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  • 小松 香織
    日本中東学会年報
    1990年 5 巻 113-172
    発行日: 1990/03/31
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    オスマン帝国軍
    艦エルトゥールル号は、スルタン。アブデュル・ハミト2世の命により1890年日本に来航したが、帰路熊野灘で暴風雨のため遭難し多数の犠牲者を出した。この悲劇的な事件は、これまで日土交渉史の文脈の中で繰り返し語られてきた。本稿は、この事件の百周年を契機に、従来とは別の視点から捉え直そうと試みたものである。第1章では、トルコ海軍文書館の史料に基づき、エルトゥールル号派遣計画の立案から遭難に至るまでの経緯を整理し、事実関係をできるだけ明らかにするとともに、いくつかの問題点を指摘した。第2章では、背景となった19世紀末のオスマン帝国をめぐる国際関係、特にアブデュル・ハミト2世の外交政策を分析し、その結果をふまえてエルトゥールル号派遣の持つ歴史的意味を考察した。なお、詳しくは拙稿「アブデュル・ハミト2世と19世紀末のオスマン帝国-エルトゥールル号事件を中心に-」(『史学雑誌』第98編第9号40-82頁)をご参照いただきたい。
  • 小澤 一郎
    日本中東学会年報
    2016年 32 巻 1 号 119-148
    発行日: 2016/07/15
    公開日: 2018/06/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this article, the author studies the arming of the Ottoman-Iranian Borderland after the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-78), as an attempt to clarify the significance of the “modern age” in the history of firearms. The Russo-Ottoman War gave rise to the diffusion of Martini-Peabody rifle in the Borderland, the impact of which can be discerned from Sheikh ‘Obeyd allāh’s revolt in 1880 and the destabilization of the regional security in the 1880s and 1890s. On the other hand, the Qajar irregular forces armed with those rifles displayed their own importance, and the Qajar dynasty attempted to utilize “modern” arms spread in the region by mobilizing these irregulars. This attitude seems to have been related to the general military policy of the Qajar dynasty in the age. Reacting to the arming of the Borderland, indigenous gunsmiths attempted to produce the imitations or to reuse metal cartridges locally, showing the indigenous technological level of arms production. Finally, the author suggests that these developments prepared the ground for the later historical developments including the Constitutional Revolution and the conflicts between various ethnic groups in the region in the WWI period.
  • 宇野 昌樹
    日本中東学会年報
    1997年 12 巻 217-243
    発行日: 1997/03/31
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    There is a mountainous region, covered by volcanic rocks called Jabal Druze, situated approximately 80km south-east from Damascus, the capital of Syria. This region is inhabited almost entirely by Druze people and is the largest center for the Druze in Syria, and an important stronghold of the Druze in the Middle East. It was from the end of the 17th century to the early 18th century that the Druze built their community in this region, which seemed to be waste land. However, only since the early 19th century have the Druze people increased their population rapidly and established their influence. In 1861, the name "Jabal Druze" was first mentioned officially as a place name in Ottoman documents. The establishment and the expansion of the Druze community in Jabal Druze were impelled by the Druze settlers (newcomers), who came from other regions beginning in the 19th century. Their arrival affected the preexisting community in Jabal Druze in diverse ways. In short, on one hand, the migration of the Druze led to the establishment and expansion of the communal society. On the other hand, the Druze community has experienced a large social change due to the rapid expansion of the population. The following examples will serve to highlight these social changes. First, the prominent family, which had dominated the Druze community since its early establishment in Jabal Druze, lost its leading position, and has been replaced by a new prominent family. In short, the expansion of the community played an important role in destroying the relations among existing powers. Second, the leading religious class was formed. It is well known that there is a hierarchy, like Sheikh 'Aql, 'Uqqal and Juhhal, in their religious establishment. But it seems that the leading religious class as a Sheikh 'Aql did not exist before the 19th century, but only since the 19th century. It seems that the appearance of the leading religious class occurred because of the growing population of the Druze and the development of the Druze community. But the most rapid social change inside the Druze community may be the growth of the difference between the rich and poor peasants'. That is to say, the society differentiated deeply between "haves" and "have-nots" (holders and nonholders) by the increasing of the population. Although in 1889, many Druze peasants rose in revolt on a large scale (the so-called "Ammiya"), it seems that the main cause of the revolt were the rapid social changes created by the artificial increase of the population due to migration. The main motives of this article are to examine the following points: one is how the increase of the population brought the social changes through the Druze migration to Jabal Druze during the 19th century. The other is how the social changes affected the outbreak of the Druze peasants' revolt.
  • 高橋 公太
    Organ Biology
    2023年 30 巻 2 号 124-126
    発行日: 2023年
    公開日: 2023/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小山 皓一郎
    オリエント
    1971年 14 巻 2 号 125-141,186
    発行日: 1971年
    公開日: 2010/03/12
    ジャーナル フリー
    In 1683 Vienna was sieged by Ottoman Turks and was relieved after two months “Vekayi'-i Beç” is the first major Turkish source for this historical event. It exists in two manuscript copies, one in London and the other in Istanbul (T. K. S., Revan, No 1310-of which microfilm was recently accepted by the Toyo Bunko, Tokyo). The portion of the work concerning the siege and its aftermath has been translated into German and annotated by Richard F. Kreutel (Kara Mustaf a vor Wien: das Türkishe Tagebuch der Belagerung Wiens verfasst vom Zeremonienmeister der Hohen Pforte). “Vekayi'-i Beç” is. supposed to be an official diary written by the anonymous Master of Ceremonies (tesrifatci) of the Ottoman court. Its eyewitness description reflects first-hand knowledge about the abortive Turkish siege of Vienna. Moreover, through the examination of this diary we shall be able to throw light on the military structure of the Ottoman state.
  • New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003, xix+506pp.
    江崎 智絵
    アジア経済
    2005年 46 巻 3 号 91-94
    発行日: 2005/03/15
    公開日: 2023/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岩本 廣美
    人文地理
    2015年 67 巻 3 号 267-268
    発行日: 2015年
    公開日: 2018/01/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 木村 真
    現代史研究
    2006年 52 巻 85-90
    発行日: 2006/12/25
    公開日: 2018/06/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―トルコの奉仕運動のグローバル的教育支援の理念と実践―
    イディリス・ダニシマズ
    比較教育学研究
    2015年 2015 巻 50 号 222-233
    発行日: 2015年
    公開日: 2020/08/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中村 覚
    日本中東学会年報
    2000年 15 巻 127-151
    発行日: 2000/03/31
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this paper is to clarify the political perspectives of bedouins who joined the Ikhwan Movement. This study argues the process that the chief of the Mutayr tribe Faysal al-Dawish became a major Ikhwan leader from the perspective of examining the balance of power and the political rhetoric he used. Faysal al-Dawish had been an opportunistic bedouin chief and had resisted the expansion of the rule by Al Sa'ud before he joined the Ikhwan Movement. However, after the cities of the Qassim region were occupied by Al Sa'ud in 1907 and the northern desert became a target for tribal manipulation by the Ottomans in 1914, he reconciled with 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud and pledged loyalty to him. Then he settled in hijrat al-Artawiyah. This was a political process of rational choice by Faysal to preserve political independence and to expand the territory of the Mutayr tribe as much as possible. Faysal engaged in propagating the Wahhabism to the bedouins since 1917 and started compeling his tribesmen to accept it by force in 1919. He voiced his opinion directly to 'Abd al-'Aziz that he wished to attack the enemy of the Wahhabis. He commanded an Ikhwan troop in the Battle of Hamd and the Battle of Jahra' in 1920. Thus, he became a leading figure in the Ikhwan Movement. However, relations between 'Abd al-'Aziz and Faysal were more complicated than to be simply called "Imam and subject." In one aspect, their relationship was an alliance which benefited both of them mutually in order to expand their territory. He never abandoned his ambition to expand his suzerainty. However, on the other hand, they were rivals in the fact that they were cautious about the increasing power of the other. They also competed for Islamic legitimacy in their political rhetoric.
  • 宇野 昌樹
    日本中東学会年報
    1989年 4 巻 2 号 81-116
    発行日: 1989/03/31
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    La population des Druzes compte actuellement environ 530,000 personnes reparties entre la Syrie, le Liban et Israel, et s'eparpillant jusqu'en Jordanie. En Syrie, les Druzes sont a peu pres 260,000, ce qui signifie que presque la moitie de la population druze se trouve en Syrie, et surtout au Jabal ad-Druze. Elle ne represente toutefois que 3% de la population totale syrienne. On peut done dire que cette communaute confessionnelle est peu nombreuse. La population druze, bien que tres minoritaire en Syrie, a cependant assume un role important dans l'histoire moderne syrienne. Par exemple, la lutte centre l'ocupation francaise de 1925 a 1926, qui a ete a l'origine de "La Grande Revolution Syrienne". Et on ne peut pas non plus negliger les mouvements de resistance contre les dictateurs, lances par les Druzes a l'epoque des bouleversements politiques apres l'independance. Cependant, les etudes concernant les Druzes en Syrie, a la difference de celles concernant les communautes druzes du Liban ou d'Israel, restent peu nombreuses et peu systematiques. Cet article se propose d'ebaucher une analyse et d'apporter des precisions sur l'histoire et la societe druze en Syrie. Tout d'abord, sur le plan historique, le developpement de la communaute des Druzes est du aux migrations en provenance du Liban en particulier, migrations dont les causes etaient essentiellement politiques. Ce developpement de la societe druze en Syrie a donne lieu a des changements politiques et sociaux importants, en particulier, au Liban et en Syrie. Sur le plan sociologique, leur communaute presente un morcellement hierarchique particulier fonde sur une ideologie religieuse, formulee par les "Majlis" et les "Mazars" et renforcee par une pensee comme celle de "Taqammus". Il n'existe pas a notre connaissance d'etude realisee sur la communaute druze qui traite specifiquement de la Syrie, ni d'etude comparant les communautes entre elles. Le travail a realiser est donc du domaine du defrichage et il serait souhaitable que des recherches se multiplient qui eclairent de point de vue varies un domaine de recherche quasiment inexplore. [figure]
  • 三倉 康博
    HISPANICA / HISPÁNICA
    2005年 2005 巻 49 号 135-149
    発行日: 2005/12/25
    公開日: 2010/06/11
    ジャーナル フリー
    En el Viaje de Turquía, diálogo anónimo del siglo XVI, encontramos dos visiones distintas del Imperio Otomano, una positiva y otra negativa.
    Por medio de Pedro de Urdemalas, ex cautivo de Estambul e interlocutor principal en dicho diálogo, el autor alaba algunas características del Imperio Otomano en contraposición con la sociedad española de la época; valora muy positivamente la devoción y laboriosidad de los turcos; tiene una elevada estimación por la eficacia de su justicia y de su ejército; y además, habla a favor de la política de tolerancia religiosa y sistema de movilidad social de Turquía. Por momentos, los audaces alcances de esta visión laudatoria del Imperio Otomano son sorprendentes.
    Pero por otro lado la obra abunda en descalificaciones acerca de los turcos, y en los estereotipos antimusulmanes más comunes de la época: su religión-el Islam-es falsa y terrenal; su moral sexual es materia de corrupción; los otomanos no son continuadores, sino destructores, de la civilización bizantina; el nivel de sus letras y de sus ciencias- sobre todo en el ámbito de la medicina-es deplorable.
    Estas aparentes contradicciones en la imagen que el autor nos presenta sobre la sociedad turca tienen su explicacián: para él, al igual que para muchos contemporáneos, el Imperio Otomano es el enemigo religioso irreconciliable de la cristiandad. Partiendo de esta premisa, el Viaje de Turquía subraya los defectos de los turcos para justificar la guerra contra ellos, y al mismo tiempo elogia sus virtudes para demostrar al lector lo que falta a España para vencer al enemigo.
  • 羽田 正
    オリエント
    1987年 30 巻 2 号 28-46
    発行日: 1987年
    公開日: 2010/03/12
    ジャーナル フリー
    Eclaircir une partie des politiques de Sah Tahmasp face aux Qizilbas est un but principal de cet article.
    Après avoir examiné les deux sources persanes, l'une qui montre la situation des tribus qizilbas au début du règne de Tahmasp et l'autre qui est une répertoire des émirs qizilbas à la mort de ce deuxième souverain safavide, l'auteur a souligné les trois points suivants.
    (1) En attribuant bien des pontes d'émir à la tribu Ustagalu, Tahmasp lui accorda un traitement spécial. Il en résulta que, d'une part, la coopération Chah-Ustagalu réussit à maintenir l'ordre politique au moins sous le règne de ce roi, d'autre part, elle provoqua le mécontentement sérieux parmi les autres tribus qizilbas. Cela explique bien la scission de la confédération qizilbas après la mort de Tahmasp.
    (2) En accordant les pontes presque équivalents aux plusieurs personnages dans une tribu, Tahmasp tenta d'y diviser le pouvoir.
    (3) Tahmasp forma une équipe administative, composée des membres de la famille royale non-tribaux et non-divaniens persans pour éviter la contestation quelconque de la part des Qizilbas.
    Toutes ces mesures prises par Tahmasp assurèrent un régime relativement stable dans la deuxième période de son règne. Mais, une telle politique menée par Sah Tahmasp n'était pas sans limite. Tant qu'il comptait entièrement sur les forces qizilbas, it lui était impossible de tout mettre en oeuvre pour anéantir l'influence des tribus.
  • ―関係性の結果としての宗派―
    酒井 啓子
    国際政治
    2017年 2017 巻 189 号 189_17-189_32
    発行日: 2017/10/23
    公開日: 2018/12/19
    ジャーナル フリー

    In order to analyse contemporary global crises, it is necessary for scholars of International Relations and Area Studies to overcome two limitations: Area Studies’ tendency to focus only on the substance of certain states or areas and the state-centric understanding of International Relations. Contemporary conflicts and faultlines that intermingle and interlock from the local level to the global level cannot be explained simply by unilineal causal relations among the existing actors but rather are complicated by their reciprocal interaction. In order to grasp the widespread networks of co-relationship among various actors, a new analytical framework should be introduced which frames current affairs as the product of a web of interconnections, and as a result of the transformation of those relationships, rather than on the actors’ essential qualities.

    As a case study of the above new framework, this paper analyses sectarian “faultlines” in post-war Iraq. Since 2003, violent clashes have occurred in Iraq, which Western media and policy-makers considered to be “sectarian conflicts.” As most of the Western policy-makers assume an essentialist understanding of sectarian relations in Iraq, they consider the sectarian factor as an explanatory and independent valuable. However, in order to propose an alternative approach to the perception of sectarian groups as cohesive actors, this paper avoids substantial “sectarian factors” for explanations of conflict in post-2003 Iraq, and focuses instead on the transformation of the various kinds of relationships that led to political and social strife. It sees how sectarian factors emerge as a result of mobilisation of rhetoric and legitimisation of fighting parties.

    This paper analyses media narratives in Iraq and surrounding states. It discloses that pro-government Iraqi media and Iranian media consider IS as inhuman terrorists while Arab and Turkish media as a reflection of anti-government ideology and sentiments in Iraqi society. In the regional power struggle between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, each media, domestic or regional, focuses on the victimhood of their side, and a sectarian narrative further legitimatises the appeal of the victims for their rights. For each side it is not “us” but “others” that discriminate us and exclude us from the Iraqi nation or from the religion of Islam; each side uses sectarian terms to demonise the others, with each insisting that it is “us” who pursue the unity of the community. This paper concludes that the conflicts in post-war Iraq are caused by the competition among the fighting actors over the right to claim the injustice of marginalisation, which often relies on sectarian legitimisation.

  • 反植民地闘争を率いたリビアのスーフィー教団
    塩尻 和子
    宗教研究
    2023年 97 巻 2 号 153-173
    発行日: 2023/09/08
    公開日: 2024/02/29
    ジャーナル フリー

    第一次世界大戦前の一九一一年からリビアはイタリアによって過酷な植民地支配を受け、多くのリビア人が犠牲になった。そのなかで社会参加型の視点をもった神秘主義思想を目指したサヌースィー教団の活動は、戦間期のネオ・スーフィズムの一環であったとみなされる。その活動は砂漠の遊牧民の団結を目標に展開され、ジハードを掲げて武装集団を指揮し、リビアへ侵攻するヨーロッパ列強の撃退を担った。創始者の大サヌースィーによって最初の修道場が建設されて以降、特に第三代教団長の下では、リビア以外のエジプト、スーダンでも外国勢力と戦うことになった。神秘主義教団によるゲリラ戦は負け戦になることが多かったが、第二次世界大戦では連合軍に加わり、小規模ながらこの参戦によって戦後の一九五一年一二月にリビア連合王国の独立を勝ち取った。サヌースィー教団の活動は、西洋列強による植民地政策に抵抗する政治的活動を宗教的に意味づける効果があった。

  • 黒川 知文
    宗教研究
    2005年 79 巻 2 号 475-498
    発行日: 2005/09/30
    公開日: 2017/07/14
    ジャーナル フリー
    十字軍、レコンキスタ、フス戦争と近代以後に起きた諸宗教戦争は、宗派対立型、教派対立型、政治対立型に類型化することができる。その本質構造は、社会的危機、経済的危機、政治的危機、宗教的危機等の危機状態になった時に、宗教に民族主義が結合して、排他的教説が採用されると、排他的戦争へと変容するということにある。排他的教説とは、二項対立論と悪魔との「聖戦」論と終末における戦争論であり、キリスト教においては、その救済論と人間論と終末論から生起したと考えられる。民族紛争における宗教の要素は宗教戦争のそれとはかなり異なっていると推定される。
  • ヌーリ・パシャとエルキレット・パシャの活動を中心に
    宮岡 孝尚
    オリエント
    2003年 46 巻 1 号 144-161
    発行日: 2003/09/30
    公開日: 2010/03/12
    ジャーナル フリー
    As nationalism was one of the most important aspects of Kemalism, the early Turkish Republic showed no interest in the areas and peoples beyond her border. Atatürk suppressed the activities of those advocating Pan Turkism and had them purged, but after his death, Ismet Inönü recognized their rights and the movement rose again.
    During the final years of the First World War, Nuri Pasha, who was one of the younger brothers of Enver Pasha, and his uncle Halil Pasha advanced towards the Caucasus region with an army. After the war they stayed in Berlin. After returning to Turkey, Nuri established a weapon factory. Many people visited him because of the nostalgia they felt for his brother Enver Pasha. During the republican era, there were many generals and officers within the Turkish Armed Forces who admired Enver Pasha, and the relatives of generals monopolized the weapon industry.
    Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet fought together with German colleagues during the First World War and retired as a major general in 1932. As for the reason for his retiring at such a young age, a famous story has it that it was because he gave the map of the fortified zone of Çanakkale to the Germans, but the real reason was his intimate relationship with the Freedom Party.
    In 1925, Nuri and Erkilet secretly assembled with friends who had fought in Caucasus, in 1940 Erkilet, Halil and their families vacationed together, and after 1941 they often held meetings concerned with the Turkic peoples living in the Soviet Union.
    It was thought that Erkilet was pro-German, though in his articles in the ‘Cumhuriyet’ newspaper he seemed to be neutral. However, after the start of the Nazi-Soviet War, he was active against not only the Soviet Union but also the Russians.
    In September 1941 Nuri visited Berlin, and proposed to persons of authority in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Turkic peoples found their own states and organize the Muslim corps to support the German forces. Moreover, he stated that a Pan Turkist cabinet would be formed in Turkey and most of the officers would support it, and he mentioned the name of General Kazim Orbay, his brotherin-law who commanded the 3rd Army, as a person who would play an important role in the Pan Turkism movement.
    Hitler personally invited the two retired generals Erkilet and Ali Ihsan Sabis to the eastern front, and so they applied for the necessary visas for leaving the country. However the Turkish government intervened and replaced Sabis with General Ali Fuat Erden. In this way, the Turkish government turned the personal invitation into an official one.
    In 1944, after the advance of the Red Army towards Eastern Europe, the Turkish government arrested the Pan Turkists and began the trial so-called “Racism and Pan Turkism Trial.” They were convicted on the pretext of having cooperated with the Germans. However since Nuri and Erkilet were prominent persons under the patronage of the Turkish Armed Forces, they were neither arrested nor indicted even though they had close German ties.
    General Erden, who was promoted to chief judge of the Supreme Court-Martial, dismissed the verdict of the “Racism and Pan-Turkism Trial.” As the reason for this dismissal, it was thought that he believed that it was not necessary for Turkey to demonstrate any sympathy for the Soviet Union. However, at the same time, there were conflicts between Inonu and the Turkish Armed Forces as is shown by the contraversy over Fevzi Çakmak's pension and Orbay's resignation. After the war, the explosion in Nuri's factory and his death gave rise to active discussions in the Turkish National Assembly. This also proves that there were many opponents to Inönu.
  • 帯谷 知可
    ロシア史研究
    1992年 51 巻 15-30
    発行日: 1992/08/07
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 鈴木 真吾
    日本中東学会年報
    2015年 31 巻 1 号 1-27
    発行日: 2015/07/15
    公開日: 2018/03/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the second half of the nineteenth century, belediyye (municipality) was established in major Ottoman cities. Its principal role was to maintain public health by means of street cleaning and disinfection. Though it was the autonomous body, a Provincial Health Inspector (Vilâyet Sıhhiyye Müfettişi) regularly examined the task of sanitary services offered by the municipality. Also, he often ordered it to take preventive measures such as a medical care for the poor and a vaccination for children. Street sweepers who were recruited by Dutch auction cleaned the street, collected the garbage and disinfected the city. Hygiene guidelines issued by the municipality instructed its inhabitants on how to maintain public health. But at the same time, these kinds of municipal services were strongly demanded by inhabitants of Izmir who considered it essential to keep the environment clean in order to defend against poisonous air. Thus, it can be said that the sanitary reform of the municipality was not only the top-down process, but also the bottom-up process. Personal hygiene was stressed as well as public hygiene. With the progress in bacteriology, the sanitary measure in this period seems to have become an individual thing.
  • 奥 美穂子
    比較都市史研究
    2010年 29 巻 1 号 13-30
    発行日: 2010/06/20
    公開日: 2017/08/25
    ジャーナル フリー
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