This paper examine the provisions of some constitutions on voting rights. If we remove Buchanan-Tullocks two suppositions on voting rights, and think the range of qualified voters as a variable, then changing the value of this variable will have an influence on interdependence costs of people. So, it is reasonable to entrust the task to select the range of qualified voters to the legislature, in making an optimal reaction to exogenous changes immediately. On the other hand, because people in the legislative stage have two different incentives to reduce the range of qualified voters, and to choose specific attributes as criteria to be given voting rights, it is necessary to protect other people from them. The condition that such a protection is given could be thought along Muellers theory.

　Sensitivity analysis is a thought experiment typically performed as one of the robustness checks in statistical analysis. It relaxes one of the assumptions necessary to estimate the unbiased estimator. Especially, sensitivity analysis for unobserved confounder slightly relaxes the ignorability assumption. While ignorability usually requires that the independence between potential outcomes and the treatment assignment conditional on observed covariates, this sensitivity analysis posits ignorability holds only after conditioning on both observed and unobserved confounders. Then, the treatment effects are estimated under the influence of an unobserved confounder with various strengths. If these estimated treatment effects still reveal the substantively same results as the original estimates, researchers might conclude that the original estimates are robust against the presence of an unobserved confounder. In this paper, I introduce the three major classes of sensitivity analyses with the examples drawn from political economic literature.

　This study examines how the appearance of candidates and campaign pledges affects voting in younger generations. Regarding the mechanism of political decision-making in teen voters in Japan, previous research divided young voters into two sides: politically immature or mature. However, which side is valid is indecisive. To test the hypothesis, whether teens can make the "right choice" based on campaign pledges, rather than looks, we conducted a randomized survey experiment targeted at young ages in Japan (n=1929). In this experiment, we prepared promises that randomly combined five age-different looks of candidates and policies that focused on benefits for young voters. And subjects selected the most profitable candidates from five candidates. The result of the experiment showed that people in their twenties choose candidates whose pledges are closer to their benefit, whereas teens select candidates based on their own benefit when the candidate looks young. This result suggests not only that increasing the voting rate but also political education is important for the enlightenment of teens.

　In this paper, I analyze the relationship between the candidates apparent age and young voters' evaluation of him, utilizing the movie retouching technology and randomized experiment. Specifically, I analyze the effects of apparent age on 1) the image of reformist 2) the power of mobilization for young voters 3) voters' evaluation of his policy and 4) overall evaluation as a political candidate. To do so, I videotaped a speech of an actual local politician of 40 years old. Then by utilizing the movie retouching technology, I manipulated apparent age of him and prepared two videos of speech of him. The two videos are exactly same except for the apparent age and I use the video as stimuli of an experiment. With the interaction of political interest of voters, the image of reformist and power of mobilization are affected by the apparent age. However, apparent age does not affect voters' evaluation of his policy and overall evaluation as a political candidate.

　In this paper, we examine what kinds of the elements of distributive principles, such as maximizing the amounts of the lowest income and maximizing the amounts of the average income, individuals prefer behind the "thin" veil of ignorance using an experimental research. Behind the thin veil, although individuals know the structure of income distribution in given imaginary societies, they do not know who they are, how talented and rich they are. The conjoint analysis, which is used to analyze the results of our experiments, reveals that behind the thin veil, individuals prefer the society that provides higher lowest income to the one that provides higher average income or larger gap. Following this result, we conclude that, contrary to previous theoretical and experimental research, Rawls's idea can be supported behind the thin veil. (132 words)

In order to obtain voters' sociotropic economic evaluations during election surveys in Japan, a question worded "how are the overall business conditions [keiki] at the present time in Japan?" has long been used. The question could instead ask for an objective evaluation of the national economic condition by being phrasing as "how is the economy [keizai] in the country as a whole? Would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten worse, stayed about the same, or gotten better?" In the first question, the choice of the phrase "overall business conditions" could invite subjective and even egotropic evaluations. Furthermore, a simple question about either business or economic conditions cannot educe which economic policy field respondents recall while answering. In the present study, we assumed that the ex-ante partisanship of those who respond with government policy in mind affects their sociotropic economic assessments more strongly than those who do not, and a partisan bias therefore exists. Further, literature has pointed out that subjects use their pocketbook conditions for information cues to evaluate socioeconomic conditions, and to confirm the presence of this egotropic bias, whether respondents tend to evoke their own economic situation as reflective of the nations socioeconomic policy must be confirmed.

　The method used to address the above concerns was an online-survey experiment comparing the conventional question based on business conditions (control), the question based on economic conditions (treatment 1), and a branching question (treatment 2). The branching question first asks survey respondents to choose and rank four appropriate fields of economic policy, and then asks them to evaluate the actual situations in these four fields. Based on this experiment, involving three types of questions, and by testing the hypotheses with a conventional difference-of-means test and structural equation modeling, it was found that (1) the most recalled economic field is personal income when respondents were asked about economic policy; (2) both partisan and egotropic biases are likely to exist among Japanese voters; and (3) both partisan and egotropic cues are triggered in those who think of the economic field as related to the Cabinet's policy emphases, than those who do not.