In “From Alethic Anti-realism to Alethic Realism” Künne distinguishes between alethic realism and alethic anti-realism. This article examines whether or not alethic anti-realism is appropriate, when we take the position of using common sense to settle a philosophical problem. To that end, I will first review Künne's theory. Next, I will point out that Putnam's natural realists are alethic realists, that Wright's moderate internalists are alethic ani-realists, and that Wright argues against Putnam. Then, I will argue that Künne's conception of truth escapes the criticism of Wright's argument. Lastly I will also review Tennant's argument for anti-realism, and argue that in spite of Tennant's argument, alethic anti-realism is not appropriate when considered from a commonsense point of view.

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The theory of knowledge as a natural kind holds that knowledge has a theoretical unity in the causal structure of the world. Since knowledge supports causal explanation and prediction, we can investigate knowledge empirically like other natural kinds such as water. But epistemological nihilism holds that knowledge does not have such a theoretical unity because we can always observe the diversity of knowledge. This paper aims to defend the theory of knowledge as a natural kind from epistemological nihilism. To do this, I will suggest that we can understand knowledge as a biological kind like species or organs, and then accommodate the diversity of knowledge to this viewpoint positively.

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Historians of mathematics often mention that Cauchy's Cours d'Analyse (1821) brought a “rigor revolution” to analysis. Since the notion of rigor occasionally appears in the history of mathematics, it is essential to characterize Cauchy's “rigorous” attitude. When Cauchy encountered special examples that didn't satisfy general rules, theories, or formulas, he modified the latter to accommodate the former. This attitude was quite innovative because eighteenth century mathematicians generally neglected such examples and kept the general theories. After Cauchy, nineteenth century mathematicians refined their arguments when they found counterexamples to their theories. The change of treatment of counterexamples is an essential factor of Cauchy's rigor revolution.

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According to the relational view concerning the ontological nature of perceptual experience, perceptual experience is a relation between the perceiver and its object. Moreover, if it is a relation, then it must be a cross-time relation. After explicating the principal motive for the relational view, this paper considers whether the ontological nature of perceptual experience can really be construed as a cross-time relation, and argues that the relational view can be defended against objections based on a temporal ontology in the form of the time-lag argument which assumes either Presentism or Eternalism. So it is concluded that as far as temporal ontology is concerned the relational view has no serious problem.

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It seems necessary to reply to the review of my book Paradoxes of Bertrand Russell, by Natsuki Takamura on this journal No. 106. Takamura was involved in verbal trivialities and repeated a stereotyped view to the effect that Russell did not admit the significance of modality in metaphysics. On the contrary, Russell's idea of modality as properties of propositional functions, not of propositions, must be estimated to have anticipated the possible world semantics. My book suggested it, and many texts by Russell himself and other scholars support the interpretation.

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