The thesis that the use of words for sensations is dependent on its situations provides us two crucial insights into Wittgenstein's philosophy ; one is explicable and the other critical.
It has long been a matter of controversy what his Private Language Argument really means. The argument has been understood wrongly as a proof of the impossibility of private language. But it should be interpreted as an attempt to establish the above thesis that without determinations of situations surrounding the uses of sensation-words one cannot tell whether those words are meaningful.
The same thesis also highlights a limitation of Wittgenstein's thought. He excludes speaker's neurophysiological situations from upon what his usage of sensation-words depends. This exclusion seems me untenable. It is possible and necessary to pursue determinations of the situations thoroughly into speaker's neurophysiological aspects. This move gives a way to naturalize his philosophy which is regarded as antinaturalistic.
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