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  • 小谷 賢
    国際安全保障
    2015年 42 巻 4 号 61-75
    発行日: 2015/03/31
    公開日: 2022/04/07
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 信田 智人
    国際安全保障
    2015年 43 巻 2 号 91-94
    発行日: 2015/09/30
    公開日: 2022/04/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―国難の今こそ横断的意思決定システム確立を―
    高橋 秀幸
    国際安全保障
    2011年 39 巻 3 号 14-27
    発行日: 2011/12/31
    公開日: 2022/04/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―我が国の制度の在り方に関する考察―
    小林 良樹
    国際安全保障
    2013年 41 巻 2 号 81-98
    発行日: 2013/09/30
    公開日: 2022/04/07
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中山 俊宏
    国際安全保障
    2011年 39 巻 3 号 141-144
    発行日: 2011/12/31
    公開日: 2022/04/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 1950年代の国際政治
    梶浦 篤
    国際政治
    1994年 1994 巻 105 号 112-126,L12
    発行日: 1994/01/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    With the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan at San Francisco in 1951, the Amami Islands as well as the Ryukyu, Ogasawara, and some other islands were to remain in the control of the United States and thus to be separated from Japan. However, as early as 1953, the United States returned the Amami Islands to Japan. That action has often been explained as a means to compensate for the United States' retention of the Ryukyu Islands. Beyond that, the United States' action regarding the Amami Islands was developed in relation to the Soviet Union's control of the Northern Territories. This article intends to add a new explanation for the return of the Amami Islands, taking into account the relationship between the Japanese southern and northern territorial problems.
    The Japanese desire for the return of the Amami, Ryukyu, and Ogasawara Islands was strong. The United States recognized that Japan's territorial frustration toward the United States could not be rectified until the United States returned all of those islands. The United States concluded that some consessions to Japan were necessary. But the United States also felt a serious concern about the potential confrontation with the communist powers in East Asia. With such considerations, the United States decided to return only the Amami Islands, while merely improving the administration of the Ryukyu Islands. The United States considered that that series of actions was the maximum possible concession at that time.
    There is another aspect that should be emphasized. The United States was irritated that the Japanese felt any antipathy toward the United States for controlling the southern islands. Similarly, the Japanese also felt antipathy toward the Soviet Union for its occupation of the northern islands. The United States was afraid that the Soviet Union might forestall it by returning some of those islands. In that case, the Japanese frustration would then concentrate on the United States role with the southern islands. That scenario was one of the main reasons why the United States separated the strategically unimportant Amami Islands in the peace treaty and quickly returned them to Japan two years later. The above strategy was possibly brought by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, especially by Hugh Borton, who was a specialist on Japan. It is highly probable that the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, knew the strategy.
    Ironically, even following the return of the Amami Islands, the Japanese frustration regarding the territorial problems turned toward the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands rather than to the Northern Territories. It was not before the total territorial settlement between the United States and Japan that the Northern Territories problem became the Japanese main interest among its territorial problems.
  • 神保 謙
    国際安全保障
    2010年 37 巻 4 号 122-125
    発行日: 2010/03/31
    公開日: 2022/04/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 湊 邦生
    アジア動向年報
    2012年 2012 巻 69-94
    発行日: 2012年
    公開日: 2023/02/10
    解説誌・一般情報誌 フリー HTML
  • 信田 智人
    国際安全保障
    2018年 46 巻 1 号 68-87
    発行日: 2018/06/30
    公開日: 2022/03/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 金子 紘和
    海幹校戦略研究
    2024年 13 巻 2 号 41-78
    発行日: 2024年
    公開日: 2024/05/17
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines the possible conclusion of international conference of LAWS(Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems) under the CCW(Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons) LAWS does not exist yet, and there are on definition about that, but the negotiation of ban and limitation to use LAWS conducts in international conference. It goes without saying that it is desirable that LAWS be regulated to some extent, considering the risk that could arise if it were to be operated without restriction. Conference of LAWS have achieved to some extent, with the adoption of 11 Guiding principles as guideline for domestic operating of LAWS, but there are some difference in that interpretation of that words between participating nations. Therefore, nations submitted of that commentaries, which clarified their claims to certain extent. This paper clarifies the difference of that interpretations of “human responsibility”,“meaningful human control” and“accountability”, which are considered to particularly important elements, and concludes which is the most appropriate outcome in the conference. And in order to reach a conclusion, in addition to the principle of like a distinction and proportionality that have been considered as the principles of the Law of armed conflict, and how to deal with issue of “ethics” will assume a key role.
  • 木宮 正史
    国際政治
    2014年 2014 巻 177 号 177_1-177_10
    発行日: 2014/10/30
    公開日: 2015/11/13
    ジャーナル フリー
    Changes of government parties had been regarded as unrealistic in the post-war Japan. As the party system has been transformed during the 1990s, however, changes of government parties have been realized. Moreover, the result of elections was partially due to the government’s diplomatic performance. That is why this topic has received much more attention. We extend the research scope by including not only changes of cabinets by the same government party but also regime changes such as breakdown of democracy or democratic transition. We often ascertain that changes of leaders in the same party sometimes brought much more different policies, but regime changes brought very little change on their policies.
    Regarding the impact of governmental performance on changes of governments, we must accumulate many case studies. “Failure” of diplomacy is sometimes regarded as fatal and promotes changes of governments, but ordinary governments usually never regard it as failure. How much weight is the evaluation of diplomatic performance considered in the voting behavior in elections? How much change do electoral results bring in terms of political arrangements? Domestic political process is important for explaining the impacts of international factors on changes of governments.
    Moreover, we must take the impact of governmental changes on the continuity of diplomacy into consideration. On the one hand, diplomacy might have to be consistent regardless of governmental changes because its national interest is relatively constant according to its international environment, and its reliable relation with other countries is so important lest the revolving policy changes should cause damage to its diplomacy. On the other hand, changes of foreign policy due to governmental changes should be taken for granted because diplomacy has to be under democratic control. What is problem is how to compromise the mutual different views of previous diplomatic achievements between countries.
    The role of political leaders is important in terms of diplomacy, but changes of leaders never always bring policy changes. Moreover, the role of such professional institutions as NSC is also important for diplomatic stability, but they cannot automatically guarantee diplomatic continuity. The institutionalization of decision-making process is also important, but performance of leaders are sometimes beyond institutional constraints. International constraints are regarded as decisive for guaranteeing diplomatic continuity. What is important is not whether such constraints exist or not, but how much constraint governments perceive. A government ordinarily cannot but obey the constraints, but it sometimes tries taking advantage for promoting policy changes. Nixon’s policy toward Vietnam and Brandt’s Ostpolitik are regarded as latter cases. International constraints are not always obstructive for policy changes, and the new government sometimes can change the perception toward constraints and take the chance for policy changes.
  • 1950年代の国際政治
    五十嵐 武士
    国際政治
    1994年 1994 巻 105 号 94-111,L11
    発行日: 1994/01/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The foreign policies of the Eisenhower administration represented American diplomacy at the height of the Cold War. From the perspctive of the post-cold war era, however, it is inappropriate to regard all of them as cold war policies, because some of them still have their own raison d'être, whereas others failed accompanied by the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Eisenhower diplomacy brought about such an ironic outcom that its cold war policies were rather straightforward toward the third world nations, where relations of communist movements with nationalist ones were ambiguous, while intervention into the Eastern European countries was cautiously avoided in spite of its provocative rhetoric of “roll back”. In order to investigate the reasons for this irony, it is necessary to distinguish various objectives or aspects of Eisenhower diplomacy and to identify their interrelationship. In this article, we break down such objectives and aspects as follows:
    (1) Leadership style and its interaction with domestic politics or political moods.
    (2) Eisenhower's public philosophy.
    (3) Type of policy formation and decision-making.
    (4) Strategies.
    (5) World system-oriented policies.
    The leadership style, such as the rethoric of anticommunist crusade, as Robert Dallek points out, greatly appealed to Americans of the 1950's, because they felt uneasy in the transitional period from individual ethics to organizational ones. Such strengthened popular anticommunism, in turn, constrained options of Eisenhower diplomacy. On the other hand, intentions to promote international economics as the world system did not work so strongly as to restrain the cold war policies in the cases of the third world countries. The type of the policy formation and decision-making was not so flexible, either, while it made the Eisenhower administration well-prepared for eventualities. As a result, cold war policies toward the third world nations were rather straightforward.
    The primary goal of the Eisenhower administration, as Robert Griffith persuasively analyzes, directly derived from Eisenhower's public philosophy was to keep American economy healthy to prevent the United States from becoming a garrison state. One of the main reasons the Eisenhower administration adopted a notorious “massive retaliation” strategy was to reduce the military budget. However, the Soviet success in developing thermonuclear weapons caused Dulles to think of the inevitability of mutual deterrence. Thus, concerns of Eisenhower and Dulles with the outbreak of the third world war, according to John Lewis Gaddis, led to their sincere search for a plan to place nuclear weapons under the superintendence of the United Nations. Nonetheless, why did the Eisenhower administration fail to stop the nuclear arms race? This is still an important topic to be investigated.
  • ―「協力的自主国防」をめぐる機会と制約―
    西野 純也
    国際安全保障
    2006年 33 巻 4 号 11-36
    発行日: 2006/03/31
    公開日: 2022/04/24
    ジャーナル フリー
  • William F. Martin
    電気学会誌
    1995年 115 巻 11 号 726
    発行日: 1995/10/20
    公開日: 2008/04/17
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岡本 雅弘, 西野 司, 田窪 渓太, 小林 一穂, 上村 圭右
    IATSS Review(国際交通安全学会誌)
    2025年 49 巻 3 号 323-330
    発行日: 2025/02/28
    公開日: 2025/02/28
    ジャーナル フリー

    防衛力整備計画においては、防衛力の抜本的強化に当たって重視する事業の一つとして無人アセット防衛能力を掲げており、自衛隊車両においても無人化に取り組んでいる。本稿では、防衛装備庁陸上装備研究所における自衛隊車両の無人化に向けた研究の概要について報告する。まず、車両の遠隔操縦技術として、試作した遠隔操縦が可能な装軌車両について述べ、次に車両の自律走行技術として、自衛隊特有の運用環境に対応したSLAM技術について述べる。

  • ――第2次安倍政権下の3つの懇談会――
    井形 彬
    国際安全保障
    2015年 42 巻 4 号 1-15
    発行日: 2015/03/31
    公開日: 2022/04/07
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 1950年代の国際政治
    高松 基之
    国際政治
    1994年 1994 巻 105 号 60-79,L9
    発行日: 1994/01/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper aims to elucidate how the Eisenhower Administration responded to the China Differential issue with an extensive use of recently declassified materials. In September 1952 the China Committee (CHINCOM) was established to coordinate the trade embargo against Communist China. From its beginning trade controls against Communist China had been considerably more comprehensive than those applied against the USSR and Eastern Europe. The gap between them substantially increased in August 1954 when the COCOM countries agreed to a major reduction in trade control against the USSR and Eastern Europe. This gap was called the “China Differential.”
    After the Geneva summit in July 1955, CHINCOM participating countries including Britain, France, and Japan started to ask the United States to either reduce the CHINCOM controls or eliminate the China Differential. Against their mounting pressures, the United States government managed to forestall a showdown with other participating countries of CHINCOM by postponing the Consultative Group meeting. However, President Eisenhower did not display his strong leadership in solving the China Differential issue and instead he left the handling of that issue in the hands of bureacrats. Because of both Ike's lack of presidential leadership and conflicting views among concerned agencies of the U. S. government, the Economic Defense Advisory Committee(EDAC), a sub-organization of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, often faced serious difficulties in reaching a bureaucratic consensus over the issue of reducing the China differential in the process of reviewing both the economic defense policy and the U. S. negotiating position. Bureacrats were reluctant to make extensive concessions to the CHINCOM participating countries' demands of reducing the diffrential. The bureaucratic reviewings always resulted in only minor concessions. Such reluctant postures of the United States government increased frustations among CHINCOM participating countries. When the mulitlateral negotiation began at the Paris meeting of CHINCOM in May 1957, the U. S. government found herself to be isolated. What the Eisenhower Administration finally obtained after their two-year struggle to maintain the multilateral trade embargo control against Communist China was the United Kingdom's decision to eliminate the China Differential on 27 May.
  • 有馬 洪
    ファルマシア
    1970年 6 巻 7 号 451-
    発行日: 1970/07/15
    公開日: 2018/08/26
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―平和安全法制の効用と今後の課題―
    德地 秀士
    国際安全保障
    2019年 47 巻 2 号 20-38
    発行日: 2019/09/30
    公開日: 2022/03/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 伊藤 剛
    国際安全保障
    2010年 38 巻 1 号 100-103
    発行日: 2010/06/30
    公開日: 2022/04/14
    ジャーナル フリー
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