この試論においては日本における学士課程教育について考える．まずアメリカにおける学士課程教育を直接の観察とアーサー・レビーン，マーク・エドモンソンらいくらかの大学人の言葉をとおして見る．その目的は比較することではなく，一考することにある．次に日本の高等教育について，専門機関の一般教育課程で教壇に立った経験を基礎に考える．最後にリベラルであれ専門化したものであれ学士課程教育においてなにが真に大切なのかを追究する．

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As the United States fought the War with Iraq under the administration of George W. Bush, there emerged a heated discussion on the nature of the American presidency. Some even speak of the arrival of “the new imperial presidency.” Yet the nature of the American presidency, especially its powers concerning foreign policy, is still unclear.

This essay delineates the contours of presidential foreign policy concentrating on the first successive administrations, i.e., those from George Washington to John Quincy Adams, because their foreign policy can be construed as an archetype. In doing so, this writer attempts to demonstrate the framework under which the modern presidents of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have pursued their foreign policy.

On the subject of the first successive administrations, Ralph Ketcham’s Presidents above Party is a penetrating intellectual history. Although acknowledging his interpretations of the presidency as a whole, this essay focuses on foreign policy under the first six presidents.

First, the origins of the foreign policy powers of the American president and how the Federalist administrations of George Washington and John Adams actually confronted international issues are discussed. In the young republic, the partisan battles between Federalists and Republicans were closely connected with the Anglo-French rivalry. All in all, however, Washington and Adams contributed to the establishment of an independent executive by forging bipartisanship in foreign policy.

Second, this essay deals with the administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. The Jefferson administration provides the first example of how the presidency can display strong leadership. Following the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, Jefferson’s power was at its zenith. The subsequent Madison administration fought the War of 1812, the first foreign war since the founding of the United States. In starting the war with England, Madison cooperated with Congress, holder of the power to declare war. But by the end of his term, he barely retained the leadership role he had inherited from his predecessor because predicaments from “Mr. Madison’s War,” such as the burning of Washington, were humiliating to the nation’s honor.

Third, the relationship between the President and Congress under the administrations of James Monroe and John Quincy Adams is discussed. During this period, Congress increased its power under the leadership of Speaker of the House Henry Clay. Thus Congress was able to influence the Monroe administration’s recognition policy toward the new Latin American republics. After the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, Congress also influenced the course of foreign policy under the Adams administration.

In conclusion, the bipartisanship in foreign policy, the strength of presidential leadership, and the rise of Congressional power seen under the first presidencies were the harbingers of the foreign policy role of the modern presidency. The bipartisan Vandenberg resolution of 1948, Woodrow Wilson’s leadership in the United States’ entry into World War I, and the resurgence of Congress after Watergate all testify to it. In this sense, the foreign policy of the first successive administrations was the archetype for that of the American presidency.

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The research to date on the fleet of the United States North Pacific Exploring and Surveying Expedition (NPSE), which visited Shimoda in May 1855, has concluded that the fleet's aim was to test the effectiveness of the treaty of peace and amity between Japan and the United States, known as the Kanagawa Convention (concluded 31 March 1854), under direct orders issued by the US Secretary of the Navy, despite the fact that the Convention had not yet been concluded when the NPSE departed from Norfolk, Virginia, in June 1853. The purpose of this article is to reveal more concrete detail the diplomatic purposes and reasons behind the NPSE's visit to Japan. It was in August 1852 that the NPSE was scheduled to be dispatched to survey the North Pacific maritime region, as part of US Navy and State Department policy aimed at challenging British hegemony and protecting whale fisheries in the region. While these objectives were similar to those of Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan, the NPSE also intended to negotiate with countries that Perry had not visited. This means that both Perry's expedition and the NPSE were equally important to US diplomacy regarding the North Pacific region. However, the two expeditions did not always cooperate. For example, the NPSE had to suspend its surveying activities when it arrived at Hong Kong in May 1854, because Perry had concentrated his vessels in Japan, leaving no US ships in the South China Sea to protect American merchants during the confusion created by the Taiping Rebellion. Finally, the author shows that when the NPSE did arrive in Shimoda, its aim was to open negotiations with Japan, not on the orders from the Navy, but on the decision of the NPSE Commander John Rodgers himself. Before heading for Japan, the NPSE visited the Ryukyu Kingdom, where Rodgers judged that the treaty between the Ryukyus and the United States, which had been concluded by Perry, was being violated by the government of the Ryukyus, a perception that probably influenced his decision to proceed to Japan. Contrary to the widely held view, the author shows that the Secretary of the Navy did not order the NPSE to visit Japan with the purpose of testing the effectiveness of the Convention of Kanagawa and calls for a reconsideration of the character of US diplomacy regarding the Pacific Ocean region, in general, and Japan, in particular during the mid-19th century.

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