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  • 中央銀行制度改革の試みとその挫折
    真渕 勝
    年報政治学
    1991年 42 巻 139-163
    発行日: 1991年
    公開日: 2010/04/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ──戦後日本における国際基督教大学成立の事例から──
    齋藤 崇德
    教育社会学研究
    2014年 94 巻 217-236
    発行日: 2014/05/31
    公開日: 2015/06/03
    ジャーナル フリー
     本論の目的は二つの制度的圧力下にあった戦後日本におけるキリスト教系大学の成立と適応のメカニズムを明らかにすることにある。まず,高等教育組織の成立と適応の意味を明らかにし,次に国際基督教大学の事例研究からそれら概念を実証する。国際基督教大学は,戦前に歴史を持たず,またキリスト教と高等教育という二つの制度下にあったという意味で特徴的な事例である。
     第一に,高等教育組織,その環境,そしてその適応という概念を明らかにする。高等教育組織とは制度化された公式組織であり制度的源泉に依存する。その環境とは集合的に制度的生活の認識された領域を構築する組織フィールドであると言える。そして,組織は文化・認知的概念,とくに制度的論理によってフィールドに適応する。
     第二に,戦後日本における国際基督教大学の成立と適応のプロセスについて論じる。国際基督教大学は,既存のキリスト教系大学と占領期という,二つの制度による環境の複雑性を抱えていた。国際基督教大学は,学問的卓越性と日本の「発展」という論理を使用して,この複雑性を処理した。
     国際基督教大学の成立と適応の分析を通じて,組織と環境間における文化・認知的概念を通じた制度的メカニズムの存在が示唆される。
  • アーサー・ドレクスラーの仕事を中心に
    山崎 泰寛, 松隈 洋
    日本建築学会計画系論文集
    2013年 78 巻 688 号 1441-1446
    発行日: 2013/06/30
    公開日: 2013/08/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this study is to clarify the role of curator through Arthur Drexler's works on exhibition “Japanese Exhibition House” in the Museum of Modern Art, New York. This study focuses on his preparation of the exhibition, relationships to contributors, and requirements to the architect. Through this study, his role as a curator becomes clear in following points: 1. Thorough research based on on-site observation, 2. Persuasive financial management. 3. Respectful discussion with architect.
  • 小川 英雄
    オリエント
    2003年 46 巻 2 号 1-6
    発行日: 2003年
    公開日: 2010/03/12
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 仁科 雄一郎
    日本物理学会誌
    1990年 45 巻 10 号 724-726
    発行日: 1990/10/05
    公開日: 2020/03/26
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 若林 悠
    年報行政研究
    2016年 51 巻 87-108
    発行日: 2016年
    公開日: 2020/03/24
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 終戦外交と戦後構想
    中北 浩爾
    国際政治
    1995年 1995 巻 109 号 126-140,L13
    発行日: 1995/05/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The domestic economic policy of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) immediately following the war was interventionist in character. It included emphasis on a planned economy, the nationalization of major industries, and cooperation between labor and industrialists at the expense of the interests of capital. As a consequence, it has been conventional practice to view the JPS's foreign economic policy as based on the principle of autarky. In actuality, however, it was much more open in nature, promoting both participation in the Bretton Woods Agreement and the introduction of foreign capital. The JSP reasoned that it would be necessary to pursue an interventionist domestic economic policy in order for Japan to obtain the economic power to enable competitiveness in an open international economic order.
    Two historical origins of the JSP's postwar positive evaluation of an open international economic order can be delineated. First, the right wing of the JSP was supportive of an open international economic order from the time immediately following the formation of social democratic parties in the late 1920s. Second, the attitude of the left wing of the JSP, the ‘Labor-Farmer’ faction (Ronoha), changed over time from opposition to support of an open international economic order. Prior to the Second World War, the ‘Labor-Farmer’ faction had been critical of such an open order. However, at the time of Japan's defeat, upon reflecting on the international economic order created by Japan during the war, it came to approve of the open international economic order created by the United States of America.
    At the time of the formation of the Socialist Party-led Katayama Cabinet in June 1947, the Japanese economy was autarkic out of necessity, and it was thought that this situation would continue for some time. It was in these circumstances that the major industrialists and the left of the capitalist parties, the Democratic Party, supported the economic policies of the JSP. Further, with economic recovery in mind, they cooperated with the JSP and its labor union base, the Japan General Federation of Labor (Sodomei), in order to prepare for entry into an open international economy. As a result, the Katayama Cabinet was a coalition centered on the JSP and Democratic Party and it placed much importance on the Council for Economic Reconstruction (Keizaifukkokaigi), an organization for the promotion of cooperation between workers and employers in which the major economic groups and labor unions participated, as a means of implementing interventionist domestic policies.
    In August 1947 GHQ approved of the restoration of private trade in certain areas. The major industrialists and the Democratic Party, confronting this earlier than expected partial deregulation of exports, became more positive towards the rationalization of firms through such measures as the retrenchment of excess employees so as to improve international competitiveness. The industrialists were, however, unable to implement such rationalization programs because of the fact that, firstly, despite the above mentioned partial deregulation, the government still controlled an extremely large portion of trade, and secondly, that a socialist filled the post of Prime Minister.
    From the end of 1947, the situation had improved so that the introduction of foreign capital, especially private foreign capital, was now considered possible, although respective party responses differed to this changed situation. The major industrialists and the Democratic Party, who were both highly supportive of the introduction of foreign capital, began anti-labor calls similar to the right of the capitalist parties, the Liberal Party, for a retrogressive revision of the labor law in order to better promote the interests of capital. Furthermore, they commenced a program of enterprise rationalization. The resignation of Katayama and the appointment of a Democrat,
  • 大川 時夫, 堤 一郎
    会議録・要旨集 フリー
    The history of Former Ikegai Iron Works are reviewed especially on the productive works of Diesel engines. Engineer dream of the president Shotaro-Ikegai of the company, was production of mother machines for the domestic country. He was a so skill full and so excellent wise engineer that he had started to produce reciprocal engine energized with fuel materials beside of works of mother machine-shop. The first realization of production of diesel engine in Japan was taking place in his iron works, modifying commercial engine inported in Japan from Deutschrand. By such industrial activities, he and his followers had established the Ikegai konzern around 1940in Japan, in which the Ikegai automobile company was established. After the second world war, the Ikegai works had been fallen in severe economical situations. Those historical problems with developing technology of Diesel-engines are reviewed briefly.
  • 石井 寛治
    史学雑誌
    1989年 98 巻 11 号 1826-1834
    発行日: 1989/11/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 竹中 佳彦
    史学雑誌
    2004年 113 巻 2 号 222-231
    発行日: 2004/02/20
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 日高 圭一郎
    九州産業大学建築都市工学部研究報告
    2022年 5 巻 9-17
    発行日: 2022年
    公開日: 2023/04/11
    研究報告書・技術報告書 オープンアクセス
  • 〈技術が支えた日本の繊維産業—生産・販売・商品開発の歩み—7〉
    松下 義弘
    繊維学会誌
    2014年 70 巻 3 号 P_109-P_114
    発行日: 2014/03/10
    公開日: 2014/03/16
    ジャーナル 認証あり
  • 池田 直隆
    国際政治
    2002年 2002 巻 129 号 173-185,L20
    発行日: 2002/02/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In January 1955, Prime Minister HATOYAMA Ichiro emphasized that Japan's primary objective is to attain for Japan full independence and self-reliance by pursuing as “independent diplomacy”, while at the same time Japan will adhere its basic principle of close cooperation with the United States. And HATOYAMA sought to adjust its relations with countries with which Japan still does not have diplomatic relations. So, He began Japanese-Soviet negotiations. U. S. Government took the position with the Japanese Government that the United States did not oppose establishment of diplomatic ralations with USSR, because they thought Japan was already an independent nation.
    But, U. S government feared that Japan chose the Neutral policy or Anti-American policy. And they are discontented with Japan's attitude toward the national security problems. They thought that Japan did not regard the threat of communism as seriously as did the United States and NATO countries. U. S. Government was irritated by the fact that Japan lacked self-knowledge of their position and responsibility.
    U. S. Government suspected whether HATOYAMA cabinet understood the importance and significance of mutual security systems or not. Moreover, they understood that HATOYAMA's leadership was so weak that difference of foreign policy between HATOYAMA and the Foreign ministry became very serious. HATOYAMA's directions to the Foreign ministry was sometimes not transmitted, and HATOYAMA's action did not sometimes coincide with the policy of Foreign ministry.
    There were two typical examples. One is Japanese-Soviet negotiations, and the other is Japanese-SouthKorea negotiations. Japanese Government and LDP also understood that HATOYAMA's leadership was very weak and unreliable.
    But, U. S. Government could not censure HATOYAMA publicly for his independent diplomacy, because in Japan, the anti-American feeling was growing rapidly by reason of U. S. troops and bases. In March 1956, when Secretary John F. Dulles visited Tokyo, MIKI Bukichi, who was the member of proxy committee of Liberal Democratic Party, said to Dulles, “even a mountain can be undermined and crumble because of ant holes”. MIKI warned Dulles against Japanese anti-American feeling. Indeed, HATOYAMA's independent diplomacy came to a deadlock. Japan failed to negotiate with USSR, South korea. The abuse of veto by USSR and Chinese Taipei prevented Japan from admitting to the United Nations in the 10th session, December 1955.
    So, it was very important for the U. S. Government to make HATOYAMA succeed in his Independent diplomacy. U. S. Government thought that HATOYAMA should resign honourably when Japanese-Soviet negotiation was concluded. It was called “Hanamichiron” in LDP. MIKI Bukichi once said to KISHI Nobusuke, who became Prime Minister in 1957, as follows.
    “What is most important is to make HATOAMA resign without injuring his political reputation”.
    The cognition of U. S Government was coincided with Japanese one.
  • 中村 起一郎
    年報政治学
    1998年 49 巻 195-212
    発行日: 1999/01/27
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 河野 康子
    年報政治学
    1997年 48 巻 117-132
    発行日: 1997/12/10
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 天羽 正継
    財政研究
    2007年 3 巻 206-225
    発行日: 2007年
    公開日: 2022/07/15
    ジャーナル フリー

     本稿の課題は,戦時期に資金計画の一環として形成された地方債計画が,終戦後にどのような経緯を経て,戦後のわが国の地方債制度を支えるシステムとして再形成されることとなったのかを明らかにすることである。戦時期には国家資金計画による地方債計画の下,地方債の全額が政府資金によって引き受けられた。終戦後に戦時期の地方債計画は撤廃されたが,政府資金がインフレにより蓄積不足が続いたため,一部の地方債が民間資金によって引き受けられることとなった。ところが,地方債の消化が困難をきわめたため,大蔵省と日銀により計画的な消化を図る政策が展開されることとなった。こうした過程で大蔵省は,民間資金と政府資金による引受量を把握しつつ,新たな起債許可権限を用いてそれらに見合うように地方債発行額を調整することが可能となった。こうして,終戦後に撤廃された地方債計画は新たな装いをもって復活し,戦後に引き継がれることとなったのである。

  • 国際開発論
    後藤 一美
    国際政治
    1980年 1980 巻 64 号 61-81,L3
    発行日: 1980/05/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this article is to attempt an examination of the present state and problems of the system, process and efficiency of Japan's bilateral loans provided, as official development assistance, directly to developing countries.
    The aid administration in Japan has not yet fully laid hold of a device for relating policy and objective effectively within the almost narcissistic “check and balance system based on consultation” which is the outcome of the pursuit of administrative autonomy by each of the administrative organs concerned, in the context of a multiple decentralised administrative structure for aid policy-making.
  • ―日本政府内政治過程と国際関係1955–59―
    友次 晋介
    東南アジア研究
    2019年 57 巻 1 号 31-55
    発行日: 2019/07/31
    公開日: 2019/07/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article discusses the process of negotiation by which the Japanese government reached an agreement on economic and technological cooperation with the Cambodian government, in which both parties eventually decided to build an agricultural laboratory and medical center. In order to strengthen its economy, Cambodia wished to obtain economic aid from Japan while surrendering its right to request reparation for the losses it incurred due to Japan’s invasion during World War II. Japan appreciated the Cambodian goodwill, because establishing a friendly relationship would be meaningful in securing the Japanese return to post-World War II international society. For Japan, moreover, the success of the negotiations with Cambodia would become the best reference case that could dissuade the South Vietnamese and Indonesian governments from claiming “exorbitant” reparation. Yet, the amount of aid that the Cambodians initially expected reduced within a short period of time, as a result of inter-organizational politics within the Japanese government.

  • 増田 弘
    国際政治
    1986年 1986 巻 Special 号 145-165,L11
    発行日: 1986/10/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Ishibashi Tanzan, the Finance Minister under the first Yoshida cabinet (May 22, 1946 to May 24, 1947) was purged on May 16, 1947, in accordance with category G of Appendix “A” of SCAPIN-550, dated January 4, 1946. Ishibashi's purge was clearly unreasonable. As president and editor-in-chief of the Oriental Economist, Ishibashi had been firmly in opposition to the Manchurian Incident (1931), the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), The Triple Alliance (1940), and the Pacific War (1941-45). He was well known as one of the few liberalists opposing the totalitarian government in those days. That is why Colonel Kramer, who became the first chief of the Economic & Scientific Section (ESS) of GHQ and had been a reader of the Oriental Economist even during the war, asked for Ishibashi's cooperation from September to December, 1945.
    This article aims to clarify the factors and process of Ishibashi's purge as GHQ's attempt to silence him and to squelch his economic enlargement policies in favor of their own economic retrenchment policies. There were three purge actions on Ishibashi. The first purge movement was requested by the Soviet representatives at the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) conference; GHQ disagreed. The second occasion arose when Ishibashi and ESS came into extreme conflict over the Extraordinary Tax Legislation issue, but General MacArthur denied his purge for fear that the Yoshida cabinet would fall. And finally, the situation that led to the purge of Ishibashi was the clash on the cost problems of the Occupation that occurred between Ishibashi and GHQ. Moreover, the Government Section (GS) viewed Ishibashi as a dangerous man for offering such stout resistance to GHQ. GS had to purge him not as a politician, but as an journalist because there was no clause on resistance to the Allied Powers as a justification in SCAPIN-550. Prime Minister Yoshida assumed an indifferent attitude because Ishibashi was becoming powerful in the Liberal Party.
  • 辻 泰岳
    文化資源学
    2020年 18 巻 1-16
    発行日: 2020年
    公開日: 2021/07/16
    ジャーナル フリー

    本稿では建築家のアントニン・レーモンドとノエミ・レーモンドが収集した器物が展示された「Japanese Household Objects」展(1951年)を題材として、かれらが文化外交(カルチュラル・ディプロマシー)にどのような思いを介在させようとしていたのかを明らかにする。先行する成果として、たとえば2006年に開催された「Crafting a Modern World」展はジェンダー・スタディーズの観点をふまえ、アントニンだけではなくノエミの関与を含めてかれらの活動を包括的にまとめている。そこで本稿はこの成果に続き、ペンシルバニア大学のアーカイブズやMoMA Archivesに保管される資料を用いて、レーモンド夫妻の実践が占領期の社会と不可分の関係にあったことを示す。この「Japanese Household Objects」展は、ジョン・D・ロックフェラー三世とブランシェット・ロックフェラーが推進しようとしていた文化による外交をいちはやく視覚化する機会でもあった。ただしこの展覧会はノエミの打診に応じたフィリップ・ジョンソンが開催に至る準備を進めたため、自分たちの目で見た日本を紹介したいと考えていたアントニンとノエミは「日本の食卓を表していない」と不満を漏らした。他方、この会期中にはレーモンド夫妻がイサム・ノグチと共に設計を進めていたリーダーズ・ダイジェスト東京支社も竣工する。アントニンとノエミは「Japanese Household Objects」展に続き、このホールで開催された「現代日本陶磁展」にもかかわるが、要人が集まるこの展覧会もやはり、外交の渦中にあった。本稿では外交が文化を資源として扱うことでそれを規定し直す過程に着目しながら、こうした経緯を詳らかにすることによって、当時の外交が建築や絵画、彫刻、工芸といった造形の区分を再編する契機でもあったことを描く。あわせてアントニンとノエミが文化の当事者として外交に織り込もうとした思いと、それが後に及ぼした影響を考えたい。

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