indirect observations via the work of Linnaeus. For Smith, the human species incorporates the instincts of self-interest （self-preserva-tion） and mutual altruism （sociability, the propensity to exchange）. This understand-ing is maintained without any change from that outlined in the “Letter to Authors of the Edinburgh Review” to that in the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
JEL classification numbers: B 10, B 31, B 41.
This paper re-examines W. S. Jevonsʼs thought on labour and elucidates its unique-ness and limitations.
Jevonsʼs subjectivist approach penetrated his theory of labour, and he regarded pain as the measure of labour. In the first edition of The Theory of Political Economy, Jevons provided insights that could lead to the negation of the market determination of wages and other work conditions, thus offering a rationalisation of the interven-tion of socio-political factors in labour exchange. In doing so, Jevons distinguished himself from other neoclassical economists.
However, Jevons lacked self-knowledge of the feature of his own theory. In addi-tion, he failed to provide a deeper perception of the distinctiveness of labour ex-change rooted in the variability of labour that depends on the workerʼs identity and the constraints imposed by the employer. Consequently, instead of advancing the an-ti-neoclassical perspective implied in his arguments, Jevons argued for the market determination of wages, similar to that of prices of non-human productive services and products, in the second edition of The Theory of Political Economy and other writings.
Jevonsʼs opinions on real issues concerning industrial relations also demonstrated ambivalence. Jevons approved of union activities to shorten labour time and conced-ed the efficacy of legal measures in settling labour disputes. At the same time, he clung to his advocacy of the market determination of wages and harshly criticised strikes for a pay rise. Furthermore, Jevonsʼs dichotomy of ʻeconomicʼ and ʻsocialʼ mat-ters, expressed in The State in Relation to Labour, excluded labour-capital class strife and other socio-political factors from the scope of his economic study.
This paper makes a thorough reappraisal of Jevonsʼs thought on labour, which has traditionally been construed as a transitional product from classicism to neoclassi-cism.
JEL classification numbers: B 13, J 01.
This paper aims to consider how the Chicago school of economics influenced the economic thought of Friedrich Hayek in his period at the University of Chicago, where he was a follower of the Committee of Social Thought from 1950 to 1962. This period is well known as “Hayekʼs transformation”‐from a theoretical economist to a thinker of liberalism. Therefore, to under-stand the development of his thought, it is im-portant to know who influenced him during this period. This paper will explore the relationship between Hayek and the members of the Com-mittee of Social Thought, by analyzing his works, correspondence, and typescripts written during this period. On the one hand, the similarities and differences between Hayekʼs liberalism and that of the Chicago school are pointed out. Hayek and several economists of the Chicago school were members of the Mont Pelerin Society and were anti-communists. Despite the tendency to place both Hayek and the Chicago school under the general banner of anti-socialism or anti-Keyne-sianism, they actually diverged widely on points of methodology and liberalism. However, it is an inevitable consequence that different methodol-ogies produce different economics, and the forms of liberalism based on these economics also differ.
JEL classification numbers: B 25, B 41.
This paper is intended to investigate the specula-tion theories discussed from the end of nine-teenth century to the early years of the twentieth century in the United States. During that period, business transactions such as futures trading, short selling, and settlements without any deliv-ery of properties were regarded as gambling or wagers, and therefore these transactions were prohibited by statutes in many states. However, some economists and finance professionals tried to justify these speculative transactions by argu-ing that there was a difference between specula-tion and gambling. In this paper, I investigate the arguments by H. C. Emery, A. T. Hadley, T. F. Woodlock, S. S. Pratt, H. Dewey, and J. E. Meeker, through which they all tried to distin-guish speculation from gambling and supported speculative transactions.
This research is significant because of two points. First, the discussion about the difference between speculation and gambling in the United States at that time can be adapted to the present evaluation of speculation. Second, it is clear that speculation theories at that time had an impor-tant role in the birth of risk theory and insurance theory in the United States.
JEL classification numbers: B 19, N 21.
In Jealousy of Trade （2005）, I. Hontʼs “realism” involves both a warning against understanding The Wealth of Nations as a product of the two idealisms of “civic-humanism” and natural juris-prudence, and an attempt to apply “Machiavel-lism,” or the perspective of reason of state, to the history of the world trade economy. However, when one puts Hontʼs argument in the context of Machiavellian political discussion, such as that of F. Meinecke, R. Tuck, and W. F. Church, it becomes clear that all of these scholarsʼ realistic understanding of the European history of ideas entails the description of the idealʼs history, in terms of progress towards it, rather than its re-nunciation. Specifically, Meinecke finds his ide-al in reason of enlightenment, Tuck in peace, Church in morality, and Hont in “cosmopolitical economy.” Nevertheless, each views the ideal in terms of its tension with historical reality. In contrast, H. Takemoto and T. Nakano, unencum-bered by such European idealism, seek a realis-tic political economy if in different ways while disregarding the ideal. For these two thinkers, reality is not a temporal hindrance that will eventually be overcome, but rather what contin-uously and permanently is. Hence, T. Nakano argues that an ongoing governmental industrial policy is a necessary measure to protect the nation and society, and H. Takemoto finds in The Wealth of Nations something like a political economy of order and safety.
JEL classification numbers: B 11, B 49, Y 30.