Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
Online ISSN : 1884-1236
Print ISSN : 0022-7668
ISSN-L : 0022-7668
Volume 48, Issue 1
Displaying 1-4 of 4 articles from this issue
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Articles
  • Why is Spacetime’s atom not Spacetime itself?
    Sho FUJITA
    Article type: Articles
    2020 Volume 48 Issue 1 Pages 1-19
    Published: 2020
    Released on J-STAGE: November 18, 2020
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

    In recent discussions as to emergence of spacetime, spacetime is said to be not fundamental in quantum regions, which we must apply quantum gravity’s theory to and to be derived from fundamental entities. This is a very strange picture not only from philosophically but also commonsensically. As to classical regions, there have been already many discussions from structural realists about spacetime in General Relativity regarding how “curved spacetime” exists and where it does. But most papers on emergence of spacetime in quantum gravity’s theory are independent from details of these structural interpretations, namely traditional discussions about ontology of spacetime. This paper tries to connect classical structural spacetime and quantum spacetime’s atoms called “spinnetwork” in loop quantum gravity as one of the examples of fundamental entities through the quantization of gravitational fields. And I check from ontological viewpoints whether there are some structural discontinuities between classical and quantum regions based on “isomorphism”, comparing the quantization of electromagnetic fields.

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  • Kodai SATO
    Article type: Articles
    2020 Volume 48 Issue 1 Pages 21-26
    Published: 2020
    Released on J-STAGE: November 18, 2020
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

    The topic of this paper is an intention. John Searle distinguished two types of intention: a prior intention and an intention in action. Subsequently, Hubert Dreyfus and Elisabeth Pacherie presented their views of intention in action. This paper places importance on Dreyfus’ view among three views of intention in action. In my view, on the one hand, Searle and Dreyfus discussed a propositional intention in action. Regarding this discussion, I argue that Dreyfus’ view is superior to Searle’s view. On the other hand, Pacherie presented the view of non-propositional intention in action. I argue against her view by invoking Dreyfus’ insights about a propositional intention in action.

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