Before independence of the USA, diagnosis and treatment, including surgical operations of oral and maxillofacial lesions were performed by medical doctors of European emigrants and their American disciples.
The first American dental school was founded in 1840 and exodontia was established to be the core of most educational programs in oral surgery for almost 100 years. The earliest American dental schools did not contribute to the development of oral surgery. The Journal of Oral Surgery, which was the first specialized journal of oral surgery in the USA, was published in 1943 by the American Dental Association.
Many emigrants played an important role in upgrading educational programs in oral and maxillofacial surgery, including AJ Asgis (Russia), RH Ivey (1881 UK), VH Kazamjan, (1879 Armenia), CW Waldrom (1887 Canada), and K Thoma (1883 Switzerland). In 1938 Asgis emphasized the importance of including basic sciences in American dental education programs. The same opinion was asserted by Thoma in 1957. These opinions stressed that the educational programs of American dentistry should include basic sciences. Lack of knowledge about basic sciences would be unsuitable for dental medicine and might impair the development of oral and maxillofacial surgery.

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Arms control policy is aimed at achieving objectives such as (1) disarmament, (2) stability, and (3) the pursuit of superiority. These objectives can be understood as three aspects of arms control policy that are simultaneously in place, rather than mutually exclusive. Under stability, there was at the same time a technological and political competition between the great powers for superiority within a framework set by the arms control regime. Which of these aspects is emphasized in the negotiation and policy pursuits of arms control and which of these aspects comes into play in reaching an agreement between the parties will depend on (1) the international political environment, particularly the distribution of power, (2) domestic political dynamics, and (3) innovations in weapons technology.

This paper discusses how the multi-polarization of the international political structure due to the rise of China and changes in military strategy due to emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic gliding and precision warheads, missile defense, and cyber offense will affect the designing of deterrence architecture and the modality of nuclear arms control regime that defines the framework for strategic competition between the major powers.

The nuclear arms control regime encompasses the conflicting objectives of ensuring stability and pursuing superiority. As the United States, Russia, and China have different strategic visions and different prospects for power distribution in the future, which increase uncertainty in the prospect nature and modality of mutual relationships among them, as emerging technologies assign a strategic role to conventional and cyber technologies, and as non-strategic uses of nuclear weapons are incorporated into national nuclear policies, a concept of strategic stability will require extensive work to re-define. Institutionalizing nuclear deterrence at the strategic level based on mutual vulnerability is not enough to ensure stability among states, and the potential for intense security competition to unfold across the borders of nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional domains is increasing. As a result, different nuclear weapons employment policies make it difficult to find a point of equilibrium in the institutional design of an arms control regime that ensures the establishment of stability among the three countries, including the United States, Russia and China. In addition, as a result of the convergence of competition at the global level of the great powers and regional security that includes non-nuclear allies, a new challenge has also arisen: how can arms control bridge the stability at the strategic level between the great powers and security at the regional level?

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Consideration on the relation between the military technology and the non-military technology is performed by comparison between two flying boats. One is the flying boat type 2 of the Japanese Navy, which was used for fighting in the World War II. The other is the type US-1 of the Maritime Self-Defense Force of Japan, which has been used to rescue the people who meet with a disaster on sea. First, the flying boat type 2 is explained. By agreement of the disarmament conference in 1922, the former Japanese Navy determined to produce big flying boats to compensate the lack of the marine power. Kawanishi Aircraft Co. (next ShinMaywa Industries Ltd.) received the request from the navy and developed the flying boat type 2, which succeeded in the first flight in 1942. It had the maximum high performance as that time. Next, the rescue flying boat US-1 is explained. Although it was a new type of flying boat of which ShinMeiwa Industries Ltd. received an order from the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the base was the antisubmarine patrol flying boat PS-1, whose developers were the same as the developers of the type 2. Therefore, as for the origin of design technique, it is the type 2 and the appearance also resembles it. After describing that the rescue activity of the rescue flying boat is usually done with the (antisubmarine) patrol aircraft (PS-1, P2-J, P3-C, etc.), the meaning of classifying the technology into military one and non-military one is discussed. Finally, it is concluded that evaluation of the technology is "relative" and is done by not the engineer but the society and the citizens.

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The purpose of this study is to examine the public opinion for disarmament between World War I and World War II. This research analyzed editorials be connected with disarmament in the Jiji-Shinpo from 1920 to 1931 to observe how issues are emphasized in the mass media, adopted quantitative and qualitative content analysis. As a result of the analysis, it became apparent that theory of disarmament is difference in each time. To be concrete, disarmament of the army is related with political institution on the one hand, disarmament of the navy is related with international issues on the other.

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There are still remain that many buildings which have constructed by the former Japanese Imperial Navy in Kure city, Hiroshima and they are now used by Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force or some private enterprises. However, most of them have not been investigated enough, and construction history and/or structural details of the buildings are unknown still now. The purpose of this study is to clarify construction date and structural characteristics of the office buildings of machinery and shipping department in the former Kure naval arsenal.

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This essay focuses on the preliminary negotiations of the second London Naval Conference held in 1934 from the Japanese, American, and British points of view. International crises in the early 1930s, such as the Manchurian incident of 1931 and the rise of Nazi Germany, strongly influenced UK and US naval policy. The British Royal Navy in particular faced strategic challenges by Germany and Italy in Europe and Japan in the Far East. Serious financial constraints prevented the navy from countering both threats, so the British government decided to prioritize defence in Europe over the Far East and to appease Japan at the conference. However, it was expected that this appeasement policy would not be accepted by the US government, which wanted to deter Japanese expansion in the Far East. The British government also faced a diplomatic difficulty in handling a rivalry between the US and Japan.
　Soon after the Roosevelt administration came to power in 1933, the new US government decided to expand its naval command to the upper limit of the Washington and London naval treaties in order to counteract Japanese expansion policy. This decision gave the Japanese navy an excuse to expand, and Japan decided to secede from the Washington and London naval treaties. In October 1933, the commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), Shingo Ishikawa, drafted a secret plan, “Personal policy to the next naval conference”, which suggested denouncing the Washington Naval Treaty if the UK and US did not accept Japan’s demand. The Kantai-ha (Hawks) of IJN, who were frustrated by the treaty, formally approved Ishikawa’s plan.
　During the preliminary negotiations of the second London Naval Conference, the British government tried to be an intermediary between the US and Japan, but the Japanese delegation was uncompromising in its demand for naval parity among the UK, US, and Japan. The UK and US delegations, who estimated that a naval ratio of 5:5:3 should be beneficial for Japan, rejected the parity plan. The British government tried to keep Japan at the negotiating table, but the Japanese government denounced the Washington Naval Treaty on December 29, 1934, indicating the failure of the preliminary negotiations of the Second London Naval Conference.

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