The behavioral inhibition network is a conceptual model that combines a mechanism for inhibiting extraneous behavior so that animals can maintain behavior appropriate to their environment, and the other one for suddenly releasing that inhibition and producing unexpected behavior. This model was developed from efforts to reconsider the animal mind not only as a source of mental function, but also as a source of otherness. Originally conceived as a mechanism by which the mind produces otherness, the model has points of contact with Whitehead's philosophy of the organism. The first is that extraneous behaviors hide inside the animal by inhibiting each other, so that behaviors appropriate to the environment are maintained. This function of inhibition is related to the 'negative prehension' in the philosophy of the organism. The second is that unexpected behavior is produced. Unexpected behavior is positioned as extraneous behavior in contrast to environmentally appropriate behavior. On the other hand, in an unknown environment, where it is impossible to choose a suitable behavior from an existing behavioral repertoire, unexpected behavior is positioned as an emergent behavior to help the animal cope for the time being. The emergence of such unexpected behavior is associated with 'novelty' in the philosophy of organisms. This paper considers the significance of the behavioral inhibition network model for the philosophy of organisms. Section 1 explains how this network works, using the example of an experiment leading to unexpected behavior in a familiar animal, the pill bug. Section 2 considers the the relationship between this model and Whitehead’s philosophy of organism.

View full abstract

The recent publication of A. N. Whitehead’s Harvard Lectures has turned scholars’ attention to the important role the concept of “evolution” may have played in the formation of his cosmology . Following this discovery, this paper aims to identify a “philosophy of evolution” as a general study on the modes of becoming of various types of entities, which underlies his well-known “philosophy of organism.” In light of his emphasis on change over stability, the paper argues that the concept of evolution in Whitehead’s system points to the way in which the various orders of nature co-become from the chaotic flux of events as emergent “values,” forming what he calls “societies.” Although this idea clearly differs from the nineteenth century theories of social evolution, the paper further suggests that Whitehead’s incorporation of a theory of value realization into the concept of evolution nevertheless ends up putting the latter in an ambiguous position in relation to the idea of progress. Finally, the paper considers the implications of the “philosophy of evolution” for the question of philosophical method. A close reading of the 1936 discussion between Whitehead and John Dewey shows how Whitehead ’s notion of “aesthetic enjoyment” corresponds with Dewey’s idea of “enrichment of life,” both of which are inseparable from their respective philosophical responses to the evolutionary worldview.

View full abstract

This paper examines the relation between Whitehead’s natural philosophy and metaphysics in “First Lecture: September 1924”. The first chapter looks at what problems arise according to what Whitehead’s metaphysics is thought to be. L.S. Ford asserts that the metaphysics suddenly emerged in the middle of the Harvard Lectures. However, this paper argues that the metaphysics formed progressively from a train of thought from the natural philosophy. Chapter 2 clarifies an awareness of the problem between the natural philosophy and “First Lecture”. In this way, this paper provides a continuous flow of thought between them. Chapter 3 examines the transition from the natural philosophy to the metaphysics. This transition involves two changes. The first is the change from the theory of extension to the theory of process. The second is the change from providing the concept of nature to providing the concept of reality. Thus, this paper discusses the flow of thought from the natural philosophy to the metaphysics and the formation process of the metaphysics.

View full abstract

Nishida’s and Whitehead’s philosophies are the non-substantial philosophies that have their basis in the “process of generation” based on relativity and quantum theory since the beginning of the 20 the century. It is a philosophy that understands that “reality” exists in the process of becoming in a “field” (chora) opened at the “bottom of nothingness” (= the infinite opening of the absolute), rather than a philosophy that has been based on substantive notions such as “idea”, “ousia” or “eidos” since ancient Greek philosophy. Then, I would like to inquire into the problem of the field in both philosophers. The problem is, how the logic of the contradictory identity between God and each individual in K. Nishida’s philosophy and the convertibility in the process of becoming concerning six characteristics between God and world in A. N. Whitehead’s philosophy are possible in the field of groundless ground as the absolute infinite openness through the ways of understanding the problems of field, God, reality and nature in both philosophers.

View full abstract