詳細検索結果
以下の条件での結果を表示する: 検索条件を変更
クエリ検索: "奥村勝蔵"
13件中 1-13の結果を表示しています
  • 高分子
    1976年 25 巻 1 号 58-58,18
    発行日: 1976/01/01
    公開日: 2011/09/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 桜田 一郎
    高分子
    1982年 31 巻 1 号 72-75
    発行日: 1982/01/01
    公開日: 2011/10/11
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 国際政治研究の先端3
    井口 武夫
    国際政治
    2006年 2006 巻 144 号 85-98,L13
    発行日: 2006/02/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    60 years after the Pacific War, Japanese Foreign Ministry published on October 14 2004 relevant documents related to Japan's Final Memorandum delivered to the U. S. Government at the outbreak of the War. The documents were found in the files of diplomatic archives by the author in 1999. They reveal that the Ministry was supposed to submit to the U. S. Government the Final Memorandum which was originally worded to express an intention to enter into war. This formula was not accepted and the Memorandum was changed to simply inform Japan's intention to terminate the Japan-U. S. negotiations. When Final Memorandum which was divided in fourteen parts was cabled to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, the 14th cable embodying the concluding paragraph was withheld for 15 hours while its phrase underwent subtle wording change. A withholding of cabling the final phrase as well as additional corrigenda for 15 hours caused a fatal delay in transmitting the Memo to the State Department at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time), just before Pearl Harbor attack.
    There had been no serious in-depth investigation by the Japanese Government to pursue the reason for suspending the telegram of the 14th part of the Memo at the Tokyo side, and in its stead, a wrong search focused on a confused cable-handling and typing of the Final Memorandum by the Japanese Embassy. The delayed dispatch of final part of the Memo could be traced to an obstruction made at Tokyo Central Telegraph Office on the same day in connection with a clandestine army operation carried on by Major Tomura of Communication Section of Japanese Army's General Command when they withheld for ten hours the American President's message to the Emperor. During the seizure of Roosevelt's message, it is conclusively analyzed that a secret decoding was done by the Army before its delivery to the U. S. Embassy at 10: p. m. on December 7 (Japanese time). Major Tomura admitted later that he feared the Emperor might be induced to accommodate the President's appeal to delay the war. This Paper examines that the Foreign Ministry must have been informed of the decoding, and therefore, it had to adjust the wording of the last paragraph of the Final Memo to respond to the final position of the U. S. Government. Also a cover-up of delayed dispatch of correcting cables to Washington was made to block reinvestigation up till now.
    Author observes that President's Message intended to delay war with Japan since he preferred to fight with Hitler first. Roosevelt opted for a last-minute attempt to send his Message directly to the Emperor to avoid war, as suggested by the Japanese Embassy.
  • ――ソ連による日米安保の「受容」――
    岡田 美保
    国際政治
    2020年 2020 巻 200 号 200_84-200_100
    発行日: 2020/03/31
    公開日: 2020/04/16
    ジャーナル フリー

    In the pre-negotiation stage, the most difficult obstacle to start the Japan-Soviet normalization negotiation turned out to be the issue of the Japan-US Security Treaty. While Japan regarded it as the most fundamental framework to realize its security, the Soviet Union did not change its position that the Treaty was an obstacle to start Japan-Soviet negotiations. This article investigates what kinds of discussions were held within the political leadership of the Soviet Union on the positioning of the Japan-US Security Treaty in the process of normalization with Japan. An analysis of declassified Soviet archival documents reveals the following five points. First, the Korean War changed the Soviet Union’s perception of the threat posed by the US forces stationed in Japan, and the role of the Kuril Islands in their defense policy changed accordingly. Second, as for the issue of peace with Japan, the division in the Soviet Union’s political leadership after Stalin’s death was most evident in the question of whether or not to accept the Japan-US Security Treaty. Third, the Soviet Union entered into negotiations with differences in opinion on this point. Fourth, after the start of negotiations, the political leadership of the Soviet Union, headed by Khrushchev, overturned Foreign Minister Molotov’s negotiating stance of not accepting the Japan-US Security Treaty, and made a decision to “accept” it under certain conditions. Fifth, the Soviets’ proposal on transferring Habomais and Shikotan islands to Japan was closely related with their decision to “accept” the Japan-US Security Treaty.

  • 吉田路線の再検証
    井上 正也
    国際政治
    2008年 2008 巻 151 号 36-53,L7
    発行日: 2008/03/15
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    On December 27, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru sent John F. Dulles a letter that explained “Counter infiltration” against China. Yoshida thought the best way to wean Chinese from the Communist regime was by sending people into China through trade activities and encouraging an anticommunist movement in China. He believed that Japan could have a major role in such an operation. The purpose of this paper is to examine Yoshida's “Counter infiltration” plan against China from the standpoint of intelligence. Yoshida, taking a special interest in intelligence, established intelligence organs such as the Public Security Intelligence Agency and the Cabinet Research Chamber (CRC) in quick succession soon after the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect in April 1952. Worried about indirect aggression from communist countries, Yoshida concentrated his efforts on developing an interior intelligence framework. At the same time, he tried to foster the growth of a Japanese intelligence organization that could gather information and perform covert operations it Mainland China.
    This study shows that Yoshida proactively tried to strengthen intelligence cooperation with governments of both Taiwan and the United States. Yoshida appointed Ogata Taketora Chief Cabinet Secretary and made him supervisor of Japanese intelligence organs. Ogata urged the Nationalist government on Taiwan to cooperate in establishing a Communist information exchange organ, and asked the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for assistance in creating a Japanese CIA. On the other hand, Yoshida let retired lieutenant General Tatsumi Eiichi recruit ex-military personnel for service in the CRC. With the assistance of Tatsumi, the CRC started actual intelligence activity against China after January 1953. The CRC interrogated repatriates from China, and proposed a joint operation with the CIA to use Japanese agents. Thus Yoshida tried to establish a Japanese intelligence system and backed U. S. strategy against China in the intelligence field.
    Yoshida's idea, however, was frustrated by rapid changes at home and abroad. After the Peace Treaty came into force, Yoshida couldn't maintain a firm hold on power. Not only the opposition parties but also the media criticized Ogata's plan to launch a Japanese CIA. In the end, Ogata had no choice but to downscale his ambitious plans, and eliminate overseas covert operations. Moreover, Yoshida's confrontational approach against the Chinese government was criticized for being behind the times after the Indochina armistice in 1954. In the last days of his ministry, Yoshida encouraged both Britain and U. S. to set up a “high command” on China in Singapore. His aim was to use overseas Chinese based in Southeast Asia to infiltrate Mainland China, but his idea wasn't put into practice because he was unable to gain the support of either Britain and the United States or even his own entourage.
  • 日本外交の思想
    塩崎 弘明
    国際政治
    1982年 1982 巻 71 号 141-159,L12
    発行日: 1982/08/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article aims to reappraise the official diplomatic historiography on Japanese-American negotiations from April to December 1941. The foreign minister, MATSUOKA who was alienated from SHIRATORI, kept in mind a grand strategic design that would be a peace resolution between Germany and Britain through the intermediary of Japan and the United States. MATSUOKA was sure that it was difficult to negotiate equally with the United States unless Japan was powerful.
    At first, KONOYE, MUTO and the “Reformist” group approved MATSUOKA's world-policy, the Tokyo-Berlin-Rome-Moscow entente. KONOYE's New Order group made efforts to end the Sino-Japanese War and may have had in mind the completion of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, keeping the United States out of the war.
    But on the coming of the peace negotiations between Japan and the United States, each of the many factions in the Foreign Office and the Military Section of the Government reacted differently to Drought's peace proposal-a proposal was later strategically adopted by F. D. Roosevelt through F. Walker.
    Except for the MATSUOKA and SHIRATORI group, the moderate “Reformists” in the Foreign Office, e. g. the ARITA group, had aimed at a resolution of the Sino-Japanese War, being short of going to war with the United States.
    It seems possible a peace-bargain could have been made between Japan and the United States before the Russo-German War.
    Japanese-American negotiations were dominant in “backdoor diplomacy” because of a strategic bargain. Thus the full story of the outbreak of the Pacific War can not be really described without the framework of the official negotiations from “Draft Understanding” to “Hull Note.”
  • 金 恩貞
    アジア研究
    2016年 62 巻 1 号 9-23
    発行日: 2016/01/31
    公開日: 2016/02/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper presents an historical analysis of the policy formation process within the Japanese government regarding the issues of claims between Japan and South Korea (below, “Korea”) for the period from February 1951, the start of the first round of Japan-Korea talks, to October 1953, when the talks were suspended. This paper aims at providing an overview of the Japan-Korea talks from a novel perspective via elucidation of the situation within the Japanese government during the early 1950s—a period mostly blank in previous research. The process of forming concrete policies for relations with Korea during this period in Japan was clarified as described below.
    The paper first presents its overview findings, while referencing previous research, of the Japanese government’s negotiation strategies regarding the Japan-Korea claims issue before the Japan-Korea talks officially began, specifically in regards to how these initial strategies impacted the first round of talks. It was during this period when differences in attitudes towards the claims issue surfaced between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, and considerations are presented regarding the background for such.
    Described next is the formation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the “mutual abandonment of claims ‘plus alpha’” concept around the time that the negotiations became locked and had their first suspension. This included the concept of justifying Japan’s claims on Korea, with both sides then together abandoning their claims, and Japan agreeing to make monetary payments to Korea while avoiding the nomenclature of “claims.” Examination is made of how the processes of discussions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs converged on this idea, with focus on the interactions of the logic of the Asian Affairs Bureau, which viewed foreign relations with Korea as important, international circumstances at that time, and commitments Japan had to the United States.
    Finally, in the midst of opposition between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance regarding policy proposals for the Japan-Korea claims issue, clarification is made as to what kind of arguments were presented that led to the Japanese government’s adoption of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ plan as the official policy for negotiating with Korea. The flexible attitude toward Korea by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to its emphasis on international relations was taken up as part of the Japanese government’s initial Korean strategy, and made possible a conceptual framework for government policy proposals that were more suited for mutual agreement. Also, in tandem with the changing international circumstances on the Korean peninsula, Japan could not avoid improving its relations with Korea, and this served to soften the hardline policy stance that the Ministry of Finance had adopted towards Korea.
    When one considers the progression of the debates within the Japanese government, most worthy of notice is that Japan did not abandon its original perceptions towards Korea, but rather conceived a solution that had as its premise exclusion of the term “claims” (literally, “the right to make claims”). It is of deep interest that this concept was similar to that inclusive within the solution of the claims issue in 1965 with the adoption of the “economic cooperation” policy in the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.
  • 日本外交の非正式チャンネル
    吉川 洋子
    国際政治
    1983年 1983 巻 75 号 130-149,L13
    発行日: 1983/10/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Japanese-Philippine negotiations on war reparations lasted from 1951 through 1956, often interrupted by disagreements on the terms of payment. Significantly, the diplomatic deadlocks were often broken by informal channels of communications and secret talks. A host of political and business leaders who had varying degrees of interests in each other's country participated.
    A most important breakthrough in deadlocked talks was made in New York and Washington in November 1954 by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Senator Jose P. Laurel, whose secret meetings were arranged by the Premier's confidants on Philippine affairs, Nagano Mamoru and Shiohara Tamotsu. Nagano, a leading steel industrialist, had business interests in the Philippine iron mines and other resources, and had his own proposal on a variety of development projects to be financed by reparation funds. Shiohara, Executive Director of the Philippine Society of Japan, had been a personal friend of Senator Laurel since the Japanese occupation period when Laurel was President of the Republic and Shiohara served his government as an advisor on internal affairs.
    Nagano played several other roles during the whole process, including one as a member of the Japanese delegation for reparations talks. So did many other leaders such as former Ambassador Murata Shozo, Minister Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, and businessmen like Furukawa Yoshizo who had lived in the Philippines before the war and claimed to be experts about the country.
    Another diplomatic breakthrough was achieved in May 1955 by Ferino Neri, chief Philippine reparations negotiator, who ran a series of secret meetings in Tokyo with political and business influentials regarding the terms of payment. He finally obtained Prime Minister Hatoyama's confidential endorsement of his proposed terms. This success was made with the skillful help of Hatoyama's Deputy Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto Takizo, who apparently had many Philippine acquaintances primarily through the Free Masonry whose members pointedly included Hatoyama, Senator Camilo Osias, and most probably Senator Laurel.
    The long negotiations demonstrated the significant roles played by informal contact-makers on both sides. Many of them were those with official capacity seeking secret contacts, but some without official capacity also volunteered secretly to help the talks. Both Japanese and Philippine political cultures weigh personal ties, particularly, ties based on clientelism, in political dealings. The interaction of the two cultures over such difficult negotiations multiplied the effectiveness of informal contact-makers.
  • 日中民間交渉における「三団体方式」を中心として
    大澤 武司
    アジア研究
    2003年 49 巻 3 号 54-70
    発行日: 2003年
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 香内 三郎
    新聞学評論
    1991年 40 巻 167-192
    発行日: 1991/04/30
    公開日: 2017/10/06
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 新見 幸彦, 浜井 和史, 熱田 見子, 濵田 耕平
    外交史料館報
    2022年 35 巻 143-167
    発行日: 2022年
    公開日: 2022/06/17
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 服部 龍二
    外交史料館報
    2019年 32 巻 39-75
    発行日: 2019年
    公開日: 2021/10/25
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 勝田 渡
    日本世論調査協会報「よろん」
    1980年 46 巻 1-130
    発行日: 1980/09/10
    公開日: 2017/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー
feedback
Top