The purpose of this paper is to clear up the security relation between Japan and Korea, which was formed through dealing with the “security crisis” of 1968. This became the origin of the Japan-ROK (Republic of Korea) security cooperation later called “economic security cooperation”.
The “security crisis” of 1968 occurred when reunification by all-out war became impossible due to the establishment of the divided-system. North Korea’s purpose was to bring down South Korea from within by armed guerrilla warfare. Therefore, what the ROK and Japan emphasized in dealing with this crisis was not how to respond to all-out war, but rather how to respond to indirect aggression.
South Korea asked Japan for cooperation concerning the enhancement of equipment for ROK’s anti-guerrilla police. They have explained to Japan that the possibility of an all-out war was low, and that even if war happened to occur, they could respond under the mutual defense treaty with the United States. This is why they have requested special assistance from Japan.
The Ministry of foreign affairs of Japan and Prime Minister Sato decided to cooperate with South Korea. They pointed out that the patrol boats ROK asked for does not violate Japan’s regulations which prohibit the export of military arms. “Three principles on arms exports” would not be undermined in this situation. However, South Korea ultimately withdrew its request. This was because the pressing issue of drought damage inside the ROK required immediate attention. Therefore the ROK requested emergency assistance from Japan to deal with this situation.
It is very significant that both countries have discussed and found possible areas of cooperation for the security of the ROK. The characteristics of which are as follows. First, it has clarified the political position of both countries to counter North Korean indirect aggressions. Secondly, in order to ensure the internal security of South Korea, Japan and South Korea have sought to cooperate for the enhancement of equipment used by the police engaged in counter guerrilla operations. South Korea and Japan, while premising on the treaty of alliance with the United States, identified new threats from indirect aggressions and tried to find areas of possible cooperation. Thirdly, is the fact that South Korea has ultimately withdrawn the request for police equipment cooperation and eventually switched to a request for emergency economic assistance to focus on domestic stability. This is how a typical pattern of security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, later called “economic security cooperation” has developed.

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This study aims to clarify the process of the Okinawa reversion in 1969 with regard to the establishment of “asymmetry,” which has been regarded as a special feature of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation. The mutual acceptance of asymmetric cooperation between the two countries can be evinced by examining the security dialogue on the status of Okinawa and bilateral security cooperation after reversion. Asymmetry in the alliance, which is considered a fundamental problem in U.S.-Japan cooperation, became a structural feature of the alliance in the reversion negotiations.
To analyze the process of acceptance of asymmetric cooperation between the U.S. and Japan, this study utilizes James D. Morrow’s “arms vs. ally” model. This model presents an alternative explanation for nations’ willingness to form alliances in the face of a common threat. For a nation to enhance its security, there are two main options: to ally with another state or to develop armament. This decision is made based on calculations of the domestic/external costs and benefits. The perspectives of Japan and the U.S. on Okinawa’s status after the reversion clashed during the negotiations, with Japan desiring the denuclearization of Okinawa and across-the-board application of the prior consultation system articulated in Article 6 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The United States, for its part, wished to ensure freedom of military operation in Okinawa after reversion. The two countries carried out their negotiations based on consideration of their internal and external circumstances. As a result, the reversion of Okinawa enhanced alliance cooperation, which in turn signified a new Japanese security presence in East Asia. The Korean clause in the Sato-Nixon Communiqué was a consequence of the calculations of the two countries and delineated some of Japan’s increasing responsibilities in alliance cooperation. This served to deepen asymmetric cooperation rather than mitigate it. The Korean clause brought about the political elimination of asymmetry in the alliance even though the substance of asymmetric cooperation remained unresolved. Nevertheless, this represented a rational solution, considering the two countries’ contradictory demands and respective circumstances.
In analyzing this process, this study clarifies the significance of the Okinawa reversion through the alliance model. Unlike most states, Japan has emphasized alliance cooperation as a means of enhancing her security. This factor has been influenced by the uniqueness of Japan’s foreign policy, which is formed within the bounds of the U.S-Japan Security Treaty and its Peace Constitution.

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This article aims to clarify the effect of the US-Japan agreement in 1969, especially concerning the removal and reintroduction of nuclear weapons in Okinawa under the US-China rapprochement. The focus of previous studies was mainly on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa and how it affected reconciliation between the US and China. However, nuclear restoration in Okinawa and its significant effect on US-China relations have not been discussed. Revealing concealed historical facts, this paper explores a new document of the Minutes among Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in October 1971, focusing on the specific part regarding the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa, which was disclosed in 2014, far later than the other sections. Specifically, I shed new light on the “Okinawa Factors”—the reversion of Okinawa without nuclear weapons and the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa bases under the 1969 Japan-US agreement—analyzing US Operational Plan (OPLAN) and Chinese policy. In short, this thesis argues that maintaining the use of bases and nuclear weapons in Okinawa enables the US to approach China without changing its OPLAN. China did not interfere in the re-entry of nuclear weapons to Okinawa because they assumed the probability of nuclear war with the US was low, rather, they prioritized improving relations with the US.

Since China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb in 1964, the US raised threat perception associated with China as opposed to the peripheral threat of the USSR. In this context, the Okinawa base was regarded as one of the most important sorties and military supplies to attack China. Through the negotiation of the Okinawa Reversion in 1969, the US military kept operating the bases in Okinawa without prior consultation with Japan. The Nixon administration attempted to move closer to China in order to contain the USSR and honorably withdraw from the war in Vietnam. At the same time, the Chinese government shifted its strategy to be hostile towards the USSR and to approach the US. Kissinger visited China in July 1971, holding an OPLAN against China with regard to the use of bases and nuclear weapons in Okinawa. During the conference in October, Zhou pointed out the possibility of reintroducing nuclear weapons to the Okinawa bases. Kissinger acknowledged the possibility while emphasizing the non-nuclear status of Okinawa. Despite concerns for the US nuclear capacity, China became a bystander to observe the reintroduction of nuclear weapons based on the low likelihood of the US-led nuclear war against China as well as a willingness to enhance relations with the US. The Okinawa bases secured the US military capability against China without alarming China, and therefore, Okinawa can be viewed as a mediator in facilitating the US-China rapprochement.

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