「日本研究のための歴史情報」プロジェクトでは、様々な資料のテキストデータ化に取り組み、研究に利用している。本報告では、テキスト処理とその結果の活用事例の一つとして、『人事興信録』の人的ネットワークの可視化について報告する。『人事興信録』は、家族・親戚情報が詳細に記載されている点に大きな特徴があり、これを利用することで、実親子関係やより広い姻戚関係の情報を得ることができる。可視化のための前提作業として、テキストデータからの親の氏名の抽出処理や、採録者との同定処理について紹介する。特に、採録者の同定処理は、他の人事情報資料を扱う際の参考になるものと考えられる。このようなテキスト処理を経て描かれたネットワーク図は、『人事興信録』原典だけでは容易にわからない人的関係性を可視化しており、実際の事例を用いてその有効性を示す。

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In 1873, Imperial Japanese Army started intelligence activity in China under the tensions preceding Taiwan Expedition of 1874. But this attempt was almost slumbered by the confusion of Japanese civil wars.
When the General Staff (GS) was founded in 1878, they restarted the intelligence activity. GS dispatched 12 officers to China for information-gathering for three years. They collected military and topographical information all over the China. Also GS sent staff officers to the short trips for strategic reconnaissance. By these activities, GS could lay out a war plan against China and military review about neighboring powers. But GS was not satisfied with intelligence reports at the earlier date.
Against Russia, GS started intelligence activity in 1880. But GS disposed only 2 officers in Siberia in 1882. GS tried to focus on China, shelving Russia matters.
In 1882, GS was surprised by China's dispatch of troops to Korea. In China, GS was obliged to improve their intelligence apparatus and increased the number of officers from 12 to 16. Captain FUKUSHIMA Yasumasa, Military Attaché in Peking, employed informers in the Chinese Department of Military Affairs and obtained confidential papers from them. Based on the information, he realized that Chinese military modernization would fail and criticized the Japanese diplomatic policy to concert with China.
In Russia, GS reduced the number of intelligence officer to only 1. In 1885, GS's intelligence in Russia was stagnant.
But then GS was shocked by the British occupation of Port Hamilton, and started to pay attention to British-Russian relations. In 1886, GS reduced personnel in China and sent staff officers to Siberia and India for strategic reconnaissance. In 1887, GS appointed Fukusima to Military Attaché in Berlin. He collected information on Russia, especially the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway. Finally, in 1892, he carried out the Trans-Siberian expedition on horseback. He concluded that the Trans-Siberian railway would be completed in 10 years and after the completion Japan would be in difficult position. He insisted that Japan should make a strategic plan against Russia as soon as possible. GS also made a report estimating about transportation capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway.
In 1892, GS reinforced intelligence apparatus in Russia sending Military Attaché and 3 intelligence officers to Saint Petersburg. Adding to the officer in Siberia, GS deployed 5 officers in Russia. In China, GS disposed only just 3 officers at the end of 1893. By the First Sino-Japanese war, GS intelligence placed more emphasis on Russia rather than China.
In these years, GS started the intelligence from scratch, and accommodated it to international situation. The GS intelligence activities anticipated the future situation and preceded Japanese diplomacy.

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