This paper analyses EU's contribution in order to stabilize the Middle East particularly from the point of view of preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy has been recognized since the 1990s especially in the United Nations in a broad sense and in a long-term context including not only the prevention of conflict but also conflict resolution and peace building; this framework will be suitable for the EU's case towards the Middle East.
Though there is no consistent EU's Middle East policy (this paper refers mainly to the East Mediterranean region), policy frameworks exist separately through the bilateral and multilateral forms of the “Conflict Prevention Model,” as well as through the “Conflict Resolution Model.” The 2003 European Security Strategy represents the response towards the conflict resolution stage of the Israel-Palestine conflict, where efforts towards conflict resolution and post-conflict stabilization are concentrated on the civic fields. Short-term aims of avoiding violent conflict as well as long-term plans of injecting concepts of democracy, protection of human rights and the rule of law are done through multilateral dialogue and cooperation frameworks such as the 1995 Barcelona Process and the 2008 Union for the Mediterranean, as well as through bilateral framework such as the 2004 European Neighbourhood Policy. The pluralistic and multi-layered outcomes of these policy frameworks, which aim for the construction of a societal structure that prevents the build up of conflict in the Middle Eastern region, has contributed to the promotion of long-term preventive diplomacy.
The processes that exert influence in the Middle East through these frameworks are thus given: the compulsory pathway, the enabling pathway, the institutionalizing pathway, the connective pathway and the constructive pathway. Although the pathway process taken differs with each policy framework, these processes have pluralistic functions which have given way to distinct accomplishments in preventive diplomacy.
Nevertheless, challenges still remain, as it is imperative to coordinate between policy frameworks as well as to secure and improve the trust with Middle East actors including Israel.

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Following the end of the Cold War, various tentatives to achieve peace have been made, most notably through the United Nations peacekeeping operations. The first attempt to be carried out was, one called “preventive deployment” and consisted in the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces before a conflict takes place. Under the name United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), such a force was successfully dispatched to the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia) and was able to achieve its purpose of preventing the conflict in Yugoslavia from spreading to Macedonia.
If we consider the terrible events that took place during the Yugoslavia civil war and their consequences as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, numbers alone cannot accurately measure the positive impact this mission had in preventing the conflict from spilling into Macedonia. However, it is doubtful whether one should expect that such a singular success in conflict prevention could easily be reproduced. In this article I propose to examine the case of the UNPREDEP mission in Macedonia and to clarify why it succeeded. In Section 1 I will present an outline of UNPREDEP. In Section 2 I will focus on the reasons that can explain why UNPREDEP succeeded.
Concretely speaking, the mission took place under the following conditions: (1) international trend towards conflict prevention, (2) support for preventive deployment in the country concerned (Macedonia government and domestic players), (3) existence of a reliable force with deterrent capacity (U. S. A participation), (4) existence of a reward (participation to the EU and cancellation of sanctions from New Yugoslavia, etc.), (5) a domestic shared understanding of the potential aggressor country, (6) existence of other conflict prevention means (activity of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), NGOs etc.), (7) clarification/limitation of purpose/mandate, (8) establishment of a division of labor system, (9) good timing. All these can be considered factors that contributed to the mission's success.
This leads us to the following conclusions: UNPREDEP did succeed in the carrying out of its deployment and in the prevention of conflict in Macedonia at that time, because various activities were performed very well, and, at the same time, supported by a set of favorable conditions and environment. So, we can deduce that changes in some of those factors could have led to quite a different, and less favorable, situation. The success of UNPREDEP should not be seen as a solid model. Rather, it serves to show the possibilities, but also the limits of achieving conflict prevention through such preventive deployments.

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Aspirations for minority group rights are one of the most pressing issues facing the UN in the post cold war era. This article analyzes the issues of minority rights in relation to the current debate on how the international consensus on state sovereignty has changed. The main thrust of the UN position on minority issues is to balance the integrity of multi-ethnic states with the protection of minority rights. While the UN Charter lacks specific criteria on how to accommodate these conflicting demands, the member states have attempted to establish certain rules to resolve these conflicts.
Questions concerning minority rights include whether or not states should protect not only individual human rights but also the group rights of minorities which have developed their own identities. I argue that during the early post-war period the UN was primarily concerned with the stability of nation states, and thus was negative on the group aspect of minority rights. It had taken sides with the existing states or assumed hands-off policies in various conflicts relating to the rights of minorities, such as in Katanga, Biafra, and Bangladesh.
However, since the 1960's, minority group rights have gradually to be seen as legitimate issues in UN debates, and since they have come to the forefront of UN discussions. Although the member states acknowledged the danger involved in the recognition of a right to ethnic self-determination, they nevertheless have tried to place minority rights within the framework of conflict prevention and democratization of former authoritarian regimes. Efforts of the UN members on minority issues have been demonstrated in the UN Declaration on Minorities and the activities of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Apparently the UN has increasingly recognized that the protection of the group identities of minorities would prevent radical ethnopolitics. Thus, it is particularly important for the UN to develop mechanisms in which minority rights are protected in a democratic framework. The final section of this article briefly compares the UN mechanisms on minorities with the European system in which various regional organizations have developed multi-layered mechanisms for the protection of minorities. It shows that the UN still lacks effective and proactive mechanisms for the protections of minority rights.
The article concludes, first, that the perceptions of state sovereignty among the UN member states have changed, as was shown in recent debate's on minority issues. Second, the UN needs to further develop the current pragmatic approach so that the group aspects of minority rights will be protected within the framework of the democratization of a state in order not to destabilize multi-ethnic states.

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In recent French external relations, not only Europe but the Mediterranean region has also been attached with great importance. Its background can be found through geopolitical reasons, historico-cultural reasons, and global strategic reasons; however, how can we recognize characteristics of the French security policy in the Mediterranean region? This article attempts to clarify these characteristics through analyzing French security policy in this region from the viewpoint of the study of security culture.
French national security culture is analyzed in this article from three viewpoints: 1) an external view of the world's environment, 2) in terms of instrumental preferences for security maintenance, and 3) in terms of interaction preferences with other states. For the first point, though the foundation has carried the perspective of realism since de Gaulle, it can be also confirmed that in the multi-polar world, securitization has developed wherein non-state actors have become a target of security. The second point refers to the preference of preventive diplomacy and peace building through non-military means which is increasingly taken into focus. However as the exercise of military force is still considered superior in the protection of citizens, there is a continuing clash between the use of military means and the use of non-military means. For the third point, the French preference is to criticize unilateralism, while having the highest regard for security actions based on multilateralism.
The manifestation of French security culture in the Mediterranean region can be confirmed with the above stated orientation. Gradually raising the awareness of the importance of regional security in the Mediterranean, successive presidents of the Fifth Republic not only have securitized various sectors involved in the transformation of the entire international community, but also have put importance on regional stability through international institutionalization based on multilateralism, thereby strengthening the orientation to ensure the safety of France. Concrete manifestation of their security activities can be understood through the non-military means of strengthening cooperation with southern Mediterranean countries, through the military reform in France based on the changing situation around its Mediterranean neighbours, the development of regional security mission of European Union CSDP, while taking advantage of the Union for the Mediterranean that was launched in 2008, and through verifying how France has exhibited its leadership. In the Mediterranean region, France is promoting multilateralism based on international institutionalization in terms of all aspects ranging from the military to non-military aspects, which promotes the strengthening of France's political leadership.
In the external policy of France in the Mediterranean region, although the realistic Gaullist attitude is still deeply rooted in the foundation, the French have gradually come to focus more on realistic political responses focusing on non-military means in adapting to the changing era of security, while utilizing a multilateral concept of framework of international relations which also supports this kind of political orientation.

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Many observers have pointed out the need for a multilateral security discussion in East Asia. But since the diversity of the region underlies a latent potential for discord, there is also a widely-held pessimistic view that it will be difficult to realize a security arrangement amid the lack of any consensus that could serve to underpin its formation.
On the new role of the U. S. -Japan security alliance, the 1997 new guidelines note in an item on “Various Types of Security Cooperation” that the “bilateral [Japan-U. S.] cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security environment.” In other words, it is the new global role of the alliance and its complex functions that are being given particular importance. These functions include U. N. peace-keeping, international humanitarian relief operations and emergency relief activities in major disasters. They also include encouraging security dialogue, defense exchange, regional confidence building, as well as arms control and reduction-an alternative to focusing on the containment of an adversary.
Despite the avowed importance of this new role, however, its logical and conceptual underpinning remains to be clearly laid out. During the Cold War, the existence of the enemy was clear, as was the objective of assuring the security of one's own country in opposition to it. But alliances can no longer be considered simply containment measures. Instead, they must be looked upon from the wider perspective of the pursuit of an institutional means of forming and maintaining a stable geopolitical environment through building confidence and mutual exchange among alliance members.
Given that, the purpose of this paper is to discuss the potential roles for today's alliance in a security arrangement for the whole region. We will take into consideration issues related to managing the alliance, dilemmas associated with it and the related security structure, as well as the relationship between the alliance and the multipolar framework in which it exists.
This paper begins with a clarification of the characteristics of post-Cold War international politics in East Asia, and the structural limitations they place on Japan. A discussion of the new role of the alliance follows, with a comparison between the significance of the concept of “cooperative security” during the Cold War and after it as it applies to the Japan-U. S. alliance. The third part of the paper specifies practical choices faced by alliance members as they endeavor to establish a “cooperative security” framework, as well as the conditions for valid “cooperative security”.

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From January 1992, at the outset of his work, a new Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has dealt with the reform of the United Nations (UN). He declared in his annual report that there was a possibility to bring about a renaissance-to create a new UN for a new international era. Before he commenced planning to improve the UN, there were many proposals for reform. The objectives of this paper are to compare these proposals for reform with the efforts of the Secretary-General. This paper is composed of three chapters; I) The history of the proposals for the reform of the UN, II) The reform of the administrative and financial functioning of the UN, III) The reform of the organization of the UN.
I) There were two causes of the crisis at the UN. First, in 1983, the US Congress passed the Kassebaum Amendment which cut off the rate of US payments to the UN. Second, in 1984, the US and the UK withdrew from UNESCO. These two events gave rise to a financial crisis at the UN. The financial pressures have forced the UN to reduce its expenses and to reform its organizational structures. From 1985, many ideas and plans to reform the UN were devised and proposed. These proposals had some effect on the effort of Secretary-General Ghali.
II) There are three aspects to the reform of the administrative and financial functioning of the UN. (1) The Secretariat; Ghali has implemented the regrouping a number of offices and the consolidation of related functions and activities. On account of this regrouping and consolidation, 14 posts at the Under-Secretary-Gen eral and Assistant-Secretary-General level were abolished. (2) Personnel Management; The number of UN posts financed by the regular budget has been decreased from 11, 409 in 1987 to 10, 100 in 1992. (3) Financial and Budgetary problem; The system for planning and budget procedures was revised in December, 1986. Since then, the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC) has had a decisive role in controlling programme content and budget size. And the decisions of intergovernmental bodies for planning and budget procedure began to be taken by consensus.
III) In the field of the maintenance of peace and security, Ghali identified four areas for action: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace-building. These four areas should be considered together as part of an integrated approach.
In the field of economic and social cooperation, there are three problems. First, Ghali suggested that the Economic Social Council (ECOSOC) might introduce a flexible high-level inter-sessional mechanism in order to facilitate a timely response to evolving socio-economic realities. Second, in the field of economic development, Ghali proposed an integrated approach. He thinks that political progress and economic development are inseparable. Third, concerning the global environment, Ghali refers to the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in June 1992.
Five points are concluded. First, the central concepts of Ghali's reform are democratization and development; a people-centered vision of development. The ultimate goal of the reform of the UN is the reform of the world system. These dramatic visions are useful as background for UN reform. Second, in accordance with other proposals, Ghali proposes to hold a UN Summit Meeting with high-level government representatives to strengthen ECOSOC and the Security Council. Third, Ghali reaffirms that the main objective of the UN is maintaining international peace and security. Fourth, administrative and structural reform has been executed effectively since 1985, such as strengthening of the CPC and introduction of consensus decisionmaking.

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The ending of the Cold War and the cooperative atmosphere among Great Powers brought by it has become the basis for today's discussion on revitalizing the United Nations' role in maintaining world peace. The purpose of the essay is threefold: 1) to examine the nature of the United Nations' Peace-keeping Operations (PKO), which has been a major instrument in containing regional conflicts throughout the postwar period; 2) to evaluate the view of the activist school of thought in today's debate on enhancing the role of PKO; 3) to discuss the future course of the PKO.
Although there has been an increasing tendency since Gulf War to regard PKO as part of Collective Security or something linked to it, a distinction has to be made between the two. In contrast to Collective Security, which is based on “just war theory”, PKO is characterized by its non-combatant nature and impartiality. Two important features of postwar international society created the background for the emergence of PKO. The first is the change in the concept of war that was brought by the development of modern weapons technology and by the antagonism of the Cold War. Wars had to be contained on the local level before they escalated into general war. “Cease-fire” became an end in itself rather than a step in a war-settlement process as in the past.
The second important feature of postwar international society is what Robert Jackson calls the “negative sovereignty regime.” The postwar world has witnessed the expansion of the European state system, which now covers the globe. By the extinction of open space to which the international system “exports” war while maintaining peace within the system itself, the international system has become conservative in terms of territorial sovereignty. Preservation of the territorial status-quo became an implicit rule of the postwar international relations, to which the United Nations' PKO has contributed.
The future course of PKO will be found in its link not with “peace-enforcement” but with “peace-making, ” which is outlined in Chapter 6 of the Charter. This chapter suggests a UN role in mediating between the parties of disputes and investigating the conflict situation. In energizing PKO, the enhanced role of the Secretary General will be the key, especially in preventive diplomacy. Most needed is a systematized information-gathering system that will enable the Secretary General to have his own sources of information, on the crisis situation.
Although each PKO is unique and generalization is difficult, the effectiveness of PKO, like that of any institution, depends on how to balance its “autonomy” as a system and its “flexibility” to adapt to new environment. PKO activities have been expanding in response to emergence of post Cold War conflicts. There is a tendency to use PKO not only as an instrument of preserving order, but also as an instrument of achieving justice. However, diversification of the types of PKO should not undermine its impartiality, which has been the essence of its success both in the past, and likely in the future.

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