This article will examine the Sulayman al-Nabulusi government (29/10/1956-10/4/1957) as an achievement of the national liberation movement of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples in Jordan. The national movement in Jordan (al-haraka al-wataniya fi al-urdunn) led by the National Socialist Party (NSP, al-hizb al-watani al-ishtiraki) whose secretary-general was Sulayman al-Nabulusi, had been struggling against the military presence of Great Britain in Jordan. We will analyze the developments of the national movement in Jordan as the response to the drastic changes caused by the inflow of many Palestinian refugees to the East Bank of Jordan and the incorporation of the central Palestine (the West Bank of Jordan) into the Kingdom after the 1948 war. It is noted that NSP, composed of Jordanians and Palestinians, cooperated with the National Front and the Ba'th party in the parliamental strategy and then formed the coalition government with them, although diverse from one another in the political goals. Some observers wrongly criticize that the al-Nabulusi government was communist-oriented and tried to plot against the monarch. But the fact was that they internally tried the experiment of more political freedom in the public life while they externally pursued the political and military alliance with the 'liberated countries' such as Egypt and Syria and the Eastern Bloc. Other observers emphasize that the weak nature of NSP as the national bourgeois party had led to the failure of the experiment. But we must remember that the international circumstances did not allow them to complete this experiment. Because King Husayn had decided to choose U.S.A. as patron instead of Great Britain through accepting the Eisenhaur Doctorine. King Husayn used the rhetoric of "the threat of Communism" in his biography in the same context as the U.S. government, in order to charge the al-Nabulusi government for permitting communist activities in Jordan and to justify himself to accept American aids against the waves of the demonstrations which supported the nationalist government In conclusion, the experiment of the al-Nabulusi government fell victim to the American interests in the Middle East because Jordan was and continues to be strategically important, however poor and small, as a buffer-state in the region.

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This article seeks to answer the question: why did Palestinians in the occupied territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) develop political activities that differed from those of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), but at the same time maintain strong support toward the PLO? Primary documents collected in al-Wathā’iq al-Filasṭīnīya al-‘Arabīya (The Documents of Arab Palestine) can help illuminate the dynamic politics inside and outside the territories. Following analysis of historical developments using these primary documents, this article concludes that strict control by Israeli authorities inside the territories and Palestinians’ fear of the appearance of an alternative leadership brought their own political program to support the PLO within a relationship of co-existence. Inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it was very difficult to insist on the full liberation of Palestine (which the PLO did), because of the stringent Israeli control, but Palestinians inside the territories needed the PLO to prevent another leadership from forming that might collaborate with Israel or Jordan. However, changing international politics led to cooperation between the PLO and Jordan: the very country that intended to create an alternative leadership inside the territories. The paper shows how the dynamics of international politics created an ironic situation inside the territories.

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This article analyzes the process of the alliance between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan from 1982 to 1987, and its effect on the occupied Palestinian territories (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). PLO leaders, like Khaled al-Hassan, sought to become allied with Jordan for two reasons: to balance the power against opponent groups that had ties to Syria, and to prepare for possible peace negotiations hosted by the U.S. However, their alliance only lasted for a few years, until 1987. The PLO leadership realized the alliance with Jordan could not achieve political status for the PLO and even caused more severe inter-factional disputes among Palestinian groups. PLO leaders sought reconciliation among factions, but then decided to cancel the Amman Agreement. Even with the Amman Agreement’s retraction, the short alliance between the PLO and Jordan introduced a direct connection between the PLO and the Occupied Territories. The PLO’s leadership, especially Abu-Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), played an important role in establishing PLO-affiliated organizations inside the territories. These circumstances led to pro-PLO political activities in the territories, and led the way to the first Intifada in 1987.

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This study considers the increase and decrease in īmān (belief) in Māturīdism and illustrates the structure and concept of īmān within this school. It is commonly understood that, contrary to the majority of Ash‘arītes and ahl al-ḥadīth (people of ḥadīth), who admit the increase and decrease in īmān, a vast majority of Māturīdītes deny this because, according to their theory, work is not a constituent of īmān, and īmān is composed of only taṣdīq (assent) by the heart, or by another perspective, taṣdīq by the heart and iqrār (confession) by the tongue.
　Even among the Māturīdītes, who deny the increase and decrease in īmān, a changeable aspect related to this concept is perceived, but it is believed that the core structure of īmān is unchangeable. The changeable aspect is referred to as nūr (light), ḍiyā’ (brilliance), or thamara (fruit) of īmān. These changeable aspects of īmān are not components of īmān, even though they originate from īmān. However, a group of Māturīdītes, all of whom are scholars from the Ottoman era, believe that īmān is unchangeable only when it refers to mu’man bi-hi (what should be believed), and it accepts the increase and decrease in īmān when it refers to assent.
　The author focuses on the following two results of the study. First, those scholars among the Māturīdītes who admit the increase and decrease in īmān are all from the Ottoman era. This perspective could be interpreted as the later Ottoman Māturīdītes' approach to the Ashartes theories on īmān-related issues. Second, the Māturīdītes who admit that there is something changeable, separate these mutable concepts cautiously from the structure of īmān, which are immutable. By doing so, this school succeeds in describing the precise relationship between the concept of īmān and its related concepts.

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This essay explores the Jordanian Muslim Brothers(JMB)' activities in legislative politics. Since the mid 1940s, JMB has enjoyed popularity among Jordanians as a state-authorized social and missionary association. JMB, not only became the largest Islamist organization in Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, but also gained political power through the struggle against the anti-state movements led by the leftists and the pan-Arab activists from the late 1950s to the 1970s. JMB has deeply committed to legislative politics since the break through 1989 lower house elections, to promote its Islamic concept and methodology in political sphere. In the first stage, JMB enjoyed its strong position as vanguard of Islam in the lower house, sole legislature chosen by Jordanians. Contrary to its radical discourses concerning domestic and foreign policies, JMB has shown its flexibility in the lower house. For example, during the Persian Gulf Crisis, though JMB mobilized masses and organized a pro-Iraqi bloc in the lower house, it joined the cabinet for national unity. However, the organization has been involved in the great debates and structural transformation in the lower house since the early 1990s. Thus, the domestic and international political processes and social movements in Jordan that changed arguments in the lower house will closely be scrutinized. Peace negotiations with Israel were the main cause. Because JMB used to criticize Israel as Zionist enemy, the government's normalization policy toward Israel made JMB irritated. Thus, JMB formed an anti-normalization group in the lower house, and often criticized the government. Regarding those issues above, JMB has had inner and outer problems. First, JMB experienced political dichotomy inside in the mid 1990s. Despite its strong position as Islamist group in the lower house, JMB felt ambiguity whether or not cooperate with the government that sought to reach a peace agreement with Israel. Moreover, its experiences in the lower house confirmed that JMB did not represent a homogenous framework from ideological or political standpoints. JMB conservatives claimed its withdrawal from the lower house, however, the liberals preferred to stay in legislative politics. Not long after, JMB met powerful challenge from its political branch, Islamic Action Front Party (IAFP). IAFP gradually acquired its own voice, and then challenged JMB's authority. In 1997, finally, JMB and IAFP crashed over their participation in the 1997 lower-house elections. Secondly, I attempt to clarify the complicated relationship between the government and JMB (IAFP) in the lower house, in regard to state in society discipline. I also attempt to clarify why the relation between the government and JMB (IAFP) became so deteriorated, and why the government took series of actions which continuously worsened relations with JMB and IAFP, key actors in the lower house. And there were seeds of trouble not only with the peace process but also in debates on "democratization." JMB and IAFP strongly opposed to a series of attempts by the government to inactivate the lower house's role. Moreover, I will examine political backgrounds in Jordan. In this argument, there has been a serious dichotomy among urban and local since the 1993 elections.

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In the first half of the 12th century, the Fâtimid dynasty in Egypt hastily changed her course on the decline through the domestic discords and the invasion of the crusades, but we have few historical materials on that period and it is not elucidated sufficiently yet.
Usâma ibn Munqidh (1095-1188) was an eminent warrior and man of letters, paticularly a poet, keeping friendly relations with Caliphs, Wazîrs, Amîrs and Francs in Syria, Egypt in those days. His memoirs, kitâb al-I'tibâr, give us valuable sources in elucidating this age.
By his memoirs, we can see many phases of Arabic society itself and those of military and cultual contacts between the Islamic world and Europe in those days, such as the living forms of Syrian amîrs and their civic life including hawking and methods of medical treatment, various forms of war and diplomacy, and the hasty changes of conflicting interests at home and abroad among Arabic powers, Frankish powers and the Byzantine empire.

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This article deals with a socio-cultural structure of singing tradition in the historic city of Aleppo with a specific focus on singer-notable relations in the old city. This study explores the background for the continuity of this tradition by shedding light on two socio-cultural aspects; first the positioning of this tradition and singers in society and second their relations with the elite. In the Mashriq region, Cairo saw the rise of secular and new musical scenes in the 20th century, while in this tradition of Aleppo religious singers, munshid in Arabic, still played an important role. Firstly their quality of being religious singers gave them more freedom for activities in Muslim society, where the centrality of religion was highly respected. And the social norms put more emphasis not on music itself but on conditions such as time, place, and companion when listening to music. In this context talented singers used to sing at courtyard house of the elite in the old city and were able to identify themselves as companion to the elite due to their art as well as to their religious quality. All these factors helped them shape their distinct identity and create group cohesiveness to preserve the repertoire as well as musical knowledge, which have been passed down to date.

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