Prior research on innovation/creativity suggests that creative projects transpire in two tasks: idea generation and implementation. During idea generation, the team engages in developing prototypes with massive information processing and high unpredictability because the task and team elements, such as problem definitions, solutions and relationships, are highly ambiguous in the initial phase. On the other hand, during idea implementation, the team should mobilize actual resources required to convert the prototypes into commercial products. These distinct features of each task are deeply related to both the team’s size and its network structure and are key to enhancing the team’s creative performance. However, despite a claim that the optimal team composition might differ depending on creative tasks, numerous studies have rarely taken into account the distinctive creative tasks. Thus, I posit that the optimal team composition for creative projects differs depending on whether the team is in the idea generation or implementation. To test hypotheses, I use the data of the Japanese Music industry. In song production, both lyric writing and composing can be considered part of idea generation, during which prototypes are produced. Arranging and performing constitute implementation, when the prototypes are converted into commercial products by mobilizing recourses. Using a dataset comprising 20,845 song production projects, the analysis reveals several findings. (1) Team size during idea generation (lyric writing and composing) has a negative impact on product market performance, whereas team size during implementation (arranging and performing) has a positive impact. (2) The relationship between team size during idea generation and market performance is negatively moderated by the degree of the team’s brokerage position. By contrast, the above relationship during implementation is positively moderated by the brokerage position. (3) The relationship between the degree of team membership overlap across two phases and market performance has an inverted-U shape.

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For this paper, five cases of new business development at Canon were studied and investigated to shed light on the logic for legitimizing the mobilization of key resources in the new business development process, and it was found that in four cases the logic was that endorsements had been received from other well-known companies or organizations. This paper emphasizes that the decision-making entity itself can deliver a process for legitimizing resource mobilization for a new business by referencing and utilizing social and political status, mainly because of the high level of trust placed in assessments made by well-known external economic entities.
The analytical framework employed in this paper is Burgelman’s Process Model of Internal Corporate Venturing process model, and two areas are analyzed. These are championing, an important process activity in the aforementioned model, and legitimization as a project strategy. The objects of the survey were projects at Canon to develop new businesses, namely 3DCGs, rotary encoders, new types of semiconductor wafer, liquid-crystal color filters, and new types of speaker.
Of these, I presented detailed facts concerning four cases the logic of which had been endorsed, and used a total of 10 examples from these cases to empirically verify them. For the investigation, I compiled the results of the analysis, discussed why such logic exists, and presented this logical model.

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Traditionally, companies in developed countries gradually lose their competitiveness in an industry as the industry matures. Under these circumstances, these companies should pursue high-value-added or cutting-edge technology to differentiate from advancing countries.
According to this traditional view, the Japanese shipbuilding industry would have lost its competitive advantage. In fact, this sector has been legally positioned as a structurally depressed industry since the 1970s. In addition, Japan’s shipbuilding production volume has been overtaken by Korea in the 1990s and by China in the 2000s. Some Japanese major shipbuilders withdrew from the industry or experienced mergers and acquisitions for survival.
However, the Japanese production volume of ships has risen since the later 1990s. Moreover, at the individual company level, certain existing Japanese companies have recently obtained competitive advantage without incorporating high value-added products or cutting-edge technology. These companies primarily make bulk carriers, which are traditional and relatively simple, and low value-added type of ships. Some of these companies are currently achieving their highest sales or profits.
This situation has not been predicted in management literature. Today, some researchers are examining this topic; however, determining how certain Japanese companies can have competitiveness without higher value-added innovation has not been fully discussed yet. Therefore, this study discusses why certain Japanese shipbuilders can gain competitive advantage with products that are low value-added and not particularly innovative.
Two cases of Japanese shipbuilding companies are considered, each with its own way of thinking regarding product design, both of whom have successfully changed product architecture. From these examples, this study infers that even an existing organization (for example, the development division of a manufacturing company) should learn component or production knowledge for successful architectural dynamism in a traditional industrial structure.

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This paper’s goal is to study the reason for rigidity in innovation framing. Entrepreneurs, typically firms in the modern society, frame innovative techniques to motivate their supporters in the market (in other words, outside of the organization). However, the framing is not always effective. Sometimes important interest groups are not in sync with the framing, and these then refuse to support the innovation. Nevertheless, firms seem to persist in ineffective innovation framing. Why does this phenomenon persist?
The answers to this question differ depending on the methodological perspectives of the analyzer. Allison (1971) provided three fundamental perspectives to consider when analyzing an organization’s actions: The rational actor model, the organizational process model, and the governmental politics model.
We propose three explanations for the rigidity in ineffective innovation framing. The rational actor and the organizational process models are important, but not sufficient because they disregard the political processes and conflicts in organizations, whereas the governmental politics model sees the organization as a combination of groups that have particular values. It also pays attention to the inequality of power that exists within an organization.
The following is our rationale for choosing the governmental politics model. First, entrepreneurial groups in organizations frame innovative techniques toward their markets. Second, in spite of the fact that important interest groups in the market are not in sync with the framing, other interest groups with greater power in the organization are in support. Third, entrepreneur groups cannot revise the framing because of the influence of power groups. This is the political explanation for the rigidity in ineffective innovation framing.

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This article investigates how Japanese firms deviate from a diffusing corporate governance practice—holding their annual shareholder meeting in the same date with other firms. Prior to the late of 1990s, despite making it impossible for shareholders who have stocks of multiple firms to attend annual shareholder meetings of firms they invest, such a practice was common among Japanese firms. However, after the late of 1990s, some Japanese firms have deviated from the diffusing practice by changing their annual shareholder meeting date. In this article, using a longitudinal dataset on the annual shareholder meeting of the Japanese firms in the period of 1995 through 2004, I examine the antecedents of the deviant behavior by Japanese firms and find (1) that foreign shareholders encourage firms to deviate from the practice, (2) that organizational misconduct (in this context, payoff scandals) leads to deviation from the practice not only by perpetrators of payoff scandals but also by industry bystanders—firms that do not involved in the payoff scandals but are in the same industry as perpetrators, (3) that as the number of deviations in the same industry increases, firms are more likely to deviate from the practice.

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