In the 1966 NATO crisis settlement process, the United States switched from its traditional “hardware solution” to a new approach for dealing with both nuclear and military expenditure issues. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union revealed no possibility of the Soviet Union approving access by West Germany to nuclear weapons through the Multilateral Force (MLF) (NATO nuclear force) system. As a consequence, West Germany was guaranteed participation in American strategy through the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) via the Defense Planning Committee, an arrangement that the Soviet Union could permit. At the same time, the United States would continue to deploy nuclear weapons in existing NATO regions under the NPT system based on the US interpretation of articles 1 and 2 of the NPT. As for military expenditure issues, the system of offsetting foreign exchange payments due to the stationing of American troops in West Germany by the purchasing of American weapons by West Germany reached its limit with the fall of the Erhard government (October 1966). In response to this issue, the United States and West German governments mutually agreed in conjunction with West German parliament deliberations that, first and foremost, these foreign exchange payments would not be offset through the government’s budget but rather be “neutralized” by having the Bundesbank hold onto American treasury securities with a pledge to refrain from exchanging them for gold.

This article explores the pivotal but largely unwatched 1985–1986 Soviet diplomacy over the Stockholm Conference, also known as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), in terms of its broader domestic and international contexts. It explains why and how the Soviet Union made concessions to Western proposals in the Stockholm negotiations after Gorbachev took office. Regarding the most contentious issue of the on-site inspection, the following three people — the new General Secretary, the Foreign Minister with no diplomatic experience, and the diplomat on the ground — collaborated to create the unprecedented Soviet decision. The long-held Soviet secrecy collapsed because the triangle stifled both the conservative KGB’s and military’s opposition.

The Stockholm agreement, reached after two and a half years of negotiations, was the first multilateral East–West security accord since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the first arms control agreement involving the two superpowers since SALT II in 1979. It is also remarkable that its success was one of the first achievements for Soviet diplomacy in the ambitious Gorbachev period. However, the real significance of the conference lies in Soviet concessions in areas previously deemed unacceptable. The Kremlin, which had long adhered to secrecy, accepted the West’s proposal for on-site inspections.

This paper is organised into four main parts. The first chapter deals with the end of the Gromyko era after Gorbachev’s advent. From the beginning, the new leader had a vision of improving international relations but no concrete plan. Meanwhile, the old-fashioned Foreign Minister, who had long dominated Soviet diplomacy, showed continuity in foreign policy from the pre-Gorbachev period. The second chapter analyses the period immediately following Eduard Shevardnadze’s appointment as Foreign Minister. Shevardnadze, who had no diplomatic experience, strengthened the bottom-up mechanism of actively incorporating his colleagues’ views. The increased discretion of negotiators on the ground significantly impacted the future of Stockholm. The third chapter focuses on the discordance between the words and deeds in Soviet diplomacy following Gorbachev’s spectacular declaration in January 1986. While the leader actively announced new initiatives, actual Soviet diplomacy did not profoundly change course. This chapter also stresses that the Chernobyl nuclear incident was not the decisive impetus for reaching the Stockholm agreement. Finally, the fourth chapter describes the confrontation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff. The quiet war behind the Kremlin walls brought complex improvisation into the Soviet decision-making process and negotiation stance.