As for the relationship between Diet members and local assembly members in Japan, previous empirical researches mainly focus on their clientelistic relations among them and upward political career move from local assembly to the Diet. In this article, the author presents a different perspective from these previous researches, and elaborates the tendency that Diet members try to change their career to local politicians, especially governors and mayors of local governments. Two political reforms in the 1990s affected the ambition of Diet members; the electoral reform changed patterns of political competition in electoral districts, and the decentralization reform enhanced the attractiveness of the position of mayors.
  In this article, the author investigates the cases that Diet members / former Diet members, who stood as a candidate in the five elections before and after the electoral reform, challenge governor / mayor / local assembly elections. The results show that more Liberal Democratic Party members challenge to local elections after the electoral reform, and the more leading opposition members, who were affiliated with Japan Socialist Party or New Frontier Party or Democratic Party, challenge to local elections than LDP members. Besides, this article reveals that by measuring the effective numbers of candidate the patterns of political competitions in governor / mayor elections are different before and after the electoral reform.

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Yatsugi Kazuo (1899-1983) was one of the most important “informal contact-makers” in Japanese-Korean relations. Throughout his career he held various titles but no government positions. Both in prewar and postwar years he headed Kokusaku Kenkyukai or the National Policy Research Association. His initial involvement in Japanese-Korean affairs began with his acquaintance in late 1956 with Ryu Tae-Ha, then Counsellor of the Korean Representative Office in Tokyo. When Kishi Nobusuke became prime minister in 1957, he wanted to improve Tokyo-Seoul relations and, using his long-time friendship with Yatsugi, which went back to the 1930s, sent him as his personal envoy to President Rhee Syng-Man in May 1958. His trip was arranged in secrecy through Ryu's help. The binational relations thus showed signs of improvement, when Rhee was outsted by student rebellions.
Yatsugi's role as an intermediary was limited during the Ikeda Cabinet period (1960-1964), but under the premiership of Sato, who was Kishi's younger brother, he became active again. In 1969, when the Japan-Korea Cooperation Committee was formed with Kishi as its chairman, Yatsugi became the de facto leader of the Committee. The two and Korea's influentials often met in secrecy and settled major political disputes.
Yatsugi confidentially managed to reach a political solution to the problem of the continental shelf exploration complicated by territorial disputes between the two governments. In late July 1972 he met with Prime Minister Kim Jong-Pil and privately proposed the idea of developing the continental shelf jointly and putting aside territorial disputes. With Kim's agreement, he brought this back to Tokyo, and his solution formulae were later accepted by both governments in January 1974.
In the summer of 1973, when the Kim Dae-Jung incident occurred, Yatsugi also worked behind the scenes to reach a political solution. In October he visited Seoul at his own discretion and met with Prime Minister Kim and other influentials and then with President Park Chung-Hee. His personal proposal for a solution formula was to recall Kim Dong-Un, First Secretary of the Korean Embassy in Tokyo, who had left his finger prints at the site, and have him punished and then to have Prime Minister Kim visit Tokyo to apologize in order to restore an appropriate climate to convene the Japan-Korea Regular Ministerial Conference. Although the First Secretary's punishment was not carried out, his formula for political settlement was basically adopted by both sides in November 1973.
Yatsugi also twice attempted to operate as an informal contact-maker between Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. His efforts failed, due to either Pyongyang's internal conditions or Seoul's disagreement. This suggests the limitations of an informal contact-maker, who has to be accepted by both parties if he wishes to be effective.

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify empirically the political and diplomatic processes centering on nuclear submarines’ visits to Japan in 1964. When the Security Treaty with the United States was revised in 1960, Japan legally stipulated that bringing nuclear weapons into its territory should be a matter for prior consultation. However, during the negotiations to revise the treaty, it did not place explicitly on the agenda the issue of port calls by nuclear-armed ships.

On the other hand, the U.S. was rapidly advancing the development of nuclear weapons to be mounted on submarines. After the revision of the treaty, it successfully launched a Polaris missile from an underwater nuclear submarine, and proceeded with the development of Subrocs to be mounted on submarines. Under these circumstances, in June 1961 and January 1963, it requested Japan to accept visits by its nuclear submarines.

The development of nuclear weapons technology and the existence of public information on it are factors that are essentially outside of alliance politics. And the former was originally intended by the U.S. to maintain its superiority over the Soviet Union and increase its credibility in the eyes of the allies. The development of Polaris missiles and Subrocs, however, put the Japanese government in a difficult position in domestic politics. Opposition legislators were able to grasp the development status of new nuclear weapons from information released by the U.S. and to take up the issue in the Diet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus had to consider how to handle, under the prior consultation system, cases of visits by submarines equipped with Polaris missiles and Subrocs.

At the time MOFA, on the basis of pre-existing official documents and government statements that had been made in the Diet, offered legal and policy interpretations of such cases. However, there were various limitations in applying to sea-based nuclear weapons past policies that presupposed those that were land-based.

In the end, while the government could not officially allow visits by nuclear-armed ships to Japanese ports, it also fell into a situation where it could not come to an explicit agreement with the United States on how to handle such visits under the Security Treaty. In this way, the development of new nuclear weapons to increase America’s credibility in the eyes of its allies had rather the political consequence of creating, for Japan, an alliance management dilemma. In 1964, in the absence of any resolution of the dilemma, Japan made a highly political decision to allow nuclear submarines to visit its ports.

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This article explores the foreign policy of the Hayato Ikeda administration toward the “Free World” of the United States and its European allies. In July 1960 in the immediate aftermath of the controversy surrounding revision of the U. S. -Japan security treaty, the Ikeda cabinet found itself in the midst of domestic turmoil and felt the sense of losing credibility from the international liberal camp. Hence it was imperative for the cabinet to stabilize domestic politics and restore Western trust on balance.
The Ikeda cabinet sought to unify the nation in the economic sphere by adopting the Doubling National Income Plan. The plan relied on Western markets as exclusively export-oriented destinations for economic growth leading to European powers, such as Britain and France, to invoke the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) Article XXXV to discriminate against Japanese imports. Improvement of relations with Europe was thus imminent for the sake of economic growth.
This meant the Ikeda administration's effort to integrate Japan in the liberal camp via the deepening of its relations with the West. Subsequent diplomatic investment resulted in Japan's forging an “equal partnership” with Washington, gaining access to the meetings of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and European states' discontinuation of discriminatory measures. Hence Japan established itself to be part of the Free World.
One can consider the movement against the U. S. -Japan security treaty as an intensification of “domestic cold war” closely associated with the Japan's position in “international cold war.” Ikeda won the domestic cold war by way of economic growth, which required Japan to be part of the West during the international cold war. In other words, the success of the Ikeda administration in balancing its domestic economic agenda with international situations epitomizes the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy.

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Scholars have agreed that the Ikeda Administration carried out a forward-looking policy toward China in areas such as trade and in establishing private contact channels with China. Nevertheless, they put forth different arguments on whether this was a result of the administration pursuing a China policy independent from the U. S. According to some scholars, cooperation with the U. S. was so highly prioritized by Ikeda that he did not pursue any autonomous China policy. They argue that his forward-looking policy toward China was realized only because the Americans accepted it. On the other hand, others have emphasized that there were independent aspects such as the administration's attitude toward the so-called “two-China” question and the policy with respect to trade and contact with China. These scholars conclude that Ikeda pursued a China policy that was rather independent from the U. S.
However, both of these dichotomizing arguments are imperfect in explaining Ikeda's policy toward China. Certainly, he had the intention of expanding Japan's autonomy in the China policy. Nevertheless, at the same time, he did not neglect the cooperation with the U. S. The goal he pursued was not the autonomy nor cooperation with the U. S. Rather, it was essential for him to simultaneously maintain the balance between both goals. Therefore, it is necessary to put forth an argument on how he attempted to realize the balance between the autonomy and cooperation with the U. S. More specifically, the analysis should focus on discovering the inherent logic in his autonomous China policy and indicating how such a policy was pursued while avoiding the breakdown of the harmony with the U. S.
By analyzing every aspect of Ikeda's diplomacy toward China, this article concludes that there were two principles in his China policy. First, his policy acted in accordance with the identity of “a Free World Nation” that was defined by the administration itself. In particular, by utilizing the precedents of the positive approach of the West European nations as compared to that of Japan, it could pursue a China policy that was somewhat independent from the U. S., while at the same time appealing the legitimacy of the policy from the position of America's close ally. Second, although the administration elaborated the plan to extend full diplomatic recognition of China, the timing of the action was intended to be decided neither by Japan itself nor the U. S., but to correspond on its admittance to the U. N. By making full use of these two kinds of logic, the Ikeda Administration balanced its somewhat expanded autonomy and harmony with the U. S.

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In the early 1960s the new leaders of Japan and the United States, Hayato Ikeda and John F. Kennedy, managed US-Japan security relations under the previously signed 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. This paper attempts to examine the development of that relations.
Following the conclusion of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, US-USSR relations stabilized. Western European countries, especially France, increased their sphere of action due to the decreased threat from the USSR. In the Eastern bloc, the conflict between the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC) grew more serious. Simultaneous détente in some areas, and multipolarization in other regions rendered Cold War alliances unstable.
In Asia, the situation was quite different. The United States felt exposed to the menace of the PRC, and the United States government believed that the crises in Southeast Asia, especially in Vietnam, were being instigated by the PRC. In addition, the PRC was in the process of building an atomic bomb. In such a situation, JFK felt the need to strengthen the US-Japan alliance, and urged Japan to help defend Asia from communism, not only economically but militarily as well. The president stated that for Japan to increase its military budget and strengthen its Self Defense Force (SDF) was of paramout importance.
The Japanese government believed that the United States exaggerated the threat from the PRC. However, Ikeda did try to meet the US demands because he believed the United States and Japan should cooperate very closely in order to counter communist aggression in Southeast Asia.
In defining the new defense build-up plan, Ikeda decided to increase the SDF faster than earlier envisaged. Within the new plan the goal for Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) would be 170, 000 troops. However, some in Ikeda's cabinet opined that GSDF troops should be increased to 180, 000 or the United States would complain. In the end the Ikeda Administration decided to increase troops to 180, 000. In short, this new scheme was initiated to deal with the demands the US placed on Japan in terms of “burden sharing.”
The Japanese government contributed in other ways as well. Within the military sphere, the United States reduced its own military assistance and introduced a “cost-sharing” system. Under this system, the Japanese government was obliged to increase its defense expenditures to procure new weapons form the United States. Moreover, the Japanese government supported the United States economically, by increasing financial assistance to Southeast Asia to prevent communist expansion in the region.
The Cold War in East Asia affected the development of the US-Japan Security System during the Ikeda-Kennedy era. In contrast to the European alliance, the foundations of the system were not shaken. While the rest of the world was in the process of multipolarizing, the US-Japan Security relations, fortified itself.

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This article examines the diplomatic process of Japan's joining in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and illustrates that Japan's participating in the OECD should be regarded as its struggle for expanding its diplomatic space in the Free World, searching for both political and economic interests.
The OECD, which was reorganized from the Organization European Economic Corporation (OEEC) under the initiative of the United States in 1961, was a forum established with the purpose of coordinating economic, trade and foreign aid policy among its members. Almost all the developed countries in the so called the “Free Word” or the West, including the US, Western European nations and Canada joined the OECD as its original members, but Japan was not one of them. This caused Japan to hold serious concerns about its isolation from the Free World. Japan had already established bilateral relations between the US, through which Japan and the Free World were only linked together. In that situation, Japan had an aspiration for expanding its diplomatic space in the Free World beyond its relations to the US, by participating in the OECD. Moreover, Hayato Ikeda administration, which wanted Japan to be equal footing with the US and European countries, considered that the membership of the OECD was essential to keep its economic growth. Thus it can be said that Japans' aim of joining in the organization was to pursue both economic and political interests.
For the part of the US, Japan's participation in the OECD was regarded as its own interest, since it might enhance Japan's cooperation on economic assistance to the developing countries and strengthen its relation to the Free World stronger. Hence Japan was allowed its membership in the Development Assistance Group (DAG) of the OEEC in 1960. After OECD set on, the DAG was reorganized as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which was one of the main committees of the OECD. The biggest obstacle to Japan's joining in the main body of OECD was that European countries, which were the majority of the organization, opposed to it.
Japan made diplomatic efforts to gain the support from European countries with the assistance of the US. Prime Minister Ikeda's visit to the European countries including the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and so on paved the way for the membership of the OECD. Through the discussion with Ikeda, the heads of these countries agreed to Japan's joining in the OECD. In March 1963, the OECD ultimately accepted Japan's full membership.

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The US-Japan Security Treaty was originally intended to deal with the threats from the Soviet Union and the Communist China. The end of the Cold War, therefore, meant the disappearance of such threats, which in turn would have seriously questioned the basic rationale for its existence. Nevertheless, not only does the treaty (system) continue even after the Cold War ended but it seems even further reinforced as the ‘redefinition’ process beginning in November 1994 indicates. This article intends to explore some of the important historical changes occurring in the 1960s that were presumed to have contributed to the treaty (system)'s continuity and transformation.
The paper will particularly focus on the emergence of regionalism in Asia in the mid-1960s in the context of the Vietnam War during the Johnson administration and its impact on US-Japan relations involving the security treaty. It is argued that the bilateral security relations tied together by the treaty (system) was often strained by the US policy in the Vietnam War but the war also contributed to the creation of both domestic and external conditions in the Asia-Pacific region where the United States, under the policy of regionalism, made strenuous efforts to pressure Japan to play a larger role in promoting the economic development and political stability of the non-Communist Asian countries. Such role was what the Ikeda and Sato administrations and the Japanese people were prepared to accept as they tried to give concrete expression to their rising consciousness and desire for Japan to play a greater international role. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was particularly conscious that the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands would be impossible without meeting the US needs and expectations; that is, to support President Johnson's war efforts in Vietnam as well as to accept Japan's larger role in Asia. To that end, Sato and his supporters tried to overcome the Japanese domestic opposition to America's war in Vietnam and Japan's assumption of larger responsibilities associated with the American war efforts. The Johnson administration wanted the Sato government to recognize Japan's regional responsibilities as well as the relationship between Ryukyus settlement and its own and regional security. As the Sato government increasingly accepted such US definition of the role of the security treaty, the treaty's functions expanded to the extent that Japan supported and supplemented the US Cold War efforts on a regional scale. The mutually supplementary relationship in the security field was made possible as Washington, while recognizing the legal and political limitations in Japanese politics, defined Japan's role in Asia increasingly in economic and political rather than military terms. The newly inserted article II of the revised 1960 security treaty was an expression of the compromise between the two differring conceptions of security that eventually enabled Japan to make contributions to the “common defense” of the “free world.” This compromise also largely explains the continuing existence of the security treaty (system) after the Cold War was over.

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The ratification of the December 1965 Japan-South Korea Treaty established formal diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Seoul. In terms of diplomatic negotiation process, on the one hand, it did nothing more than confirm the relationship between Japan and the Korean Peninsula which was already in existence following the Korean War; on the orther hand, it also announced the birth of a new international system among three countries, Japan-US-South Korea. The conclusion of the Japan-South Korea treaty itself, was Japan's first diplomatic initiative since the end of war and the first act of Japan-US burden-sharing. However, it didn't deny the existence of another government in the Korean Peninsula i. e. North Korea nor did it put constraints on future relations with it. The Japanese leaders clearly limited the treaty's scope of application to the southern half of the Peninsula; subsequent relations with North Korea would be entrusted to the international situation in the future.
From that point of view, the 1972 U. S. detente with the Soviet Union and China, and the opening of the North-South Dialogue, brought a new perspective to Japan's relations with the Korean Peninsula. In fact, after Kissinger's July, 1971 China visit, in response to North Korea's invitation, Japanese-North Korean exchanges in the fields of sports, culture, and economy, rapidly developed. Furthermore, not only journalists, but also ruling and opposition Diet members began to visit to Pyongyang and hold discussions with Kim Il Sung. The Japanese government also clarified its policy on enlarging exchanges in nonpolitical fields. However, the North Korean side demanded establishing official diplomatic relations with Japan, which in essence, signified breaking relations with South Korea. In other words, North Korea would accept “coexistence with Japan” but would not permit “coexistence with South Korea.” With North Korea's announcement of suspending the North-South Dialogue, Japanese-North Korean relations took a turn to the worst.
However, with the start of the Roh Tae Woo administration, when South Korea announced abandoning its policy of isolation with North Korea, in July of 1988, an atmosphere of improved relations prevailed once again. Interestingly enough, this time, it was the Japanese side that demanded contact between the two governments. Also, both countries did not, nor do they, seek the establishment of diplomatic relations in the near future. The North Korea side fears setting the spark to the issue of cross-recongnition if it were to establish diplomatic relations with Japan. Nor does the Japanese side believe cross-recongnition is possible. In other words, Tokyo-Pyongyang relations cannot go beyond the level of Moscow-Seoul relations. It is possible however, that after “squaring up” issues from the “unfortunate past, ” “limited coexistence” short of diplomatic recongnition, would comprise no more than cooperative economic relations. The resilience of this relationship i. e. Japan and North Korea, will be tested by whether or not it will be able to withstand the Tokyo-Seoul-Pyongyang “game of diplomacy” with all its complexity.

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