This paper traces the changing course of the patriotic policies of Putin’s government, and shows that the ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyz had a great impact on the Russian political process.
Post-communist Russia has suffered from serious political and economic disturbances, comparable with smuta in tsarist Russia. In the first period of the New Russia, while Yeltsin’s government adopted a series of western-oriented policies, the opposition put forward an alternative line based on Russian nationalism. As Russian citizens displayed anti-western sentiments, however, president Yeltsin also changed course and modified policies to take national feelings into consideration. As a result, almost all political forces in Russia became proponents of Russian patriotism. Therefore, we need to examine the real contents of the patriotism held by political forces, particularly in each administration.
President Putin, who followed president Yeltsin in 2000, stressed the importance of patriotism in his policies. Valerie Sperling, who analyzed patriotic policies in post-Soviet Russia, argues that Putin practiced various policies based on ‘militarized patriotism’ toward Russian youth, because his government needed to foster their loyalty to the state and their interest in joining the Russian army. Although I agree with her claim that Putin pursued patriotic policies, Sperling appears not to have grasped a turning point in policy transformation under Putin, in particular the real meaning of the ‘color revolutions’ that took place in the former Soviet Republics in 2003–2005.
This paper analyzes the two programs for promoting patriotism among Russians, each of which was adopted under Putin’s government in 2001 and 2005. The difference between both programs is that the first was directed at all social and age groups, while the second mainly targeted the younger generation. Why did the latter program focus on youths? This paper examines the political impact on Putin’s administration of the ‘color revolutions’ in the CIS countries in which the younger generation played a significant role, and clarifies Putin’s efforts to prevent these revolutions from spilling over into Russia, through organizing a new youth organization named ‘Nashi,’ publishing a new edition of the guidebook for teaching Russian history, and other efforts.

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As a result of a series of centralization reforms, initiated in 2000, a great number of studies have discussed that the center entrenched its control over regional subjects in Russia. Yet, several regional unrests observed in the recent years demonstrates an urgent need for an overhaul of the Russian center-periphery relationship, to which only limited attention has been paid yet. This study explains this instability by the increase of outsider governor deployments. Exploiting an original dataset of all governors from 1991 to 2019, patterns of outsider deployments and the effect of such deployments on the regional political processes are examined. Although President Boris Yel’tsin initially held the right to appoint and dismiss most governors in the first half of the 1990s, he did not try to dispatch outsider governors not firmly embedded in the regional societies. Whereas governors began to be elected through the popular gubernatorial elections in almost all of the regions since 1995, outsider candidates rarely won the posts of governors. In Vladimir Putin’s first and second terms (2000-2008), the power balance between the center and regions radically changed in favor of the center. In addition, scholars have argued that the center’s dominance over regional elites increased rapidly due to the de facto appointment system of governors was introduced in 2004. Nevertheless, even then, outsider governor deployments remained exceptional cases. Since the influence of United Russia as a dominant party was limited at that time, federal elites had to receive the endorsement of governors, as regional bosses, to secure the stability of the regime. However, after the triumph of United Russia in the 2007 parliamentary election and the advent of President Dmitrii Medvedev, the Presidential Administration embarked on active replacements of regional bosses with outsider governors loyal to the center. Consequently, while the center got capable of controlling regional political processes more tightly, these radical cadre reorganizations caused dissatisfaction and protests of regional elites, as a result of which electoral performances in the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections declined in the eyes of the center. As a compromise to massive protest movements brought about by the immense size of electoral frauds, popular gubernatorial elections were reinstated in 2012. However, the influence of the center over the recruitment of governors continues to be remarkable and the number of outsider governors is still growing. Yet, in the late 2010s, the decline of the regime’s popularity caused instability at the regional level, as demonstrated by the fact that several candidates backed by the federal government lost in gubernatorial elections. While outsider deployments have merits for the federal elites to control regional political processes through them as loyal agents of the federal government, their lack of embeddedness in local elite communities has detrimental effects on regional unrests. To test this argument, this study investigates the relationship between outsider deployments and regional electoral performances. The OLS estimate and Inverse Probability Weighted estimate demonstrate that outsider governors deliver fewer votes than local governors. Those findings imply that the center-periphery relationship in Russia is still in flux even though the rules of the game have changed since the 1990s.

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　小児および未成年期に放射線被ばくによって甲状腺がんが誘発されることは，広島・長崎の原爆被爆者，X線を用いた白癬治療，胸腺肥大治療などの医療被ばく者，ならびにチェルノブイリ原子力発電所事故からの¹³¹I取込による内部被ばく者の疫学データから知られている。本稿では，甲状腺がんの種類と特徴ならびに，これまでに知られていた未成年者の甲状腺がん疫学情報の知見を中心に記述する。

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