This study examines the impacts of political direct mail on grassroots activism by investigating the fundraising drives of the Barry Goldwater campaign in the 1964 presidential election. Goldwater was the first conservative politician nominated by the Republican Party. With enthusiastic support from the right wing, especially anticommunist organizations such as the John Birch Society (JBS), the Goldwater campaign indicated that anti-liberalism could be a national political force in the United States. Throughout the 1964 election, Goldwaterites contacted millions of voters, built up the collective identity of conservatives, and suggested the GOP would be able to make gains in the West and the South. Despite the resounding defeat on Election Day, the Goldwater movement set down the groundwork for the rise of conservatism in the following decades.

Goldwater’s fundraising campaign also transformed a long-term pattern in political contribution. Direct mail was a new marketing technique of the advertising industry in the postwar era. Unlike mass media including newspaper, radio, and television, direct mail functioned as a personalized medium which distributed different message to individuals, instead of standardized information to the masses. By sending out millions of fundraising letters, Goldwater carved out political niches and constructed a huge database of conservative Americans during the election. Simultaneously, direct mail solicitation changed the amount of each contribution. Prior to the 1960s, both major parties had depended largely on big contributions by business interests and philanthropists. Yet direct mail made it possible to tap small funds such as one or five dollars, opening the door for small money politics. After the Goldwater campaign successfully received the mass of small contributions, Democrats and Republicans began to raise funds from ordinary voters.

This article explores the 1964 Goldwater movement, focusing on two right-wing groups. The JBS mobilized many middle-class Americans in suburban areas throughout the Sunbelt, and a cadre of New York conservatives, including conservative intellectual William F. Buckley Jr., National Review publisher William A. Rusher, and political consultant Marvin Liebman, carried out advertising campaigns on Goldwater’s behalf. Whereas the JBS encouraged the grassroots to join the movement through local chapters across the nation, the New York conservatives reached out to individuals with direct mailings. Contrasting the two types of activism, this study analyzes the interactions between the leadership and the grassroots, as well as controversies within the conservative movement in 1964.

The 1964 presidential election demonstrates that Goldwater’s direct mail added a new definition of grassroots activism in political campaigns. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the 1830s, associations and communities characterized American democracy. However, direct mail as the personalized medium directly connected the leadership to the grassroots without any censorship and regulation, and the information technology recast the grassroots from “activism based on face-to-face relationship” toward “accumulation of small involvements.” Thus, the Goldwater campaign not only galvanized the conservative movement but also influenced political participation in 1960s America.

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自然災害，犯罪，テロ行為や戦争などが発生したとき，ライブラリアンやアーキビストはプロフェッショナルとしてその対応に参加することを求められる。したがってそのような事態が発生しないよう各機関で防災計画を準備していることはもとより，そのような事態が発生したとき，自然，人為にかかわらず，被害を最小限に食い止めるため，危機管理，その対応に準備万端であることは必定である。本稿では，ニューヨーク市に所在するコロンビア大学のメインキャンパスを背景にコロンビア大学図書館(Columbia University Libraries)の防災・危機管理計画について考察する。

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This paper aims to evaluate the German Forty-Eighters in the United States in the global perspective, who came to America during the revolution of 1848 and in the later years of the 1850s. They were reformers and revolutionists who tried to build up their ideal societies in America which they failed to make in their original countries. The conventional studies on them were not positively done, because they were conceived as failures of the revolution and political exiles. However, I wish to shed new light on them, by exploring their transatlantic networks between Europe and America, and by analyzing their daily activities in each hub of the networks.

The Forty-Eighters were basically intellectuals comprising of students, professors, journalists as well as political activists in their home lands. They introduced the advanced philosophical theory on politics and society to America and gave a theoretical flamework to the American ideology of popular sovereignty, which resulted in rallying public opinion, especially concerning the anti-slavery movements in the 1850s. I wish to point out that they acted a critical role, at least as a catalyst in the realigning process of political parties from the Free Soil to the Republicans.

In inquiring Watertown, Wisconsin as a hub or a terminal of the networks, I will indicate that they built up the Turner club in this German town, and encouraged the radical Turner movements which were transplanted from Europe, by inspiring the residents which included Americans as well as Germans, through making space of public sphere. For example, they tried to publish the newspapers and pamphlets, to open rental libraries, and to speak before popular meetings.

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本稿の目的は，アメリカ連邦公職選挙における選挙-政党組織関係の変化を分析し，その特質を解明することにある。同国の連邦公職選挙では，１９５０年代に至るまで，集票が固定的人間関係に基づいて行われ，政党機関が選挙運動をコントロールした。１９６０代にテレビの利用がはじまると，党大会の運営と選挙戦略の立案においてメディア専門家が全国委員長に取って代わった。１９７０年代以降，世論調査，メディア広告，ダイレクトメールなどの選挙運動手段が発達し，選挙コンサルタントが登場すると，候補者は自身の選挙運動組織を形成し，政党組織は周辺に追いやられた。１９８０年代に豊かな資金を背景に全国政党機関が選挙運動の表舞台に復帰したものの，２０００年代になると，候補者はインターネットを用いて直接的な選挙民への到達を試みた。要するに，新しい選挙運動手段に対応する過程で，政党組織は選挙運動の重要な役割を喪失してきた。

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After Russo-Japanese War, relations between Japan and the United States had been strained due to such issues; naval armament, Japanese immigration exclusion, and the Open Door policy toward Manchuria. In particular, so-called Japanese immigration issue had the singularity, because it might had isolated Japan who had acknowledged herself to be a major power as European nations. In October 1906, the decision of San Francisco School Board to segregrate all Japanese, Chinese, and Korean children from other students to a special Oriental Pulic School had extended a serious diplomatic problem between two Nations, and given rise to the War Scare in the U. S. by yellow journalism.
At that time, by not any treaty but the Gentleman's Agreement, Japanese government self-restricted of issuing the passport to it's labors for the U. S. and concluded Root-Takahira Agreement in order to soothe this War Scare.
Otherwise, While President Theodore Roosevelt had solved Japanese immigration issue peacefully through enacting new Immigration Law in 1907 and negotiating with Japanese government, he had made use of this crisis to his policy of increasing naval power. For example, although world cruise of U. S. White Fleet was evidently the militalistic demonstration to Japan, the necessity of strong navy in the emergency was impressed certainly to the American citizen. The analysis by Japanese navy that the cruise would had reinforced the U. S. naval power came true. In December 1907, Roosevelt recomended to construct four battleships to the Congress, the Naval Appropriation Act of next year authorized his plan in part, and appropriated $900, 000 to establish a naval station at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Next administration of William H. Taft made progress of laying down dreadnaught or super-dreadnaught type battleships more vigorously than the former. As well, Kincho-Aigun railway project and the suggestion to neutralization of railways in Manchuria, in other words “Diplomatic Policy by Dollors” was the challenge to Japanese special interests.
In the Imperial Defence Policy of 1907, although it seems to be not imagined that Japanese immigration issue would caused to be the war against the United States, the U. S. was stood first in it's main enemies for Japanese navy, this viewpoint led to the grand military designs of establishing the ambitious 8:8 Naval Ratio. But, Japanese naval power was declined extreemly by the above completion of U. S. navy, Japanese navy regarded it's decline and U. S. expansion toward Manchuria as the crisis of it's national security and special interests. Thus, Japanese navy had aimed to reconstruct of itself, required Japanese cabinet to the appropriation for laying down battleships and naval installations.

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This paper aims to analyze the process of the standards controversy of the United States in the 1890's and to investigate the significance of the Gold Standard Act of 1900. The main phases of the standards controversy in the 1890's evolved as follows : (1) The free silver movement was based on American silver mining interests and the indebted small farmers. This movement was accelerated by the money contraction and the agricultural depression at the end of the 1880's. Under these conditions, the Harrison administration supported limited silver purchase and the Sherman Silver Purchase Act was enacted in 1890. (2) Due to the Baring crisis of 1890 in London, British investors unloaded American securities. As a result of this recall of foreign capital, gold flowed out of the United States and the American economy was thrown into confusion. President Cleaveland attributed this crisis to the silver law of 1890 and this law was repealed in 1893. Furthermore, during the financial crisis of 1895, Cleaveland negotiated a gold bond issue with the Morgan-Rothschild syndicate for the defence of the Treasury gold reserve. By London borrowings, J. P. Morgan rescued the U. S. Treasury from suspension. (3) President Cleaveland, however, was bitterly denounced by the silver men, and J. P. Morgan was criticized as a symbol of "money power" and "plutocracy". The silver question thus became the most important issue at the presidential campaign of 1896. This election resulted in victory for McKinley, whose administration took a cautious attitude to the silver question, and no action was taken on currency reform for a few years. (4) Although American foreign investment was promoted at the end of the 1890's, the United States was still an importer of European capital, mainly from Great Britain. J. P. Morgan was a representative promoter of American capital imports in Wall Street. And the "Gold" Democrats, who were true to such interests of Wall Street, demanded and at last forced the McKinley administration to enact the Gold Standard Act in 1900.

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