This study clarifies the roles of Syrian refugee-run schools in non-camp settings, based on the fieldwork in southeastern Turkey during 2013-2015. Turkey, which hosts the majority of Syrian refugees, attempts to absorb non-camp Syrian refugee children to its public schools. Many Syrian refugees, however, send their children to Syrian refugee-run schools. In Syria before the crisis, the vast majority of the school-aged Syrian citizens had access to school, while the educational policy was strongly controlled by the regime. Based on this quantitatively favorable but qualitatively challenging educational situation in Syria, most of Syrian refugees do not question themselves whether to send their children to school, but further they consider how and what kind of school they should choose.

The autonomy of Syrian refugees has been one of the principal features which constitutes the distinctive roles of Syrian refugee-run schools, which is:(1) The evidence of Syrian refugees' capability: the expansion and development of Syrian refugee-run schools exteriorize Syrian people's capable resilience to be productive and to be the agent of change even in the refugee situation. (2) The creation of solidarity: the Syrian refugee-run schools unite the whole school members as a group of people who share the same pain as refugees, which helps Syrian refugees to overcome the social fragmentation due to the crisis. These cognitive roles make a peculiar value of Syrian refugee-run schools, which is the main reason why some Syrian refugee families send their children to refugee-run schools rather than Turkish public schools. These roles, however, are starting to decrease as the autonomy of Syrian refugees is weakened due to the Turkish government's strengthened intervention and surveillance on the refugee-run schools since 2014. Indeed, it will be more convenient to acquire practical benefits for refugee children if they get integrated to the Turkish public education system. However, it is significant to put more focus on the cognitive roles of refugee-run schools because it is the very thing which meet the needs arising from the refugee community.

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Education for displaced people has been of particular importance in the context of Education for All. Almost 50% of the world refugees are children under 18 years old. However, as more than half of them reside in non-camp settings, it is difficult to provide them with external assistance. In the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey, even with their population of 0.7 million, 70% of whom live in cities and towns, they tend to receive less assistance. There are some examples, however, that these Syrian refugees remain active players in their welfare, independently and autonomously establishing and running their own schools.

This study examines two of those refugee-managed schools in order to reveal the characteristics of the methods of their school management and teaching instruction, with particular focus on the perspectives of the teaching staff. The schools are located close to the Syrian border in Turkey. The fieldwork was carried out twice over a total period of 5 weeks in 2013. In these two schools there were a total of 1,735 students in both primary and secondary levels and about 100 staff members. To collect data, semi -structured and narrative interviews were mainly conducted, with students and parents as well as teaching staff as respondents. In addition to this, participant observation was also employed.

The results show three unique features of these schools. (1) The schools are totally managed and operated by Syrian refugees and linked with supporters particularly through social networking services such as Facebook. (2) The refugee teachers are often motivated to work because they can support and encourage students by teaching the moral of Sunni Islam. (3) This biased instruction may give negative influence on school management, but the schools have benefited from this principle since they can easily receive generous support from the same religious and political affiliation.

In conclusion, for most of the students and school staff, the practice by the school authority, which is based on the same affiliation, can be the reason why they are able to build mutual, trustworthy relationships. This produces a sense of belonging and links members of the community, school stakeholders in particular, through children's schooling. By means of this mechanism, the schools function as a unified community which can be a temporary replacement for displaced people who have lost their original communities because of the conflict.

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コミュニティ間の往来の増加や、オンライン・コミュニティの活発化により、近代コミュニティは地理的近接性に関わらず人々の連帯を拡大している。そうしたコミュニティは、とくに難民による学校経営において大きな影響力を持つ。難民には身分を保証する行政や地域社会がないため、彼らによる学校経営に公共性という保障を与えるのは、独自に形成されたコミュニティに他ならない。それはシリア難民が経営する学校の事例でも確認できる。彼らのコミュニティは構成員の営みに伴って国境を越えて広がり、インターネットを通して繋がっている。また、学校内にも独特のコミュニティが形成されている。そこでは、とくに教師と生徒がモラルを通じて連携している。子どもはそこで紛争で負った傷や憎しみを表出させ、帰属意識を獲得するとともに心理的な安定を得ている。コミュニティへの帰属は、社会関係資本を得るだけでなく、構成員としての責任を負い、他者との相互依存関係を構築することを意味している。そのなかで難民は受動的な立場に留まらず、そこに活動の主体として固有の意義を見出している。コミュニティはそのような難民の営みを支え、強化する役割を果たしている。

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In their monumental work Competitive Authoritarianism (2010), Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way insist that a high level of Western linkage guarantees democratization. However, according to recent research by Freedom House, the democratic conditions of several EU member countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, and Latvia, and the EU candidate country, Turkey, are backsliding. The aim of this article is to examine why these countries have experienced a deterioration of democracy in recent years, with specific focus on the case of Turkey.

After being recognized as an EU candidate in 1999, Turkey implemented eight harmonization packages and two constitutional amendments. The Justice and Development Party (JDP), known as pro-Islamic party, is one of the main actors supporting Turkey’s accession to the EU. From 2002 to 2005, the JDP earnestly pursued democratic consolidation in line with the EU accession process, in order to establish its legitimacy in both internal and external politics. The EU accession process also benefited the development of civil society in Turkey, and guaranteed the country’s democratization. However, after 2005, when Turkey formally became an EU candidate country, the EU accession process stagnated because of harsh opposition from several EU member states, such as the Republic of Cyprus and France. In addition to such opposition, the JDP chose to enforce the accession process in the manner of civil-military relations or religious freedom;consequently, Turkey’s democratization has gradually slowed. The range of civil society activity has also diminished. This trend became more apparent after 2011, when the JDP won its third general election. The most symbolic manifestation of Turkey’s democratic backsliding was the Gezi protest in May and June of 2013. Initially the protesters aimed to protect a historical park from redevelopment, but harsh response from the police provoked them to change their focus to direct criticism of the JDP and then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Another impetus for this change was the frustration of secular civil society, including ordinary citizens, with the JDP’s domination of Turkey’s politics.

The body of this article is divided into three parts. The first is a summary of the works of Levitsky and Way, and Jacob Tolstrup, who introduces the concept of the “gatekeeper” as an intervening variable of the relations between Western linkage and democratization. The second part is an explanation of how the JDP led the EU accession process, the EU’s internal opposition to Turkey’s accession, and the development of Turkey’s civil society. The third part covers Turkey’s democratic backsliding, especially the Gezi protest. Finally, this article clarifies that the JDP’s political speculation is a definitive factor in consolidating democracy in Turkey and suggests a revised analytical framework for external links and democratization.

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Circassian place-names in the district of Uzunyayla (Kayseri, Turkey) are to be analysed in terms of an anthropological approach to landscape. Circassians were forced to migrate to Anatolia by Russia's military conquest of the North Caucasus in the mid-19^th century. Uzunyayla, with 73 Circassian villages, is one of the principal locations where these refugees' eventually settled down and strove to reconstruct their homeland.
A landscape emerges at points where geography and human intentions meet. Place-names are the medium by which people inscribe history on natural environments and read history from them. S. Küchler (1993)'s “landscape of memory” is a landscape composed of a number of landmarks that record human actions. At the same time, she proposes to work on “landscape as memory”, i. e. a process by which history is re-negotiated on each occasion that events associated with these landmarks are recalled.
In Uzunyayla, a “landscape of memory” can be observed in the use of Circassian place-names that make a connection between the Circassians' homeland and their new “home”. Most Circassian villages are named after families known as “lords”. This practice tells a story that Circassians followed powerful leaders who struggled against each other. Such a landscape is part of Circassians' efforts to maintain an ethnic identity and territory in the face of the state's nationalist policy.
The fact that the great majority of these village names are contested means that the process of making a “home” is yet to be completed. Villages are given different names in a competition for prestige, and different village names are often supported by different types of resources. The history of the Circassians' settling in Uzunyayla is constantly re-shaped as different village names accompanying different foundation stories are set off one against another. In this “landscape as memory”, the production of history is open to dialogue.

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