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  • 澤 英武
    ソ連・東欧学会年報
    1990年 1990 巻 19 号 27-35
    発行日: 1990年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―統一ドイツNATO帰属問題とゲンシャー外交
    板橋 拓己
    年報政治学
    2019年 70 巻 1 号 1_159-1_180
    発行日: 2019年
    公開日: 2020/06/21
    ジャーナル フリー

    1989 / 90年の

    ドイツ統一
    プロセスのなかで、ドイツは自らに課されていた 「戦勝四か国の権利と責任」 を解消し、「制約なき完全な主権」 を獲得することを目指した。そしてその際に越えるべき最も高いハードルは、統一ドイツのNATO帰属をソ連に承認させることであった。本稿は、1990年5月から7月にかけて、いかにして西ドイツがソ連から統一ドイツNATO帰属への合意を取り付け、「完全な主権」 を獲得したかを検証する。その際、近年公刊された西独外務省史料を中心的な史料としつつ、従来の研究では等閑視されがちだったゲンシャー外相の寄与にとりわけ注目する。

     ゲンシャー外交の貢献は次の3点に纏められる。第一に、CSCEヘルシンキ最終文書の規定を強調し、ドイツの同盟選択権をソ連に認めさせることに貢献した。第二に、1990年6月の 「ターンベリーのメッセージ」 などを通じて、NATOの性格の変容をソ連にアピールした。そして第三に、ソ連、とりわけシェワルナゼ外相との会談を幾度も重ね、信頼の構築に努めた。こうしたゲンシャー外交がなければ、90年7月の独ソ首脳会談における統一ドイツのNATO帰属合意もなかったであろう。

  • 天野 正冶, 天野 正冶, 木戸 裕, 長島 啓記
    教育学研究
    1992年 59 巻 1 号 101-102
    発行日: 1992/03/30
    公開日: 2009/01/13
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 天野 正治, 石井 正司, 木戸 裕, 長島 啓記
    日本教育学会大會研究発表要項
    1992年 51 巻 199-
    発行日: 1992/08/27
    公開日: 2018/04/20
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • ヴァイゲント トーマス, 井田 良
    刑法雑誌
    1993年 33 巻 1 号 46-57
    発行日: 1993/02/28
    公開日: 2022/12/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 天野 正治, 木戸 裕, 長島 啓記
    比較教育学研究
    1992年 1992 巻 18 号 5-23,199
    発行日: 1992/06/25
    公開日: 2011/01/27
    ジャーナル フリー
    After the fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification advanced faster than anyone had anticipated. On 3 October 1990, East Germany acceded to the West. In this article, we analyze the mechanics and implications of the process of German reunification in the field of education. For the sake of convenience, we classify three periods:
    1. The period of the two countries
    2. The period between the fall of the ‘Wall’ and reunification
    3. The period after reunification
    In the first period, we survey the features of the education systems of the two countries, making comparisons and summarizing their distinguishing characteristics and quoting from the researches of Professor Oskar Anweiler.
    In the second period, we follow the processes of trends in educational matters in East Germany after the fall of the ‘Wall’ and give a detailed description of theimportant factors. It becomes clear that the reform of socialism ended in failure. Both countries reached an agreement that fundamentally the reconstruction of the East German educational system should be modelled on that of West Germany. We also refer to and compare, for example, the question of German language/literature school-leaving examinations before and after the fall of the ‘Wall’. We also introduce the results of a questionnaire given to pupils and teachers in June 1990.
    In the third period, we analyze the development of education and research after reunification. In each federal state of what was East Germany, educational administration was structured and laws concerning education provided by taking the West German system as a model. Many laws are still tentative. When the primary and secondary education systems were being reorganized, many states wanted to introduce the West German, or multi-track system. However, many parents and teachers opposed this plan, so as a result three states decided to introduce institutions which integrated the Hauptschule (secondary general school) and the Realschule (intermediate school). With regard to teachers, there are many problems to be solved, for example, dismissal, training, certification, etc. In higher education, the reorganization of institutions and faculties is currently being planned and undertaken.
    In conclusion, we express our thoughts on the implications of German reunification from the standpoint of the education system.
  • 有吉 英樹
    日本教育学会大會研究発表要項
    1974年 33 巻 155-
    発行日: 1974/09/01
    公開日: 2018/04/20
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 吉田 成章
    教育方法学研究
    2005年 30 巻 13-22
    発行日: 2005/03/31
    公開日: 2017/04/22
    ジャーナル フリー
    本稿の目的は,1990年10月3日の
    ドイツ統一
    後に,クリングベルク教授学がどのように展開したのかを明らかにすることである。
    ドイツ統一
    後のクリングベルクの論文を検討すると,次の三つの点で論が展開していることがわかる。第一点目として,東西ドイツの教授学状況の地図を描くことを課題として取り組んだクリングペルクは,東西ドイツの教授学は完全に違う方向へと展開していったのではなく,いくつかの点で類似していると主張したことが挙げられる。その上で彼は,旧東ドイツが政治的な観点のもとだけで評価されてしまう危険性を指摘するのである。第二点目として,一般教授学と教科教授学との関係について,教科教授学の位置をより確かなものとすることを強調しながら,両者の関係を統一的に捉えようとしたことが挙げられる。そこでは,彼の教授学のコミュニケーション論的な側面と,教科教授学を強調しながらも一般教授学を強調する側面とが明白に現れている。第三点目として,ヘルバルトとディースターヴェークを援用しながら,「指導と自己活動」というテーマに関して,自らの論を深めるかたちで展開していることが挙げられる。東西ドイツの教授学は,その出自は同じドイツに伝統的な教授学であり,クリングペルク自身も,自らの教授学をその伝統的な教授学理解の中に据えながら,自らの論を展開している。
  • ―「国民戦線」の世論調査から―
    河合 信晴
    現代史研究
    2019年 65 巻 1-15
    発行日: 2019/12/27
    公開日: 2022/11/08
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 東独市場経済移行の教訓
    中村 靖
    エコノミア
    2024年 74 巻 1 号 35-72
    発行日: 2024/02/26
    公開日: 2024/07/05
    ジャーナル フリー
     東独体制転換を社会主義期の固定相対価格体系からの脱却にともなう経済構造調整費用と経済 問題に対処できる国家機構の構築費用との観点から検討する.構造調整費用は約20 年にわたり人 口一人当たり年5000 ユーロ以上であり,国家機構構築には人材直接派遣や非公式ネットワーク形 成による西独人的資源とノウハウの投入が必須だった.東独の体制転換は成功と評価できるが, その成功には,西独の国家機構と社会的市場経済の構築という体制転換の明確なゴールと膨大な 資源の投入が必要だった.
  • 菅 英輝
    アメリカ研究
    2023年 57 巻 231-236
    発行日: 2023/03/25
    公開日: 2024/05/10
    ジャーナル 認証あり
  • 倉科 一希
    国際政治
    2024年 2024 巻 212 号 212_178-212_187
    発行日: 2024/03/25
    公開日: 2024/11/09
    ジャーナル 認証あり
  • 中村 登志哉
    国際安全保障
    2022年 49 巻 4 号 129-132
    発行日: 2022/03/31
    公開日: 2023/11/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 黒川 康
    現代史研究
    2004年 50 巻 79-90
    発行日: 2004/12/26
    公開日: 2019/08/10
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 金子 新
    日本EU学会年報
    2007年 2007 巻 27 号 191-207,339
    発行日: 2007/08/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    In 1990, Germany was reunited. The new Federal republic of Germany (FRG) became a member state of the EC and the NATO. This event was the final achievement of the “Westintegration” of the whole Germany. In fact, it was the highest goal of the former FRG, West Germany, which was an original member of the European integration and which had gained membership in the NATO in 1955. This article deals with “Westintegration” of the (former) FRG under the Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in relation to the German unification. It examines how and why Adenauer tried to integrate the FRG into the “Euro-Atlantic Community” during the crucial years, 1953-1955.
    “Westintegration” and the German unification were not antinomy to each other. All the following Political aims had to be achieved in the liberal democratic Western World: the European integration, the membership in the NATO, and the German unification. In other words, “Westintegration” needed to be compatible with the German unification, and “Westintegration” of the whole Germany had to be accomplished. In this regards, the European Defense Community (EDC) project was the most important but just a first step to integrate Germany into “Euro-Atlantic Community” and to recover its sovereignty in the free world.
    Why was the EDC important? Adenauer disliked the military framework of the EDC. However he needed EDC because this project contained the further plans to make the political integration (EPC). Moreover, EDC membership had to lead NATO membership in his recognition. European integration and Western alliance were inseparable basis of “Euro-Atlantic Community”. “Only in ‘Euro-Atlantic Community’, economic wealth, political stability, military security, and ideal unification will be achieved”. This “Confession of faith” was the main justification to adhere to EDC and to gain broad public support to Adenauer's foreign policy, “Politik der Stärke” (“Policy of Power”).
    In 1953, Adenauer reacted against the detente policy of post-Stalin Soviet government and behaved negatively to the Allied Four Power talks proposed by Churchill's Britain. For Adenauer who desired the realization of the EDC, the final failure of the EDC in August 1954 wasa terrible misfortune. Nevertheless in 1955, the FRG could gain membership in the NATO and welcomed new integration plan in Messina. These events of 1955 were just half, but precious steps of German integration into the “Euro-Atlantic Community”.
  • 松村 直人
    森林科学
    1994年 11 巻 73-75
    発行日: 1994/06/01
    公開日: 2018/02/28
    解説誌・一般情報誌 フリー
  • 第一票と第二票のもつ意味に関して
    河崎 健
    選挙研究
    1998年 13 巻 226-235,276
    発行日: 1998/02/28
    公開日: 2009/01/22
    ジャーナル フリー
    The German electoral system is known as a system which combines the principle of proportionality with the relative-majority system of single-member constituencies. In the discussions on electoral reform in Japan, the German electoral system was regarded as an ideal model for the Japanese one. But does the German system really deserve to be admired as an ideal model?
    In some constituencies in elections to the German ‘Bundestag’, where political parties are more familiar to voters than individual candidates, voters do not in fact choose a candidate from candidates of two major parties, but one of several candidates belonging to same party. For example, at a constituency in Land Baden-Württemberg, the ‘first vote’ means that a candidate from the CDU in this constituency is selected and that one of the candidates on the CDU party list is selected.
    On the other hand there is a tendency in the proportional system for voters to select a party based not only on the party ideology and/or party program, but also on the candidate for Federal Chancellor. For that position the party leader of major parties is often selected. The election in 1990 was noted as a victory by the government parties (CDU/CSU/FDP), because both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher greatly contributed to the German Unification.
    But was it true? The Greens failed in the election due to the ‘5 percent clause’. One of the reasons for that was, that Lafontaine, the Chancellor candidate from the opposition party SPD, was popular among Greens supporters. He asserted that the environmental policy and peace movement, which were proposed by the Greens, are vital. The failure of the Greens increased the numher of ineffectual votes, consequently the shere of votes obtained the greatest parties, the CDU/CSU, rose.
  • -ノルトライン・ヴェストファーレン州とブランデンブルク州の水平的協力を実例に-
    縣 公一郎
    年報行政研究
    1992年 1992 巻 27 号 167-192
    発行日: 1992/05/30
    公開日: 2012/09/24
    ジャーナル フリー
  • EMUへの政治的コミットメントの形成過程, 1988-1989年
    鶴岡 路人
    日本EU学会年報
    2002年 2002 巻 22 号 283-312,373
    発行日: 2002/09/30
    公開日: 2010/05/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    In January 1999, the biggest project in the history of European integration, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), was realized and a dream of having a single European currency finally came true. The achievement of it was neither foreordained nor just a logical consequence of market integration in the EC. It was rather a project highly political in nature.
    This article tries to explain the significant initial phases of the political process to create a European single currency from the early 1988 to the end of 1989. In January and February 1988, some proposals for a monetary union in the EC were aired by the French, Italian, and German ministers, which were, however, rather vague in content and proposed mainly as political balloons at the time. But two years later in Strasbourg in December 1989, the leaders of the European Communities came to the agreement to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to draw a new treaty on EMU, which was to begin its work by the end of 1990. Why and in what ways was such a great leap from just a vague balloon to the concrete agreement to revise a treaty made possible during this relatively brief period of less than two years? What has changed the nature of the EMU discussions?
    The main line of argument is as follows. When some calls for EMU notably the Balladur Memorandum were tabled and the discussions on its possibility became lively in the early 1988, there was no political commitment to the realization of EMU at all. Though the subsequent decision in Hanover in June that year to create a so-called Delors Committee on the study of EMU, and the approval of the Committee's report at the Madrid European Council meeting in June 1989 were of course significant steps forward, they by no means determined or ensured the way to the single currency. In fact, the Madrid summit failed to set a date to convene the IGC to make a new treaty on EMU. We had to wait six more months to have a concrete political commitment to EMU from Paris and Bonn, the two most significant actors on this issue. And the decision at the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989 to start an IGC by the end of 1990 made the road to EMU irreversible. Leading up to the Strasbourg agreement, the ever-accelerating upheavals in the Communist countries in the East, the eventual fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, and the ensuing acceleration of the issue of German unification all played the significant role of stimulating the emergence of the political commitment to EMU.
    The situation under which the issue of EMU was discussed thus went through a radical change, which inevitably influenced the positions and perceptions of the actors. As the political commitment particularly by France and West Germany emerged in the fall of 1989, the road to EMU became irreversible, which was a great leap from the situation of two years earlier.
  • ―ドイツ統一問題をめぐるドイツ社会主義統一党 (SED) の動向―
    清水 聡
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2008年 2008 巻 37 号 58-68
    発行日: 2008年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    On March 10th, 1952 the USSR sent a document called “Stalin's Note” to the representatives of the Western Powers; the USA, the UK and France. It proposed both making a “peace treaty” with Germany and unifying Germany. For seven years following the end of World War II, Germany had been divided into two states. The separate governments of West and East Germany were provisionally formed in 1949. To resolve this situation, “Stalin's Note” proposed that Germany form a Unified Government and establish a “peace treaty” on a principal of neutrality. However, the USA, the UK, France and the West German leader, Konrad Adenauer, were pursuing a policy of West European Integration of West Germany, and rejected “Stalin's Note” forthwith.
    Since the Western Powers didn't accept “Stalin's Note”, the real intention of the USSR has remained a big mystery in post WWII history. Academic disputes continue to this day, as to the real intentions of the Soviet Diplomacy. These disputes are roughly split into two groups. One group, the positive group, argues that “Stalin's Note” was a peaceful attempt to establish a “Neutral German State”, while the other, negative group, believes that it was an “Obstructive Operation” to disturb Western diplomacy and cut off the military connection between West Germany and the Western Powers.
    Following the end of the Cold War, historical materials were released in the former East Germany. Researchers had hoped to find the truth of “Stalin's Note”. Many papers have been presented by historians specializing in diplomatic history of Germany and the USSR, but the disputes have not ended between the positive and the negative groups. This paper investigates the truth of “Stalin's Note” and its relation to the Cold War through rethinking its problems from the viewpoint of the East German leaders. As a result, this investigation finds that East German leaders had formed two groups; supporters of “Stalin's Note, ” the domestic group, and dissidents, the Moscow group.
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