The Nan’yo Nichinichi Shimbun (daily newspaper in Japanese), which was published in Singapore for 28 years from 1914 to 1941, has been used in several academic books and papers, but it was never used after comprehensively understanding it. The purpose of this article is to organize the necessary prior knowledge for comprehensively using the Nan’yo Nichinichi Shimbun. I will summarize why the newspaper was able to be publisled so early in 1914, what the Japanese society in Singapore was like at that time, and what kind of research possibilities there are, including those in the surrounding areas. The aim is to explore the possibilities of research.

原子力発電所の廃炉では，地域住民，行政，事業者，原子力専門家などによる対話の場の形成が廃炉に伴う社会課題の解決につながると考えられている。しかし，2011年3月の福島第一原子力発電所（1F）事故を契機に廃炉が本格化した福島では，地域住民，国，東京電力，原子力専門家の間における社会的溝が深まり，対話が困難になっている。本研究は，こうした状況を念頭におきながら，信頼関係が損なわれた市民，行政，事業者，専門家がどのようにして社会的分断や対立を乗り越え，対話を行うことができるのかを明らかにする。

本研究は，熟議民主主義論に基づく対話の場に注目し，福島における1F地域塾という対話プロジェクトを対象とし，分断と対立に特徴付けられた社会の中でどのように対話を実現するかを考察する。考察から，これまで対話が困難であった地域住民，行政，東京電力，原子力専門家の間で，1F地域塾を通じて対話の前提となる相互尊重が醸成されたことを示す。

こうした相互尊重の醸成メカニズムについて，本研究は社会的学習という熟議の機能に注目した。従来の熟議民主主義論に比べ，本研究で提唱する社会的学習の概念は，相互理解だけでなく信頼形成を重視したものである。1F地域塾の経験から，相互理解と信頼形成を同時に促進する社会的学習を通じて相互尊重が醸成されるメカニズムを明らかにする。

1F廃炉をめぐる議論は，地域社会に広く浸透しているとは言えない。1F廃炉事業が50年，100年と続くことを考えると，より広い地域社会を巻き込んだ対話が重要となる。1F地域塾の事例は，市民，行政，事業者，原子力専門家が，社会的学習を通じ，意見の違いを前提とした相互尊重を育む可能性を示している。本研究は，厄介な社会課題に対する効果的な対話の場と学びの場（Learning Community）の形成の方法を示す。

On 21 November 1903, five Japanese were arrested in Bangkok on suspicion of counterfeiting Siamese (Thai) government notes. They were Iwamoto Chizuna, Yamamoto Yasutaro, Wada Inosuke (pseudonym of Sakutake Toranosuke), Sasaki Tokumo and Takahashi Sanya. These Japanese had just manufactured counterfeit banknotes in Japan and brought them to Bangkok on 10 November of the same year.

These Japanese were complicit in a banknote counterfeiting masterminded by two privileged Thais, one was Prince Pongsa (Kromma Muen Bongsa Disornmahip,1861–1936), half-brother of King Chulalongkorn, the other was Nai Peng Srisararaks (1867-?). The latter was the eldest son of Chao Phraya Phasakorawong and Lady Plian,who were most prestigious aristocrats in Siam.

The roles of the Japanese suspects were as follows: Yamamoto was a close friend of Nai Peng, and as a result, liaised with Iwamoto (written as Ewamoto in Thai documents), who was well known in Japan; Iwamoto used his network to find competent counterfeiting technician and Japanese funder; Sakutake was a counterfeiting technician; Sasaki was in Bangkok to liaise with the Thai mastermind; and Takahashi was a fund provider on the Japanese side.

Economic development in Thailand has resulted in the need to circulate paper money as well as silver coins. Thailand started using government banknotes on 23 September 1902, but within six months, the above two privileged Thais plotted to counterfeit banknotes and approached the Japanese to manufacture them.

It was not until 15 April 1903 that Japan’s first law (Imperial Ordinance No. 73) punishing the counterfeiting of foreign banknotes and coins etc. was implemented, and before that there was no law in Japan punishing the counterfeiting of foreign banknotes. Therefore, in February-March 1903, when Yamamoto, Iwamoto and other Japanese joined the counterfeiting of Siamese banknotes, the risk of being arrested for counterfeiting Siamese banknotes in Japan was low. In addition, Japan had extraterritorial jurisdiction rights in Thailand at the time, so Japanese nationals in Thailand were protected by the consular court, and even if they committed a crime in Thailand, Japanese law would be applied and they would not be punished under Thai law. Thus, counterfeiting Thai banknotes was a low risk for the Japanese, and they may have casually joined the conspiracy.

Iwamoto Chizuna, who had been living in Kyoto after contributing to the welcoming of Buddha relic from Thailand to Japan in June 1900, was complicit in the counterfeiting of Siamese banknotes.

This banknote counterfeiting case has been little known until now. This paper is the first to reveal the correct facts of the case by using official documents and newspaper reports from both Thai and Japanese sides.

At the same time, this paper reveals certain aspects of Thailand’s political and economic society at the beginning of the 20th century. For example, the efforts of the first Japanese minister to Thailand, Inagaki Manjoro, to build friendly relations with Thailand, economic activities of the Thai royal family and upper nobility, Japanese consular jurisdiction, the Thai judiciary not independent of the King, and Criminal penalties by the King for royalty who committed illegal acts.

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The Battle of Okinawa (March–June 1945) is known as the only ground invasion of Japan’s home islands during World War II. The fighting engulfed the population of Okinawa’s largest island, where the Imperial Japanese Army, instead of protecting Okinawan residents drove many to their deaths. Today, the battle is represented in the public memory by forcibly induced “group suicides” and the army’s reputation as “more to be feared than the enemy.” But there is another Battle of Okinawa, where some of the smaller islands, sidestepped by American and British Commonwealth forces, were spared the agony of a land war but also lived under harsh military rule in fear of imminent death.

My research focuses on the case of Miyako Island in the southernmost part of Okinawa Prefecture. Allied combat teams did not invade Miyako during the battle. War casualties were relatively few, and there were no mass suicides. During the Okinawan war, some 30,000 Japanese troops were stationed on the island, exercising military control over 52,000 residents. In September 1945, following Japan’ surrender on August 15, the soldiers were disarmed but most remained on Miyako. They were not detained and forced into U.S. internment camps, as POWs had been on the major islands. Japanese supply ships no longer reached the island, which was now cut off from the outside world. The demobilization and repatriation of the Japanese garrison would not be completed until February 1946.

Until recently, it has been held that since Miyako was not invaded and there were no collective suicides, it avoided, relatively speaking, the devastation that afflicted Okinawans on the main island. Here, however, I turn to the utter isolation into which Miyako was plunged after the defeat. My focus is on how, during the roughly seven months between defeat and repatriation, the Japanese army transformed its defensive military operations into a different but in some ways equally severe struggle, the battle against hunger. That fight, I believe, illustrates vividly an important yet often neglected aspect of the nature of war.

Since Miyako was never invaded, many Japanese army records pertaining to the food situation immediately after the war have remained intact. I discovered many of those materials in the Center for Military History at the National Institute for Defense Studies, and in the Okinawa War Materials Reading Room in the Cabinet Office’s Okinawa Development and Promotion Bureau. These documents were hand-written on flimsy, ultrathin paper as the food crisis and lack of other vital supplies threatened the army’s physical survival, and deciphering them today requires a considerable investment of time and effort.

I analyze the records of these so-called food self-sufficiency operations from the following angles. First, what kind of planning for self-sustaining food production did the Japanese military initiate in the isolated conditions prior to Japan’s defeat? Secondly, how did the army manage to maintain military discipline during these campaigns? Finally, the army had been disarmed at the battle’s end. What conditions allowed it to preserve its organizational integrity while concentrating all energies on intensive food-growing and scavenging activities?

The data presented here are significant for understanding similar self-sufficiency policies that Japanese forces in other isolated Asian countries deployed as they struggled to feed themselves in the months after the surrender. At the same time, these materials will help clarify the social and psychological impacts of wartime occupations on the people subjected to military rule.