Graham T. Allison, the author of Essence of Decision, once described the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 as “a seminal event”. In fact, numerous analytical studies of the crisis have already been written. Moreover, new information which has recently become available sheds new light on the conventional understanding of the crisis, making the event even more attractive to students of international politics and foreign policy. This article is a review of the new information that has recently arisen regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis. In addition, an analysis is made on what kind of influence this new information might have on the development of foreign policy theory.
The largest pillar of this recent revision to the Guban Crisis is the three review conferences, which have been held since 1987. The first was the Hawk's Cay (Florida) Conference, held in March 1987, in which former Excomm members and scholars on international politics got together and recapitulated and re-analyzed the decision-making process in the Kennedy administration during the crisis. The second was the Cambridge Conference, which was held in October 1987, the 25th anniversary of the crisis. At this conference, three Soviets (Mikoyan, Burlatsky, Shakhnazarov) made testimonies on what was happening in Khrushchev's inner circle. The third one was held in Moscow in February 1989. The course of events in the Kremlin was clarified even more at this conference by first-hand accounts made by Andrei Gromyko and Anatoli Dobrynin, among others.
In addition, newly declassified documents, as well as newly published memoirs by those involved in the crisis, both from the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R., include some startling revelations.
The new information from the American side includes: President John F. Kennedy acutually planned secretly that he would offer a public trade between Soviet missiles in Cuba and U. S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey at the final stage of the crisis (“Rusk revelation”); Robert Kennedy, who had been thought as “the leader of the doves, ” initially insisted on a naval invasion of Cuba; the decision-making process was in fact not so systematic as scholars have analyzed, with the policy makers heavily burdened with psychological stress; etc. Now that the new information is available and we know that there is a diverse possibility in interpreting the decision-makers' motivations for their stances, we have to construct and make use of a more dynamic decision-making model, not a static one like the Bureaucratic Politics model, in order to explain what was really happening in the Oval Office during the thirteen days.
On the other hand, the new revelations from the Soviet side include: Khrushchev's real motivation for deploying missiles in Cuba was to prevent a possible American invasion; Khrushchev got angry at Kennedy's announcement of quarantine and nearly ordered the running of the blockade; Khrushchev also suffered from the heavy pressure of being on the brink of a nuclear war and finally decided to withdraw the missiles from Cuba; 20 nuclear warheads had already arrived, and 40, 000 troops had been sent to Cuba; etc. Although the new revelations from the Soviet side are highly welcome since they fill blank spots in history, we need more information, not only oral testimony but also archival materials, to ascertain the hard facts in the Kremlin during “the Caribbean Crisis.”

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Although the United States and the Soviet Union seriously competed with each other through nuclear arms racing, they never fought each other directly. This is a puzzle because the more severe the conflict is, the higher the incentives become for the conflicting parties to fight. To tackle this issue, I pick up two classical hypotheses explaining the surprising stability of the international system. H1 is the theory of nuclear revolution developed by Robert Jervis. H2 is the stability of bipolar world constructed by Kenneth N. Waltz. The Cuban Missile Crisis is used here to test these hypotheses. This case study is timely because we now know the details of this important political event. As a result of testing these two hypotheses, H1 passed and H2 failed: U.S. decisionmakers, especially John F. Kennedy, first got angry about the Soviet’s sudden installation of nuclear missiles’ sites on Cuba, but he gradually come to favor a quarantine because he was afraid of nuclear retaliation if the U.S. military attacked Cuba. This evidence confirms that H1 is valid. As for H2, this assumes that superpowers do not have to care about alliance politics in the bipolar world because their security is ultimately threated only by the other power, so it should only balance against the other superpower internally. Nevertheless, the United States and the Soviet Union both did worry about how their allies reacted, the US even endangered the missile deal with the Soviets for the sake of its relatively minor ally, Turkey. This evidence of superpower behavior is inconsistent with H2. In sum, the stability of the international system was maintained by the nuclear revolution, at least during the Cold War.

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細胞診断業務においてわれわれは日常パパニコロウ染色を用いている.このパパニコロウ染色には, 5種類の色素が含まれており, その色調によって角化の程度の識別, 細胞型の推定, また核クロマチンの所見や増量の程度を知ることができる.しかし, それらは感覚的, 主観的であり, 検鏡する者によって, 染色結果の評価に若干の差があると思われる.そこで今回われわれは, エオジン, ライトグリーン, オレンジG, ヘマトキシリンの色調を数値化することにより, パパニコロウ染色を客観的に評価できるのではないかと考え, 繊維の染色結果を評価するため開発されたLab表色法を用い市販の4社の染色液, それぞれの色調の違いを測定し比較を行った.この方法により観察による色調の差を数値の差として表わすことを可能にすることができたので報告する.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis, which happened in December, 1962, is generally regarded to have been avoided successfully. However, new information has come to light today, as a result of new fact finding missions and historical inspections, which shows that the Cuban Crisis was not resolved but prolonged and incorporated into the structure of global politics. That is to say, the crisis was not averted and the threat of conflict continues to exist even after the Cold War. Especially in Cuba, the crisis became embedded in the core of the political regime, and political transition has been blocked as a result of tensions with the US. After the Cuban Crisis, the US promised Cuba not to invade Cuba, but Cuba has faced severe provocation, as the US has continued to carry out military interventions (Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama) and covert actions (Cuba and Guatemala) in Central America and the Caribbean. In addition to Cuba, the Nicaraguan Revolution serves as another example of how crisis was not avoided but incorporated into the structure of global politics. The US had a hostile policy against Sandinista Revolution and intervened indirectly to reverse the revolutionary process. Ultimately, a conservative group assumed power in Nicaragua and the socialist revolution came to an end.

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