Hundreds of books dealing with the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) have been published in Japan during the past years, but they have nearly all chronicled the military operations of her army by means of the gun and the bayonet, and have given very little information regarding the humanside, still less, the effects of the war on the rest of the world other than the contesting parties. Some time before the war, the Meiji government was divided; one party was for peace at any price, and the other was for vindicating national honour by appealing to arms, although even the war advocates were well aware that Japan was far below Russia in natural resources, military strength, and economic power; the national budget of Japan in the year preceding the war was only one-eighth of Russia's. Japan had, however, recognized the right of even the humblest to the opportunity of rising in the intellectual and social scale, whereas Russia was content to leave her people in besotted ignorance, without political rights and privileges, and also to leave her officers and soldiers in utter contempt of their Japanese counterparts so much that a high-ranking officer is said to have declared, “We need not the big gun; the musket will be enough to crush the yellow monkeys in a few weeks.”
The Japanese army was, in fact, far better trained than the Russian, in addition to the fact that the Japanese officers and men had had the international law and etiquette of the Red Cross Treaty inculcated in them since 1887 when General Oyama was War Minister.
Britain sent a large group of famous war correspondents and artists to the Japanese front, and their thrilling news, photographs, and sketches were collected into book form immediately after the war. Following their materials according to the progress of the war, I have tried to describe the human side, the national characteristics, and the consequent achievements and failures of both armies. In so doing, I have also tried to draw the attention of the reader to the global significance of the RussoJapanese war, which presents many cruel scenes, but provides the reader with a romantic interest reminiscent of a Homeric combat.

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On the 3rd of July 1908, Major Niyâzî, who was the vice commander of the 3rd Battalion, 88th Rejiment, 3rd Osmanli Army Corps, in Resne (now Yugoslavia) and who was also a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, rebeled against the Osmanli Government. He, along with approximately two hundred sympathizers consisting of armed Osmanli officers, soldiers and civilians, went into the mountain to plan their revolt. The purpose of their revolt was for the re-establishment of the Osmanli Constitution of 1876, which was guaranteed to all Osmanli subjects. This rebelion was the birth of the Young Turks Revolution. The Young Turks Revolution was started by Major Ahmet Niyâzî and his sympathizers themselves with no order of the Committee of Union and Progress.

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As nationalism was one of the most important aspects of Kemalism, the early Turkish Republic showed no interest in the areas and peoples beyond her border. Atatürk suppressed the activities of those advocating Pan Turkism and had them purged, but after his death, Ismet Inönü recognized their rights and the movement rose again.
During the final years of the First World War, Nuri Pasha, who was one of the younger brothers of Enver Pasha, and his uncle Halil Pasha advanced towards the Caucasus region with an army. After the war they stayed in Berlin. After returning to Turkey, Nuri established a weapon factory. Many people visited him because of the nostalgia they felt for his brother Enver Pasha. During the republican era, there were many generals and officers within the Turkish Armed Forces who admired Enver Pasha, and the relatives of generals monopolized the weapon industry.
Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet fought together with German colleagues during the First World War and retired as a major general in 1932. As for the reason for his retiring at such a young age, a famous story has it that it was because he gave the map of the fortified zone of Çanakkale to the Germans, but the real reason was his intimate relationship with the Freedom Party.
In 1925, Nuri and Erkilet secretly assembled with friends who had fought in Caucasus, in 1940 Erkilet, Halil and their families vacationed together, and after 1941 they often held meetings concerned with the Turkic peoples living in the Soviet Union.
It was thought that Erkilet was pro-German, though in his articles in the ‘Cumhuriyet’ newspaper he seemed to be neutral. However, after the start of the Nazi-Soviet War, he was active against not only the Soviet Union but also the Russians.
In September 1941 Nuri visited Berlin, and proposed to persons of authority in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Turkic peoples found their own states and organize the Muslim corps to support the German forces. Moreover, he stated that a Pan Turkist cabinet would be formed in Turkey and most of the officers would support it, and he mentioned the name of General Kazim Orbay, his brotherin-law who commanded the 3rd Army, as a person who would play an important role in the Pan Turkism movement.
Hitler personally invited the two retired generals Erkilet and Ali Ihsan Sabis to the eastern front, and so they applied for the necessary visas for leaving the country. However the Turkish government intervened and replaced Sabis with General Ali Fuat Erden. In this way, the Turkish government turned the personal invitation into an official one.
In 1944, after the advance of the Red Army towards Eastern Europe, the Turkish government arrested the Pan Turkists and began the trial so-called “Racism and Pan Turkism Trial.” They were convicted on the pretext of having cooperated with the Germans. However since Nuri and Erkilet were prominent persons under the patronage of the Turkish Armed Forces, they were neither arrested nor indicted even though they had close German ties.
General Erden, who was promoted to chief judge of the Supreme Court-Martial, dismissed the verdict of the “Racism and Pan-Turkism Trial.” As the reason for this dismissal, it was thought that he believed that it was not necessary for Turkey to demonstrate any sympathy for the Soviet Union. However, at the same time, there were conflicts between Inonu and the Turkish Armed Forces as is shown by the contraversy over Fevzi Çakmak's pension and Orbay's resignation. After the war, the explosion in Nuri's factory and his death gave rise to active discussions in the Turkish National Assembly. This also proves that there were many opponents to Inönu.

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This paper examines the relationship between President Gloria M. Arroyo and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in order to consider the connection between the military and politics. During the Arroyo administration, some officers of the AFP staged several coup attempts. However, those attempts all failed to topple the administration, and no coup occurred in its final two and half years. On the contrary, in a last phase of the administration, there was speculation that President Arroyo was conspiring to declare martial law to extend her grip on power in collusion with AFP’s high-ranking officers.
 Assuming that, despite the existence of discontent among officers, President Arroyo could win the support of generals and could build a relatively favorable relationship with the AFP, this paper examines what kind of and how the president build a relationship with the AFP. To examine these, this paper looks into the president’s manipulation of personnel affairs (appointments and promotions of AFP officers) and several factors which influenced her manipulation.
 This paper demonstrates that by appointing AFP officers who were personally close to her and who were loyal to her, President Arroyo strengthened relationship with the AFP. Additionally, it will be pointed out that this kind of relationship which is based on personal closeness and loyalty is a general characteristic of civil-military relations in the Philippines.

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