The focus of this paper is the wars in Europe from the middle of the seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century and their relationship with contemporary economics1 （limited to England and Scotland）. As for the relationship between war and economy, there has been the accepted view that war may arise due to particular economic interests. While it is true that early mercantilists saw foreign trade and war as inseparable, major economists in this period did not ﬁnd a cause for war in economy. Economists wrestled with the practicalities of ﬁ-nancing war, such as the tax reform, but as public loans were enlarged for the expenditure of war, warned against mercantilist wars and the bankruptcy of the state. Smith and Tucker had different opinions about the independence of the American colonies, and Malthus and Ricar-do disputed the causes of the recession that followed the Napoleonic Wars. The economists of this era, although considering war as a political matter, continued to look for ways to evade war. The issue of war as a struggle for supremacy between states was expected to be replaced by efforts to strengthen commercial and industrial competitiveness in the free trade market.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: B 11, B 12, N 45.
This paper raises a fundamental question and offers an original framework on war and peace arguments based on primarily examining contributions in the ﬁeld of war and economic thought after World War II. Among the prominent ﬁgures in this ﬁeld, I select three thinkers in the ﬁeld of economic thought, E. Schumacher, J. Galbraith, and K. Boulding, who present-ed their own systematic visions of a peaceful society. The fundamental question on war and peace raised here is, how we receive the principles of bios and eros, and of prosperity, from an ideally peaceful situation, wherein the nature of peace is deﬁned as “the negation of bios” (i.e., the principle of death）. In order to examine this question, I propose an original frame-work and deﬁne the concepts of war and peace using categories of conﬂict and violence.
In light of this fundamental question, in this paper, I reveal the contributions of the three thinkers to our understanding of creating a peaceful world. First, I present the background and explain the reasons for selecting these three ﬁgures. Second, I present the fundamental question and my theoretical framework to explore the responses of the three thinkers to the question. Finally, I clarify their responses and present an overview of their contributions to-wards a peaceful society.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: B 20, B 52, P 40.
This paper aims to explore the two essential factors of Dennis Holme Robertsonʼs theory of economic ﬂuctuation. Of the two, his ʻeffortʼ concept is important as the core of his real theo-ry, and his ʻindustryʼ concept is methodologically signiﬁcant. These concepts in his ﬁrst book, A Study of Industrial Fluctuation, offer clarity regarding his economic view and a method of macroeconomic analysis.
The ʻeffortʼ concept implicates the behavioural decision of individuals （micro-analysis）. All humans exert ʻeffortʼ for getting ʻsatisfactionʼ to maximise their ʻnet satisfaction,ʼ that is, the difference between utility and disutility. In other words, any behavioural decisions are based upon the ʻeffortʼ of individuals. The ʻindustryʼ concept is provisionally considered as a coordinated group of individuals. Therefore, the behavioural decision of ʻindustryʼ is assumed to be the same as that of individuals, which is based on an individualʼs ʻeffort.ʼ With these two concepts, Robertson gradually extended his analysis from an individual （micro-analysis） to industries and industry in general （macro-analysis）. This is the very macro analytical method of Robertsonian economics.
The ʻeffortʼ concept is also the core of overall Robertsonian economics; for his subse-quent major theories, ʻcapitalismʼs golden ruleʼ and ʻlacking,ʼ also are grounded in his ʻeffortʼ concept. Any factors, such as the labour-capital conﬂict or monetary disturbance, can cause ﬂuctuations. For Robertson, however, ʻeffortʼ is the only ʻrealʼ measure and should be assigned the highest weight as the essential factor.
Such a re-evaluation of Robertsonʼs ʻrealʼ theory is expected to furnish some hints with regards to certain outstanding issues of Robertsonian economics: （1） the ultimate cause of discord with Keynes, （2） inheritances from Marshall, and （3） the uniﬁed understanding of the ʻrealʼ and ʻmonetaryʼ theories in Robertsonʼs works.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: B 13, E 32.
The aim of this study is to shed light on the unknown tradition of Marshallʼs ethical notion of ʻeconomic chivalry,ʼ then inherited by A. C. Pigou, F. Y. Edgeworth, and J. M. Keynes. At the beginning, this work argues that while Marshall actually regretted not being able to indicate the practical aspects of economic chivalry in his speech in 1907, the point was later discussed by other contemporary economists. Speciﬁcally, in his public lecture, Pigou suggested that all employers should be guided by a spirit of economic chivalry, in order to built the facilities where young workers could have an opportunity to train physical and mental abilities. Then, Edgeworth regarded economic chivalry as a philosophical foundation for his economic wel-fare analysis, in which female workers should be treated equally to male ones, with the wage level determined only by productivity, not by gender differences. It is for this reason that he also pointed out the necessity of a subsidy to families. Finally, Keynes believed that, in the interwar period, the British economy could not recover only through the effort of chivalrous businessmen, who attempted to harmonise public interest and personal gain. The reason is that he negatively considered chivalrous businessmen, deﬁning them a ʻtarnished idolʼ in busi-ness practice at the time. Nevertheless, Keynes also argued the importance of setting the wage level based on fairness and reasonability. Overall, these distinguished economists evaluated Marshallʼs idea of economic chivalry within the laissez-faire doctrine both positively and negatively.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: A 13, B 13.
In the late 1920s, R. Hilferding （1877―1941）, an intellectual leader of the German Social Democratic Party and prominent exponent of organised capitalism, played an important role in economic policy, especially for agrarian problems. However, his activities have not been completely explored from a historical point of view. In several international conferences in 1926, he argued against aggressive protectionism in favour of mutually beneficial trade agreements and economic regulation under the League of Nations. Then, during parliamenta-ry discussions, he opposed the general rise of agrarian customs, and insisted on promoting high-grade, intensiﬁed production by means of differentiated tariffs and ﬁnancial aids. As for international cartels, he led the 1927 inter-parliamentary commercial conference to accepting his anti-monopolistic resolution.
Within the party, Hilferding, as commission chairperson, drafted an agrarian program based on his own earlier ideas as well as on the Austrian program, and successfully persuad-ed the party congress to adopt it in 1927. This program included measures for land reform, productivity improvement, and social policy, among others, intending to cooperate with the rural working populace anew.
As the ﬁnancial situation worsened late in 1927 and the year after, he urged the tempo-rary introduction of foreign credits in order to maintain business prosperity. He criticised the budget for mass taxation and military expenditure, highlighting the structural defects of the ﬁscal transfer system, and tried to restore the balance through administrative reorganisation. Nonetheless, he supported the emergency assistance project for agriculture, and demanded individually granted loans as well as the control of commerce and even of production for sta-bilisation. Overall, his economic policy aimed to make progresses in international cooperative relationships, avoiding block economy, and cope with agrarian and financial difficulties through productivity measures, basically grounded on his peculiar view of organised econo-my.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: B 24, B 31, P 16.
Introduction by Ken Mizuta and Shigeyoshi Senga
The text of which this is a translation is Chapter 4 of Takuya Hatori （1922-2012）ʼs Kotenha Keizaigaku no Kihon Mondai （The Fundamental Question of Classical Economics）, Tokyo: Miraisha, 1972. It had originally been published as an article with the same Japanese title, but Hatori gave it the slightly different English title ʻRicardoʼs theory of value and distribution in his Essay on Proﬁtsʼ in Fukushima Universityʼs Sho―gaku Ronsyu― （The Journal of Commerce, Eco-nomics and Economic History）, 34 （3）, 91-151, 1965, and then added some re-visions, in particular a ʻtotal rewriteʼ of Section 5, when it was included in the book cited above. Before the publication of the article just noted, Hatori had presented a report entitled ʻEarly Ricardoʼs theories on distributionʼ at the 29th Annual Conference of the Japanese Society for the History of Economic Thought held in September 1965 at the Otaru University of Commerce, and ac-cording to the postscript of the original article ʻin substance this included the content of this text up to Section 4.ʼ Hatori states that he wrote the article after having given his presentation and considered the criticisms it elicited.
Hatori began his academic work in the ﬁeld of Japanese economic history but later shifted his region of research to the broad range of economic thought, from ﬁgures such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the era of the civil revolution to classical economists in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Above all, he devoted his energies to study of British classical econo-mists like Adam Smith, Thomas Robert Malthus, and David Ricardo. Hatori particularly concentrated his efforts on the examination of Ricardoʼs economics.
This article aims to realise the concept of commerce on market economy in Sir James Steuartʼs An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy.
Studies concerning the social function of commerce remain limited, whereas commerce has performed an essential role for the functioning of the market. Sir James Steuart, known as a mercantilist, focused on importance of commercial activities and theorised on it in early times. I shall read his theory and offer an explanation of the idea and function of commerce in it.
According to Steuartʼs Inquiry, Book II, the main concept of commerce is not an inter-mediary role between producers and consumers but a trade among merchants. Merchantsʼ be-havioural principle is rational, unlike the limited rationality of producers and consumers. Trade among merchants creates the proper market price through the operation of ʻdouble competitionʼ and provides market information to non-merchants, producers or consumers, by the market price determined by it. Moreover, through the emergence the current prices in trade, commerce promotes the use of money in consumersʼ hands.
Steuartʼs theory of commerce provides an explanation of the reason for the necessity of merchants and commerce in market economy. His theory of the principle of commerce should be considered as an effective economic theory focusing on the signiﬁcance of com-merce in modern economy.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: B 11, B 31, D 49.
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw an upsurge of interest in Keynesʼs philo-sophical thinking, possibly favoured by the availability of the full set of the Col-lected Works, the reunion of all his papers at Kingʼs （the catalogue was com-pleted in 1993） and soon after the microﬁlming of all his entire papers （Cox 1995）.
Over the last 30 years or so a large literature has developed on the subject, which has branched out in various directions. Two main concerns can be found in this literature: （a） the question of the continuity of Keynesʼs views and ap-proach, since the early philosophical essays, through the Treatise on Probability to the General Theory; （b） how Keynesʼs economics is intertwined with his ethics and epistemology.
In this paper I am focusing on a narrower topic （perfectionism and conse-quentialism in Keynesʼs ethics and political philosophy） following in the foot-steps of Yuichi Shionoya, whose contribution on the subject I revisited on the occasion of a commemoration held at the ESHET Conference in Paris, in May 2016.
While much has been said in the literature on the non-consequentialist po-sition held by Keynes in ethics, less has been said on his being consequentialist in politics. Following in Shionoyaʼs footsteps, I would like to pursue the matter further, in particular on the implication for Keynesʼs economics.