This article aims to clarify the effect of the US-Japan agreement in 1969, especially concerning the removal and reintroduction of nuclear weapons in Okinawa under the US-China rapprochement. The focus of previous studies was mainly on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa and how it affected reconciliation between the US and China. However, nuclear restoration in Okinawa and its significant effect on US-China relations have not been discussed. Revealing concealed historical facts, this paper explores a new document of the Minutes among Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in October 1971, focusing on the specific part regarding the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa, which was disclosed in 2014, far later than the other sections. Specifically, I shed new light on the “Okinawa Factors”—the reversion of Okinawa without nuclear weapons and the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa bases under the 1969 Japan-US agreement—analyzing US Operational Plan (OPLAN) and Chinese policy. In short, this thesis argues that maintaining the use of bases and nuclear weapons in Okinawa enables the US to approach China without changing its OPLAN. China did not interfere in the re-entry of nuclear weapons to Okinawa because they assumed the probability of nuclear war with the US was low, rather, they prioritized improving relations with the US.

Since China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb in 1964, the US raised threat perception associated with China as opposed to the peripheral threat of the USSR. In this context, the Okinawa base was regarded as one of the most important sorties and military supplies to attack China. Through the negotiation of the Okinawa Reversion in 1969, the US military kept operating the bases in Okinawa without prior consultation with Japan. The Nixon administration attempted to move closer to China in order to contain the USSR and honorably withdraw from the war in Vietnam. At the same time, the Chinese government shifted its strategy to be hostile towards the USSR and to approach the US. Kissinger visited China in July 1971, holding an OPLAN against China with regard to the use of bases and nuclear weapons in Okinawa. During the conference in October, Zhou pointed out the possibility of reintroducing nuclear weapons to the Okinawa bases. Kissinger acknowledged the possibility while emphasizing the non-nuclear status of Okinawa. Despite concerns for the US nuclear capacity, China became a bystander to observe the reintroduction of nuclear weapons based on the low likelihood of the US-led nuclear war against China as well as a willingness to enhance relations with the US. The Okinawa bases secured the US military capability against China without alarming China, and therefore, Okinawa can be viewed as a mediator in facilitating the US-China rapprochement.

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This essay reviews the renewed strategic debate, with a particular focusing on the issue of deterrence failure. If nuclear deterrence should fail, how will it fail and why? In other words, what are the obstacles to a successful deterrence strategy? It is theoretically impossible to prove or falsify the success of deterrence strategy as long as no aggressive action is taken by an adversary. Only when an aggressive action is taken do we know that the strategy is not working.
Based on the various case studies conducted by Alexander L. George, John D. Steinbruner, Robert Jervis, and Richard Ned Lebow, part one of this paper discusses why and how deterrence failed in the past. The historical cases include the 1914 European crisis, the US-Japanese crisis prior to Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the Middle East conflict in 1973. Special attention is paid to the perceptual and psychological factors in the challenger's decision-making process. The evidence suggests that a deterrence strategy may be ineffective, risky, or, at worst, counter-productive under certain conditions. To avoid the tragedy of deterrence failure in the nuclear era, it is essential to maintain crisis stability so that no party has an incentive to launch a pre-emptive attack. Furthermore, it is argued that a strategy of deterrence must be supplemented by crisis prevention measures.
The second part of this paper examines why some strategists believe that strategic stability is undermined. We trace the arguments of Fred Charles Iklé, Colin Gray, and others with critical eyes. We also compare the key logic of the strategies with concept of Mutual Assured Destruction and of Limited Nuclear Options.
The last part of this essay examines which strategic concepts are valid for stable deterrence, and which concepts are invalid. Finally, we discuss the possibility of reassuring an adversary through the creation of “security regimes, ” as suggested by as Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Alexander L. George.

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I. Uniqueness of the Postwar Peace. II. The Nomos of the earth-Geopolitics of MAD (i) Bipolar System (ii) Geostrategic Approach to MAD (iii) Informal Rules of Game and Norms of Behavior. III. The Nomos of the Outer Space (i) Sanctuarization of the Space (ii) Ambiguity of the Space Weapons (iii) Issues of ABM Treaty in the Legal Context of SDI.
This essay aims to examine the impact of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on the Nomos of the outer space through revealing the secret of durability of the postwar peace. In calling for a defense that would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete, ” President Reagan's goal of a perfect area defense stirred the interest of the public who have long sought a moral alternative to deterrence based on the mutual assured destruction (MAD). Yet MAD is not a strategy capable of being changed by political will or strategic considerations; it is rather “existential” condition, not unlike the condition of the market mechanism, resulted by the inevitable consequence of the super-powers having the assured capabilities of mutual destruction, closely connected with the asymmetric geopolitical positon.
This condition has created the mutual vulnerability of civilized urban centers, because of the strategic reality resulted from the development of the ICBM and the so-called “reconnaissance revolution.” The detonation of even as few as five or ten Soviet warheads on U. S. cities would cause unparalleld destruction. It might be called the law of “impossibility of area defense”. This unique combination of the bipolar system and the condition of the MAD has successfully drawed a clear distinction between a zone of sanctuarity (a zone of predictability on which mutual interest in common rules based on reciprocal sanction) and a zone of danger (a zone of unpredictabily) in the periphery of the world. They have no choice, in this condition, but to play the game of influence by means of “nuclear cheque” on the security of the nuclear arsenals.
Whereas we live in “neither war nor peace, ” we are afraid of a radical discontinuity by turning a zone of predictablity into a zone of danger. The concept of a zone of danger-currently highlighted by the issue of the SDI in outer space-also signals the arrival of an era of opportunity on the formation of the Nomos of the space.
Any consideration of a militarization of outer space should not neglect the distinction of two different directions: the sanctuarization of the space (turning into a zone of predictability) through the passive uses such as reconnaissance and communications, in sharp contrast with the militarization of the space by turning into a zone of danger through the development of the ABM and ASAT technology, despite of the ambiguity of space weapons.
In all probablity, super-power rivalry in strategic defense will lead to an increased Soviet-American arms race by the exchange of the offensive and defensive in a vicious circle. This is the reason why the development of SDI might be quite different from the Manhattan and the Apollo projects, which involves no less than unlocking nature's secrets; a struggle of man against nature. In contrast, the success of the stratigic defense depends on the reactions or the counter-measureas taken by the Soviet side, as the Fletcher panel project has suggested.
Moreover, the SDI poses a real threat to the Outer Space Treaty, not to mention to the ABM treaty which is most significant arms-control agreement of the postwar period. Both treaties should provide us the legal framework (the Nomos), as a fundamental constitution, of the outer space. Such “passive” military uses as the satellites for reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning, and communications are compatible with a doctrine of peaceful purposes and deterrence. Yet the ballistic missile defence (BMD)

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