In today's age of globalization, it is not uncommon for evidence of a crime to be located overseas. Japanese investigators or prosecutors who encounter this circumstance must ask foreign governments to collect the evidence and send it to Japan. Yet not uncommonly, foreign authorities obtain evidence by means or procedures that would be unlawful under Japanese law. Under what standard or framework should the admissibility of that kind of evidence be decided in Japanese courts? The exclusion of evidence on the grounds of trivial procedural differences would thwart international collaboration in criminal investigations, to be sure. But should such evidence always be admitted? Are there exceptional cases where such evidence must be excluded? This note will first review the decisions in the Japanese courts and conclude that no concrete standard or framework has yet been formed to decide the admissibility of this kind of evidence. Second, this note will examine how courts in the United States address this issue. This examination will turn up two exceptional cases where evidence collected by foreign authorities must be excluded: one where the "joint venture" doctrine applies and the other where the conduct of foreign authorities "shocks the conscience." Finally, this note will examine the rationale of excluding evidence in those exceptional cases and argue that there is leeway for bringing those exceptions into Japanese jurisprudence.

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Until their complete withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992, the U. S. forces have been regarded as a symbol of America's continued domination in its former colony. Similarly, the U. S. -Philippine Military Bases Agreement of 1947, which legitimized America's use of Philippine bases after decolonization, has been generally considered as one of the conditions that the exsuzerain state compelled its ex-colony to accept in return for granting independence.
Such interpretations are based on the fact that the United States did maintain its military presence in the Philippines (which certainly had been a major factor of their “special relationship” in the colonial period), and that the stipulations of the agreement became a target of intensified Filipino nationalism after independence. By exploring the U. S. policymaking process with regard to the Philippines and Philippine bases during the immediate postwar years, however, one should have a different view.
When the United States decided in the 1930's to decolonize the Philippines, it was regarded as a burden from a military point of view, a vulnerable defense zone in case of war in the Pacific. The United States altered its policy during the Pacific war, having been unable to prevent the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands. It came to militarily commit itself to its former colony: defense as well as the strategic use of the Philippines. However, as wartime policies and situations were gradually dissolved, the United States again found the defense of the Philippines a burden, militarily as well as financially. As a result, the U. S. policymakers decided by the fall of 1946 to withdraw all Army units and retain only a few naval bases in the Philippines, and excluded them from America's postwar Pacific strategic base system.
The U. S. -Philippine Bases Agreement of 1947 granted the United States the right to use Philippine bases. Both Army and Navy bases were retained, requested by the Philippine government, who strongly desired the presence of the U. S. forces as a security measure. The stipulations were the product of bilateral agreement, in which the United States made considerable concessions compared to its early drafts. It cannot be denied that these conditions were still unequal, reflecting the unequal partnership of the two nations. But it must be also noticed that the United States did not have neocolonialistic intentions when they signed the agreement, and that there was certainly a possibility for them to dissolve their colonial military bondage. The United States did attempt to minimize its military commitment to the Philippines.
The intensification of the cold war from approximately 1949 on changed the attitude of the United States. The strategic importance of the Philippines resided not in itself, but it was indeed subject to the situation of world politics.

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　In recent years, there were some foreign investors who were forced to exit from successful joint venture FDI. Family Mart Japan was forced to exit from CVSJVFDI in Korea and Vietnam. PepsiCo was forced to exit from JVFDI, Sermsuk. Danone was forced to exit from JVFDI Wahaha. This essay tries to explain such exits of foreign investors from JVFDI with Institutional theory of Selznick and Berger and Luckmann, and shows possible solutions to prevent foreign investors from exiting JVFDI. Selznick says in his Institutional theory, that institution may have a social value under interactions with its environment, and the social value may be changed from its original purpose of the institution. Such social value can be coordinated and controlled by a top leader of the institution. If a top management of a JVFDI is dispatched from its local partner, he or she may justify exit of foreign partner with its social value. But the proposed social value is sometimes introduced with profit making purpose of its local investor from JVFDI not with profit making purpose of the JVFDI itself and does not match with its real environment. Berger and Luckmann show Institutionalization can be processed under interactions of the institution from externalization, objectivation and internalization. If a top management of a JVFDI proceeds in externalization and objectivation of certain social value of the JVFDI, the foreign investor of the JVFDI may prevent its internalization with appealing counter social value toward multiple stakeholders of the JVFDI including local government and employees. This strategy can be supported with several cases including above mentioned exit cases, JVFDI of TOTO, Thailand, PT NNT Indonesia and Marubeni initiated industrial estate JVFDI in Philippines. This analysis can be useful in equity localization request and can be supported with stakeholder capitalism of JVFDI.

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　外国人投資家と投資受入国の間の投資紛争を国際的な仲裁によって解決する制度は，投資家にとっての外国投資に伴うリスクの軽減と国家にとっての投資紛争の政治化の回避の目的を持つ。こうした投資仲裁を保証するISDS条項を置く投資条約や投資章を含む自由貿易協定又は経済連携協定の急増に伴い，投資仲裁の先例の数も飛躍的に増加している。投資仲裁の先例はこの分野での国際法規則に関して重要な意味を持つようになっているものの，国家主権の尊重の観点から，各国の司法制度や立法制度に与える影響が指摘されるようになっている。これを受けて，常設の投資裁判所の設立を目指す議論も展開されている。EUがカナダ，シンガポール，ヴェトナムと締結した協定には，常設の投資裁判所の設立につながるような投資紛争の解決制度が置かれている。本稿では，ISDS条項に基づく投資仲裁及び常設の投資裁判所の設立を目指す議論の意義と問題点を検討する。

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