This issue of International Relations features the international history of the 1960s and 70s.
These two decades may be characterized as the period in which the Cold War structure underwent a gradual and yet steady transformation, and it could also be argued that this period prepared for the final collapse of this structure.
In discussing this “transformation, ” we need to discern the continuing elements and changing elements in these decades. Hence constancy and change. First, what did not change? My answers are as follows: (1) throughout the Cold War period the United States had pursued a “containment” policy toward the Soviet Union. Even the “detente” of the early 1970s meant for the United States one form of containment; (2) the Soviet Union never abandoned, throughout the decades, the principle of “class struggle” in international politics. In Leonid Brezhnev's mind, “detente” never meant giving up support for “wars of national liberation”; (3) and yet, the United States and the Soviet Union were very careful not to get into a direct military confrontation, and the United States took extra care not to intervene in the Soviet “sphere of control” in Eastern Europe, as evidenced in its attitude toward the erection of the “Berlin Wall” or the Soviet invasion into Czechoslovakia.
What changed, then? (1) There were gradual, discernible changes taking place in Europe in the 1960s and 70s, in the form of economic and cultural exchanges or “independent” diplomacy or economic policy of certain East European countries; (2) while some degree of stability was established in Europe, the theater of the Cold War moved to the Third World where “proxy wars” were often fought, sometimes involving China too. It is extremely difficult, however, to explain how these changes contributed, if at all, to the disintegration of the Cold War structure; (3) during the period the power of the two “superpowers” declined relatively, thus creating the “diffusion of power” inworld politics.

抄録全体を表示

The United States has always had a unique attitude about its national security. This attitude is reflected in its isolationist tradition, the massive building of nuclear arms during the Cold War, and its eagerness to retain its military strength as the only superpower after the Cold War. This essay depicts the contours of United States security culture from a historical perspective utilizing recent studies on American foreign policy by diplomatic historians. In examining the security culture of the United States, the essay focuses upon three distinct characteristics of American political culture: the Judeo-Christian tradition, republicanism, and liberalism.
The United States is one of the most religiously observant industrially advanced nations and the Judeo-Christian tradition has influenced American security policy as illustrated in the concepts of “city upon a hill” and “Manifest Destiny.” Its anti-communist crusade during the Cold War, exemplified in John Foster Dulles's diplomacy, and the evangelical overtones of the war on terror also testify to its strong influence upon American security policy. On the other hand, the Jeremiad, typically detected in the writings of George Kennan, has urged American people to reflect upon the shortcomings of their security policy.
Republicanism is a secular heir to the Jeremiad, for its fear of “corruption” and its emphasis upon the importance “virtue” has also demanded people to contemplate the possible fall of the republic. Republicanism had a great impact upon the war for American independence and the War of 1812. The reason why American people endorsed territorial expansion in the first half of the nineteenth century is that the massive land seemed to ensure that they would remain as yeoman farmers who had civic virtue. By World War I, republicanism had been replaced by liberalism, which had been on the rise since the War of 1812, as the main current of political thought in the United States. As shown in the antiwar movement during the Vietnam War, however, a republicanism that is averse to overseas empire-building still remains as an undercurrent of American political thought.
Liberalism was reflected in the Wilsonian internationalism following WorldWar I. The League of Nations, a product of Woodrow Wilson's imagination, was a concrete example of liberal internationalism. The “containment” of the Soviet Union after World War II was another. Bill Clinton's “engagement and enlargement” policy that promoted democratization of the former communist countries and the Third World was also an example of Wilsonianism. Even war with Iraq with the goal of democratizing the Middle East can be seen as a legacy of Wilsonianism.
Thus the Judeo-Christian tradition, republicanism, and liberalism have been important factors in United States security culture from the time of its founding to the present.

抄録全体を表示

Since the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in 1979, structural realism (neorealism) has occupied the dominant position in the realist paradigm. Criticizing classical realism for its “unscientific” focus on human nature, Waltz posits that the anarchic structure of international system severely constrains states, forcing them to take balancing behavior. While structural realism contributed to making realism more “scientific,” it has generated one drawback; it has turned realist scholars’ attention away from states’ attempts to manipulate external security environments.

This article aims to present an alliance theory, dubbed dynamic theory of alliances, that may overcome the aforementioned drawback. This theory regards the degree of alignments as a product of not only the distribution of capabilities/threats but also a clash between a state’s attempt to divide adversaries (wedge strategy) and an allied state’s effort to maintain/enhance unity with its ally (binding strategy). In other words, an alliance is never in stasis but in a state of dynamic equilibrium, a phenomenon in which an equilibrium situation is achieved when two or more countervailing forces cancel one another. Based on these concepts, this article presents the logic of how states choose different wedge/binding strategies and how interactions between them may influence the formation and breakdown of alliances.

To examine how the theory may explain alliance politics in the real world, the case of the U.S.-China-Soviet relations in the early Cold War period is analyzed. In the late 1940s, Washington aimed to woo Beijing away from the Soviet orbit while Moscow tried to tighten its alignments with Beijing. After the U.S. wedge strategy failed to prevent the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1950, Washington continued seeking to divide the alliance in the 1950s by using coercion. The case analysis shows that the hypotheses derived from the theory effectively explain the three-way interactions among Moscow, Beijing, and Washington.

抄録全体を表示

There are two main streams of thought concerning the studies of Sino-American relationship; one argues America's China policy from the context of the U. S. -Soviet-China strategic triangle, the other stresses the importance of America's domestic politics in the formation of its China policy. This article tries to add another perspective on the analysis on Sino-American relationship: the interaction of U. S. China policy and its Taiwan policy.
In late 1948, the Truman Administration began to re-examine the strategic importance of Taiwan. As NSC37/1 (Jan 19, 1949) noted, the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the basic aim of the U. S. should be to deny Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores to the Communists. However, there was a slight difference between them. The State Department also wanted to deny Taiwan to the Chinese Nationalists in order to keep some options open in the case of a Sino-Soviet split and subsequent Sino-American accommodation in the future, while the military establishment was indifferent to such political implications. The JCS insisted that overt military commitment in Taiwan would be unwise at that time, but the U. S. should bolster the Nationalists forces and collaborate with them if amphibious operations were launched from mainland China.
When the Korean War broke out, the U. S. Government dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait not only to protect against an attack by the Communists but also to block any Nationalist action in the strait. In this situation, the difference between the State Department and the JCS still continued. Secretary Acheson tried to avoid a deep commitment to Chiang Kai-shek, but the military was establishing a strong relationship through the military aid and advice programs to the Kuomintang Forces. However this difference ceased. The alternative forces to the Nationalists did not emerge in Taiwan, the State Department, therefore, had to commit itself to the Kuomintang government however reluctantly, which was one of the reasons why Sino-American relations were not improved after the Korean War, even though the U. S. Government sought various chances for rapprochement with China.

抄録全体を表示

Views on the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy have dramatically changed in a decade. In the field of the Sino-American relationship, many scholars explored voluminous materials and revealed that Eisenhower-Dulles's China policy was, contrary to our common understanding, not so obstinate or stubborn. Such scholars are now called the Eisenhower revisionists.
The Eisenhower revisionists indicate various facts which exemplify the administration's flexibility on its China policy. Their remarks can be summarized into two points: despite the Korean War or the Taiwan Strait Crisis, Dulles continued to pursue the Sino-Soviet split: Dulles also tried to work out the “Two China” formula and even conceived of Beijing's entrance into the United Nations. However, the Eisenhower revisionists do not succeed in explaining why the U. S. -Chinese relationship was not improved during this period, which is the major problem of their arguments.
The revisionists tend to regard the Sino-Soviet split as premise of the Sino-American accommodation, which seems somewhat naive. If the Sino-American relationship was a dependent variable of the U. S. -Soviet relations, the Sino-Soviet split may cause the Sino-American rapprochement, but this was not true. The relationship between the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-American accommodation is not so self explanatory as the revisionists' assumption. Therefore, we cannot conclude that Dulles had a flexible policy on China, because he had a sophisticated view on the Sino-Soviet relations.
The other problem is that Dulles might consider some sort of the “Two China” formula, but he never thought of this scheme as a means of negotiation. His basic China policy remained to keep the maximum pressure on China in order to change its course. Once he said, “the U. S. could possibly recognize Communist China at some future time, but as long as Communist China is so bitterly hostile to us, we do not want to enhance its prestige”. Even if he had such a novel idea as the “Two China” policy in mind, the circumstances did not allow him to carry it out.
After the Geneva Conference of 1954, China enhanced its position in international society, especially in Asia. In this situation, the United States feared not only the expansion of communism but also the spreading of anti-Western sentiment in Asia. The U. S. thought China could strengthen this feeling through its anti-impelialist rhetoric. China became a regional threat to the U. S., which was, to some extent, independent of the Soviet or the communist threat. This was one of the main reasons why the U. S. -Cheinese relationship remained hostile, while detente between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. was in progress.

抄録全体を表示

The Korean War and the Gulf War were the two largest wars in scale after World War II, except for the Vietnam War and the Middle East Wars. The United Nations Security Council responded efficiently each time. Because of the different background of the situation, the Security Council's responses also differed in some points and had similarities in others.
At the outset of the Korean War, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling on the North Korean authority to withdraw its forces immediately. In the case of the Gulf War, the Security Council adopted a similar resolution at the start of the Gulf Crisis, also demanding that Iraq withdraw its troops with a stronger expression in the text. This tough language was the result of the end of the Cold War and the weakening position of the Soviet Union, i. e. the comparative strengthening of the United States' position in international relations.
At the beginning of the Korean War, the United States was keenly concerned about the Soviet Union's participation in the war. Although the powerful Soviet Union had boycotted the Security Council at that time, its influence shadowed the UN meeting and caused some of the neutral countries to revise the resolution text to a softer tone removing harsh words such as “aggression”. The concession made by the United States was a reflection of the critical situation at the Korean front where the South Korean Army was badly defeated by the well-prepared North Korean forces.
On the contrary, when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on August 1990, U. S. top officials did not have the same worries as they did 40 years ago. The United States had confidence in its own power to deal with Iraq's aggression. And in the end, it did expel Iraqi forces out of Kuwait after a half year's military build up. The ground battle lasted only 4 days compared to the 3 years of the Korean War.
As for the Security Council, the resolution condemning Iraq's invasion was adopted without opposition. Even the Soviet Union agreed to the resolution. At that time, the Soviet Union had to cooperate with the United States because of its internal situation. Yet the Soviet Union opposed use of the word “use of force” in the resolution adopted on 29 November 1990. The word was replaced to “all necessary means” after meetings and conversations between the U. S. and Soviet foreign ministers.
In the Gulf War, the United Nations force was not organized. Because, it is said, the United States wanted to keep a free hand to control the military command. Even if this pattern—the Multinational Froces—is efficient, it is time to consider seriously the future form of UN forces. And in order to prevent a new war, these forces should play the role of “vaccine”.

抄録全体を表示