With the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan at San Francisco in 1951, the Amami Islands as well as the Ryukyu, Ogasawara, and some other islands were to remain in the control of the United States and thus to be separated from Japan. However, as early as 1953, the United States returned the Amami Islands to Japan. That action has often been explained as a means to compensate for the United States' retention of the Ryukyu Islands. Beyond that, the United States' action regarding the Amami Islands was developed in relation to the Soviet Union's control of the Northern Territories. This article intends to add a new explanation for the return of the Amami Islands, taking into account the relationship between the Japanese southern and northern territorial problems.
The Japanese desire for the return of the Amami, Ryukyu, and Ogasawara Islands was strong. The United States recognized that Japan's territorial frustration toward the United States could not be rectified until the United States returned all of those islands. The United States concluded that some consessions to Japan were necessary. But the United States also felt a serious concern about the potential confrontation with the communist powers in East Asia. With such considerations, the United States decided to return only the Amami Islands, while merely improving the administration of the Ryukyu Islands. The United States considered that that series of actions was the maximum possible concession at that time.
There is another aspect that should be emphasized. The United States was irritated that the Japanese felt any antipathy toward the United States for controlling the southern islands. Similarly, the Japanese also felt antipathy toward the Soviet Union for its occupation of the northern islands. The United States was afraid that the Soviet Union might forestall it by returning some of those islands. In that case, the Japanese frustration would then concentrate on the United States role with the southern islands. That scenario was one of the main reasons why the United States separated the strategically unimportant Amami Islands in the peace treaty and quickly returned them to Japan two years later. The above strategy was possibly brought by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, especially by Hugh Borton, who was a specialist on Japan. It is highly probable that the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, knew the strategy.
Ironically, even following the return of the Amami Islands, the Japanese frustration regarding the territorial problems turned toward the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands rather than to the Northern Territories. It was not before the total territorial settlement between the United States and Japan that the Northern Territories problem became the Japanese main interest among its territorial problems.

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The foreign policies of the Eisenhower administration represented American diplomacy at the height of the Cold War. From the perspctive of the post-cold war era, however, it is inappropriate to regard all of them as cold war policies, because some of them still have their own raison d'être, whereas others failed accompanied by the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Eisenhower diplomacy brought about such an ironic outcom that its cold war policies were rather straightforward toward the third world nations, where relations of communist movements with nationalist ones were ambiguous, while intervention into the Eastern European countries was cautiously avoided in spite of its provocative rhetoric of “roll back”. In order to investigate the reasons for this irony, it is necessary to distinguish various objectives or aspects of Eisenhower diplomacy and to identify their interrelationship. In this article, we break down such objectives and aspects as follows:
(1) Leadership style and its interaction with domestic politics or political moods.
(2) Eisenhower's public philosophy.
(3) Type of policy formation and decision-making.
(4) Strategies.
(5) World system-oriented policies.
The leadership style, such as the rethoric of anticommunist crusade, as Robert Dallek points out, greatly appealed to Americans of the 1950's, because they felt uneasy in the transitional period from individual ethics to organizational ones. Such strengthened popular anticommunism, in turn, constrained options of Eisenhower diplomacy. On the other hand, intentions to promote international economics as the world system did not work so strongly as to restrain the cold war policies in the cases of the third world countries. The type of the policy formation and decision-making was not so flexible, either, while it made the Eisenhower administration well-prepared for eventualities. As a result, cold war policies toward the third world nations were rather straightforward.
The primary goal of the Eisenhower administration, as Robert Griffith persuasively analyzes, directly derived from Eisenhower's public philosophy was to keep American economy healthy to prevent the United States from becoming a garrison state. One of the main reasons the Eisenhower administration adopted a notorious “massive retaliation” strategy was to reduce the military budget. However, the Soviet success in developing thermonuclear weapons caused Dulles to think of the inevitability of mutual deterrence. Thus, concerns of Eisenhower and Dulles with the outbreak of the third world war, according to John Lewis Gaddis, led to their sincere search for a plan to place nuclear weapons under the superintendence of the United Nations. Nonetheless, why did the Eisenhower administration fail to stop the nuclear arms race? This is still an important topic to be investigated.

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This paper aims to elucidate how the Eisenhower Administration responded to the China Differential issue with an extensive use of recently declassified materials. In September 1952 the China Committee (CHINCOM) was established to coordinate the trade embargo against Communist China. From its beginning trade controls against Communist China had been considerably more comprehensive than those applied against the USSR and Eastern Europe. The gap between them substantially increased in August 1954 when the COCOM countries agreed to a major reduction in trade control against the USSR and Eastern Europe. This gap was called the “China Differential.”
After the Geneva summit in July 1955, CHINCOM participating countries including Britain, France, and Japan started to ask the United States to either reduce the CHINCOM controls or eliminate the China Differential. Against their mounting pressures, the United States government managed to forestall a showdown with other participating countries of CHINCOM by postponing the Consultative Group meeting. However, President Eisenhower did not display his strong leadership in solving the China Differential issue and instead he left the handling of that issue in the hands of bureacrats. Because of both Ike's lack of presidential leadership and conflicting views among concerned agencies of the U. S. government, the Economic Defense Advisory Committee(EDAC), a sub-organization of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, often faced serious difficulties in reaching a bureaucratic consensus over the issue of reducing the China differential in the process of reviewing both the economic defense policy and the U. S. negotiating position. Bureacrats were reluctant to make extensive concessions to the CHINCOM participating countries' demands of reducing the diffrential. The bureaucratic reviewings always resulted in only minor concessions. Such reluctant postures of the United States government increased frustations among CHINCOM participating countries. When the mulitlateral negotiation began at the Paris meeting of CHINCOM in May 1957, the U. S. government found herself to be isolated. What the Eisenhower Administration finally obtained after their two-year struggle to maintain the multilateral trade embargo control against Communist China was the United Kingdom's decision to eliminate the China Differential on 27 May.

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American policy toward Korea, as followed by the administrations of Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, was shaped in the face of a continuous dilemma caused by the two distinct evaluations of the situation in the Korean Peninsular. One of these was a strategic evaluation of the necessity for a reduction or elimination of the US military commitment to South Korea based on the belief that Korea was not strategically important in terms of the overall struggle with the USSR, and the other was a political evaluation of the need to avoid the adverse political ramifications in the Far East and the rest of the world should Korea fall to the communist bloc following an American withdrawal.
Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman administration entered the war as part of the UN forces under the terms of the UN's collective security system. This decision was a reflection not only of a political necessity to prevent the Korean Peninsular from falling to the communists but also of the American Government's desire to avoid an independent US military commitment in Korea. In addition, the subsequent decision of the Eisenhower administration to conclude a mutual defence treaty with South Korea, which resulted in an expansion of the US military commitment in Korea, was designed to achieve the participation and cooperation of the administration of Syngman Rhee in the armistice negotiations, a process the South Koreans had been opposing.
Meanwhile, Japan assumed a position of crucial importance in US Far Eastern policy as a bulwark against futher communist expansion. America sought Korean neutrality as this would make it possible to reduce or terminate its military commitment in the peninsular. However, at the same time, by negotiating the Japan-US Security Treaty, America aimed not only to guarantee Japan's place in the anticommunist world but also to open up the possibility of Japanese rearmament and hopefully to obtain Japanese contribution to the defense of freedom in the Pacific region.
However, the Japanese government refused American requests to build up its military potential because of factors such as its economic fragility and the contemporary domestic political situation. Ultimately America was left with no choice but to adopt a policy of emphasizing political and economic stability in Japan instead. Meanwhile, the political conference with Communist China and North Korea broke down and the plan for a neutral Korea collapsed, with the result that the division of Korea into North and South remained unchanged. As a consequence, the US started to consider, instead of Japan, South Korea, which was developing into a military power, as a potential contributor to the security in the Far East.
As a result, it could be argued that South Korea has taken on Japan's security obligations, while Japan now tends to consider South Korea essential in terms of its own security. At the same time, relations between Japan and S. Korea have become susceptible to any change in the US military strength in the Far East.

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